Randolph T., In re

• Decision Date: 04 December 1981
• Docket Number: No. 25,25
• Parties: In re RANDOLPH T.
• Court: Maryland Court of Appeals

Page 97

292 Md. 97

437 A.2d 230

In re RANDOLPH T.

No. 25.

Court of Appeals of Maryland.

Dec. 4, 1981.

Michael R. Malloy, Asst. Public Defender, Baltimore (Alan H. Murrell, Public Defender and Edwin H. Convey, Asst. Public Defender, Baltimore, on the brief), for appellant.

Stephen B. Caplis, Asst. Atty. Gen., Baltimore (Stephen H. Sachs, Atty. Gen., Baltimore, on the brief), for appellee.

Argued before MURPHY, C. J., and SMITH, DIGGES, ELDRIDGE, COLE, DAVIDSON and RODOWSKY, JJ.

SMITH, Judge.

We shall here uphold against constitutional attack the requirement of Maryland Code (1974, 1977 Cum.Supp.) § 3-817(c), Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article, that "a preponderance of the evidence" is the standard to be used by a trial judge in determining whether to waive juvenile jurisdiction. Accordingly, we shall affirm the judgment of the Court of Special Appeals.

Randolph T. was born January 24, 1963. Thus, he was just under seventeen years old on November 3, 1979, when an incident took place resulting in charges that he committed the delinquent acts of possessing an unregistered short-barreled shotgun in violation of Code (1957, 1976 Repl. Vol., 1976 Cum.Supp.) Art. 27, § 481C; carrying a handgun in violation of Code (1957, 1976 Repl. Vol.) Art. 27, § 36B; discharging a firearm within the city limits of Baltimore in violation of Baltimore City Code, Art. 19, § 112; and openly carrying a sawed-off shotgun in violation of Code (1957, 1976 Repl. Vol.) Art. 27, § 36(a).

A petition alleging his delinquency was filed in the Circuit Court of Baltimore City, Division for Juvenile Causes, on December 26, 1979. On April 29, 1980, the State's Attorney for Baltimore City invoked the provisions of Code (1974, 1977 Cum.Supp.) § 3-817, Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article, and requested the court to waive juvenile jurisdiction. ¹

A hearing was held on June 9, 1980, at which time the court's exclusive original jurisdiction was waived and it was ordered that Randolph T. be held for action under the appropriate criminal procedure. Among other things, in determining whether to waive jurisdiction, the trial judge took into consideration the fact that the juvenile was already incarcerated while awaiting trial in the Criminal Court of Baltimore on a murder charge. ² In response to a question from counsel, the judge indicated that he was using the preponderance of the evidence standard and that the nature of the events and the public safety were serious factors which he considered in determining whether to waive juvenile jurisdiction. He expressly rejected a contention that the decision in Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 99 S.Ct. 1804, 60 L.Ed.2d 323 (1979), required that he declare the Maryland act unconstitutional and that under the Due Process Clause of amend. XIV to the U. S. Const. the proper standard was proof beyond a reasonable doubt.

The Court of Special Appeals affirmed the judgment in an unreported opinion. ³ We granted the writ of certiorari in order that we might address the important public issue here involved.

The present Maryland statute relative to juvenile causes is embodied in Code (1974, 1980 Repl. Vol.) Subtitle 8, §§ 3-801 to -834, Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article. ⁴ Pursuant to the provisions of § 3-817, a court may waive its exclusive jurisdiction if it determines "from a preponderance of the evidence presented at the hearing, that the child is an unfit subject for juvenile rehabilitative measures." The statute sets forth a number of criteria to be considered by the trial judge as will be seen by reference to n.1. Although Maryland's virtually statewide juvenile law as enacted in 1945 and ultimately embodied in Code (1957) Art. 26, § 54 contained a provision for waiver, it did not set forth the standard to be used nor did it specify the required weight of the evidence.

Randolph first contends that § 3-817(c), when it states that "(t)he court may not waive its jurisdiction unless it determines, from a preponderance of the evidence presented at the hearing, that the child is an unfit subject for juvenile rehabilitative measures," does not require the preponderance standard. He emphasizes the use of the word "may" and suggests that a higher standard of proof therefore is not forbidden. We understand the statute to be saying that if the judge finds from a preponderance of the evidence that the child is an unfit subject for juvenile rehabilitative measures, then he is to bring his best judgment to bear in the weighing of the various factors. In other words, to borrow that said by Judge Orth for the court in Matter of Murphy, 15 Md.App. 434, 441, 445, 291 A.2d 867 (1972), the judge then is to "exercise ... (his) sound judicial discretion." Moreover, as Judge Orth, then Chief Judge of the Court of Special Appeals, observed for that court in Matter of Trader, 20 Md.App. 1, 315 A.2d 528, rev'd on other grounds, 272 Md. 364, 325 A.2d 398 (1974):

