Randall v. State

• Decision Date: 14 April 1933
• Docket Number: 9529.
• Citation: 169 S.E. 103,176 Ga. 897
• Parties: RANDALL v. STATE.
• Court: Georgia Supreme Court

169 S.E. 103

176 Ga. 897

RANDALL v. STATE.

No. 9529.

Supreme Court of Georgia

April 14, 1933

Syllabus by the Court.

In murder prosecution, testimony that almost immediately after homicide accused came to house he occupied jointly with another and began shooting and shot at other occupant of house held competent.

Testimony might be considered as part of res gestæ, but, if not part of res gestæ, was admissible to show the animus of accused, and in view of evidence that, when accused was arrested later in the night by the sheriff, he was drunk and utterly indifferent to the effects of the deed he had committed, and was in a reckless mood and laughing so as to attract the attention of the officer arresting him, the testimony, if not admissible for any other purpose, was admissible to corroborate sheriff's testimony that accused was drinking.

In murder prosecution, inaccuracy in court's charge stating contentions of accused as to deceased's attack upon him with substantial correctness held not reversible error.

On murder prosecution, where evidence did not raise issue of voluntary manslaughter, failure to charge thereon, absent written request, held not error, notwithstanding accused's statement introduced issue of voluntary manslaughter.

In murder prosecution, charge that provocation by words threats, menaces, or contemptuous gestures does not justify killing held not erroneous as denying defense of reasonable fears, when considered with connected charge that threats accompanied by menaces, though menaces do not constitute actual assault, may arouse reasonable fears.

1. It was competent for the state to prove that almost immediately within half an hour or an hour after the time the accused shot and killed the deceased, he came to the house which he occupied jointly with another person and began shooting and shot at the other occupant of the house.

2. The court's charge stating the contentions of the defendant was substantially correct, and, if somewhat inaccurate, the inaccuracy was not of such a character as to constitute reversible error.

3. Under the evidence, the element of voluntary manslaughter was not involved, and the court did not err in failing to charge upon that subject; for if, under the statement of the defendant, the homicide may have been reduced to voluntary manslaughter, there was no written request to charge on that subject.

4. When the excerpt from the charge excepted to in the fifth ground of the motion for a new trial is considered in connection with other portions of the charge, the criticisms of it are without merit.

Error from Superior Court, Randolph County; C. W. Worrill, Judge.

Pat Randall was convicted of murder, and he brings error.

Affirmed.

RUSSELL C.J., and ATKINSON, J., dissenting in part.

L. B. West and Geo. H. Perry, both of Cuthbert, and Olin Hammock, of Shellman, for plaintiff in error.

R. A. Patterson, Sol. Gen., of Cuthbert, Hooper & Hooper, of Atlanta, M. J. Yeomans, Atty. Gen., and B. D. Murphy and Jno. T. Goree, Asst. Attys. Gen., for the State.

BECK Presiding Justice.

Pat Randall was indicted and tried for the murder of Uriah Harrell. The jury returned a verdict of guilty, without a recommendation. The defendant made a motion for a new trial, which was overruled, and he excepted.

1. One White, a witness sworn for the state, was permitted to testify, over objection of the defendant: "I saw Pat Randall after it was said he had shot and killed Uriah Harrell. He came to my house and shot at me. He came up on the porch first, and said he wanted to talk to me. My wife did not want me to go out. Pat Randall knocked the latch off my door and came in. He had a gun. I was sitting by the fireplace. He shot the gun in my house, and the shot from the gun went in my mattress. I came out in the hall, and my wife left. Pat Randall shot once in the house and once on the outside of the house." This testimony was objected to on the ground that it was "irrelevant and prejudicial, and related to a transaction occurring after the shooting of Uriah Harrell, and threw no light on the case on trial." The court overruled the objection. This ruling was not error. The incident testified to by White occurred very soon after the homicide, perhaps in less than an hour. It may have been an hour and a half. The defendant, it is inferable from the testimony, went immediately from the scene of the fatal shooting to the house where he and White lived. His conduct showed utter recklessness; and the evidence objected to may well be considered as part of the res gestæ; but, if it was not a part of the res gestæ, it was admissible to show the animus of White. See Lampkin v. State, 145 Ga. 40, 88 S.E. 563. There was testimony to show that, when the defendant was arrested later in the night by the sheriff, he was drunk; that he was utterly indifferent to the effects of the deed he had committed; he was in a reckless mood; he was laughing so as to attract the attention of the officer arresting him. And the testimony of White, objected to, if not admissible for any other purpose, would be admissible to corroborate the sheriff's testimony that the accused was drinking, and, of course, evidence of the fact that he was drinking or drunk would be material and admissible evidence. This ruling also disposes of the exception contained in another ground of the motion, founded upon the objection to the testimony of the wife of White.

2. A part of the court's charge to the jury was as follows: "The defendant claims that he killed the deceased in self-defense; he claims that at the time he shot and killed the deceased the deceased stood up and ran his hand in his pocket for a knife, and was attempting to attack him. If you believe that is the truth, from all the evidence in the case, taken in connection with the defendant's statement, you should find the defendant not guilty. The defendant further claims that at the time he shot and killed the deceased the deceased stood up and ran his hand in his pocket for a knife and thought he was attempting to kill him and that he killed him."

Movant contends that no such contention as that stated by the court was made by the defendant in his statement on the trial or otherwise; that the only reference to a knife by the defendant in his statement was in connection with an encounter between the defendant and the deceased in the town of Cuthbert, on the same day as that on which the killing occurred, several hours...