"Not all of the factors ... need be resolved against the juvenile to justify a waiver. Hazell v. State, 12 Md.App. 144, 155 (, 277 A.2d 639, cert. denied, 263 Md. 715 (1971)). The court is not required to make an arithmetic-type calculation as to the weight it assigns each factor. The general rule is that a waiver will be upheld where a preponderance of the legally sufficient evidence shows that such a determination is proper in the light of the factors to be considered. Matter of Barker, 17 Md.App. 714, 721 (, 305 A.2d 211 (1973)); Matter of Johnson, 17 Md.App. 705 (, 304 A.2d 859 (1973))." 20 Md.App. at 14, 315 A.2d 528.

A preponderance of the evidence is the standard specified by the statute.

Randolph next contends that by virtue of the Supreme Court's holding in Addington, the State is bound to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that he is an unfit subject for juvenile rehabilitative measures, and that waiver of juvenile jurisdiction without such proof constitutes a denial of due process of law. ⁵ This contention is predicated upon the due process holdings in juvenile matters by the Supreme Court in In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 90 S.Ct. 1068, 25 L.Ed.2d 368 (1970); In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 87 S.Ct. 1428, 18 L.Ed.2d 527 (1967); and Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. 541, 86 S.Ct. 1045, 16 L.Ed.2d 84 (1966). Addington is not a juvenile case. Chief Justice Burger opened the opinion by saying for the Court:

"The question in this case is what standard of proof is required by the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution in a civil proceeding brought under state law to commit an individual involuntarily for an indefinite period to a state mental hospital." 441 U.S. at 419-20, 99 S.Ct. at 1806.

After reviewing the background of that particular case, the Court began its discussion by saying:

"The function of a standard of proof, as that concept is embodied in the Due Process Clause and in the realm of factfinding, is to 'instruct the factfinder concerning the degree of confidence our society thinks he should have in the correctness of factual conclusions for a particular type of adjudication.' In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 370, 90 S.Ct. 1068, 1075, 1076 (1970) (Harlan, J., concurring). The standard serves to allocate the risk of error between the litigants and to indicate the relative importance attached to the ultimate decision." 441 U.S. at 423, 99 S.Ct. at 1808.

The Court then discussed the three standards of proof:

"At one end of the spectrum is the typical civil case involving a monetary dispute between private parties. Since society has a minimal concern with the outcome of such private suits, plaintiff's burden of proof is a mere preponderance of the evidence. The litigants thus share the risk of error in roughly equal fashion.

"In a criminal case, on the other hand, the interests of the defendant are of such magnitude that historically and without any explicit constitutional requirement they have been protected by standards of proof designed to exclude as nearly as possible the likelihood of an erroneous judgment. In the administration of criminal justice, our society imposes almost the entire risk of error upon itself. This is accomplished by requiring under the Due Process Clause that the state prove the guilt of an accused beyond a reasonable doubt. In re Winship, supra.

"The intermediate standard, which usually employs some combination of the words 'clear,' 'cogent,' 'unequivocal' and 'convincing,' is less commonly used, but nonetheless 'is no stranger to the civil law.' Woodby v. INS, 385 U.S. 276, 285, (87 S.Ct. 483, 487, 488, 17 L.Ed.2d 362) (1966). See also C. McCormick, Evidence § 320 (1954); 9 J. Wigmore, Evidence § 2498 (3d ed. 1940). One typical use of the standard is in civil cases involving allegations of fraud or some other quasi-criminal wrongdoing by the defendant. The interests at stake in those cases are deemed to be more substantial than mere loss of money and some jurisdictions accordingly reduce the risk to the defendant of having his reputation tarnished erroneously by increasing the plaintiff's burden of proof. Similarly, this Court has used the 'clear, unequivocal and convincing' standard of proof to protect particularly important individual interests in various civil cases. See, e. g., Woodby v. INS, supra, at 285 (87 S.Ct. at 487, 488) (deportation); Chaunt v. United States, 364 U.S. 350, 353 (81 S.Ct. 147, 149, 5 L.Ed.2d 120) (1960) (denaturalization); Schneiderman v. United States, 320 U.S. 118, 125, 159 (63 S.Ct. 1333, 1353, 87 L.Ed. 1796) (1943) (denaturalization)." 441 U.S. at 423-24, 99 S.Ct. at 1808.

In proceeding with its analysis and examination, the Court observed that it "must be mindful that the function of legal process is to minimize the risk of erroneous decisions"; that "civil commitment for any purpose constitutes a significant deprivation of liberty that requires due process protection"; that "involuntary commitment to a mental hospital after a finding of probable dangerousness to self or others ...