Randolph v. State
| Citation | 853 So.2d 1051 |
| Decision Date | 24 April 2003 |
| Docket Number | No. SC93675, No. SC01-2855. |
| Parties | Richard Barry RANDOLPH, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee. Richard Barry Randolph, Petitioner, v. James V. Crosby, Jr., etc., Respondent. |
| Court | Florida Supreme Court |
Michael P. Reiter, Capital Collateral Counsel-Northern Region, Sylvia W. Smith, Special Assistant CCC-NR, and John M. Jackson, Assistant CCC-NR, Office of the Capital Collateral Counsel-Northern Region, Tallahassee, FL, for Appellant/Petitioner.
Charles J. Crist, Jr., Attorney General, and Judy Taylor Rush and Douglas T. Squire, Assistant Attorneys General, Daytona Beach, FL, for Appellee/Respondent.
Richard Barry Randolph, an inmate under sentence of death, appeals an order of the trial court denying his motion for postconviction relief under Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.850 and petitions this Court for a writ of habeas corpus. We have jurisdiction. See art. V, § 3(b)(1), (9), Fla. Const. For the reasons that follow we affirm the denial of Randolph's postconviction motion and deny his petition for writ of habeas corpus.
In 1989, Randolph was convicted of first-degree murder, armed robbery, sexual battery with force likely to cause serious personal injury or with a deadly weapon, and grand theft of a motor vehicle in the killing of Minnie Ruth McCollum. The facts surrounding these crimes are discussed in detail in this Court's opinion affirming the convictions and sentences. See Randolph v. State, 562 So.2d 331 (Fla. 1990).1
Randolph filed a second amended 3.850 motion on May 1, 1993, and a hearing was ultimately held on July 22, 23, and 24, 1997. At this time, the trial court also heard Randolph's motion to compel production of public records. The trial court granted Randolph sixty days from July 24, 1997, to depose three individuals and to file an amended 3.850 motion based on the public records produced at the hearing. Randolph then filed a motion to compel disclosure and a motion for extension of time to file an amended 3.850 motion, and the State filed an objection. The trial court heard these motions on December 4, 1997, and took testimony from four witnesses involved in Randolph's trial. The trial court granted Randolph until January 26, 1998, to file an amended 3.850 motion.
On January 26, 1998, Randolph filed a third amended 3.850 motion raising two additional grounds for relief. In total, Randolph presented twenty-one claims. The trial court issued an order on February 24, 1998, denying relief on claims one through nineteen and twenty-one, and granting an evidentiary hearing on claim twenty. That evidentiary hearing was held on April 24, 1998, and thereafter the trial court issued an order denying relief on claim twenty. Randolph now appeals the denial of his postconviction motion, raising seven claims.2
We find a number of Randolph's postconviction claims to be either procedurally barred, facially or legally insufficient, or clearly without merit as a matter of law.3 We decline to address these claims.
Randolph argues he was denied a neutral, detached judge in violation of his rights to due process and a fair trial. In support of his argument, Randolph claims the trial court engaged in improper ex parte contact with the State regarding the preparation of the order sentencing Randolph to death, impermissibly delegated its independent duty to weigh aggravating and mitigating circumstances to the State, and unconstitutionally determined Randolph would receive a death sentence prior to the sentencing proceedings.
This claim arose after a public records request under chapter 119, Florida Statutes, when Randolph discovered a draft judgment and sentence in the State's files. The draft judgment and sentence contained a handwritten "insert" mark at the bottom of the first page, along with the date and the initials "R.R.P." handwritten on the last page. The final judgment and sentence differs from the draft in two respects: the final version contains three sentences where the "insert" mark was located in the draft version, and the final version bears Judge Robert R. Perry's signature on the last page. Based on the draft judgment and sentence, Randolph filed a third amended postconviction motion alleging that Judge Perry failed to independently weigh aggravating and mitigating circumstances by either expressly relying on findings prepared by the state attorney or engaging in improper ex parte communication with the state attorney as to the findings to be included in the judgment and sentence. The postconviction court conducted an evidentiary hearing on this matter, and the following evidence was produced.4
Pamela Kohler, Judge Perry's law clerk at the time of Randolph's trial, testified that she prepared the judgment and sentence on her computer, and that the only other person who had access to her computer at that time was Judge Perry's judicial assistant, Jill Brown. Kohler stated that Judge Perry was aware of recent case law from this Court remanding cases to the trial court after an aggravating factor had been found legally insufficient because this Court could not determine from the sentencing order whether the trial court would have imposed the death penalty even in the absence of one of the aggravating factors, and that Judge Perry wanted to ensure the sentencing order would not be reversed. Kohler testified that she received assistance with the wording of the order on this point from John Alexander, then an assistant state attorney assigned to Randolph's case.5 Alexander assisted Kohler in her office as she sat in front of her computer. Neither Judge Perry nor defense counsel, Howard Pearl, was present. Kohler testified she had no knowledge of any conversations between Judge Perry and the State regarding this or any other issue of the sentencing order, and that she knew Judge Perry clearly intended to impose a death sentence before she met with Alexander.
Randolph claims that the communication between Judge Perry's law clerk and the prosecutor amounted to improper ex parte communication which prejudiced his right to a neutral judge.6 Canon 3 B(7) of the Code of Judicial Conduct provides that "[a] judge shall not initiate, permit, or consider ex parte communications, or consider other communications made to the judge outside the presence of the parties concerning a pending or impending proceeding." Based on this principle, we have repeatedly stated there is nothing "more dangerous and destructive of the impartiality of the judiciary than a one-sided communication between a judge and a single litigant." Spencer v. State, 615 So.2d 688, 691 (Fla.1993) (quoting Rose v. State, 601 So.2d 1181, 1183 (Fla.1992)). Randolph has clearly established that improper ex parte communication occurred between the trial court and the State because Kohler testified that the prosecutor was present in her office, "assisting me with the wording" of the sentencing order, and defense counsel was not present. However, we find that Randolph's right to a neutral judge was not violated by the improper ex parte communication in this case.
In State v. Riechmann, 777 So.2d 342, 351 (Fla.2000), the postconviction court concluded that Riechmann was denied an independent weighing of aggravating and mitigating circumstances because the trial judge, through an ex parte communication with the prosecutor, delegated to the prosecutor the responsibility of writing the order sentencing Riechmann to death. We upheld the postconviction court's findings, noting that section 921.141, Florida Statutes (1985), required the trial judge to independently weigh the aggravating and mitigating circumstances to determine what penalty should be imposed upon the defendant and to draft the order sentencing the defendant to death. See Riechmann, 777 So.2d at 351.
In Spencer, defense counsel happened upon the trial judge, the state attorney, and the state attorney's assistant proofreading an order sentencing Spencer to death. 615 So.2d at 689. When questioned by defense counsel, the trial judge admitted that the State had prepared a draft of the sentencing order and that defense counsel had not been given notice of the process employed by the prosecutor and the judge. Id. at 690. We reversed the defendant's conviction and remanded the case for a new trial based on reversible error occurring in both the jury selection process and the sentencing portion of the penalty phase. Our decision was predicated in part on the trial judge's error of formulating his decision prior to giving the defendant an opportunity to be heard and in part on the improper ex parte communication. Id. at 690-91.
In both Riechmann and Spencer the issue turned on whether and to what extent the ex parte communication contributed to the improper delegation of the trial court's duty to independently weigh the aggravating and mitigating factors. Here, the postconviction court found:
The Court is convinced in this case by the evidence that the final Judgment and Sentence was in fact prepared by Ms. Kohler or Jill Brown on Ms. Kohler's computer. Even though the contact between Ms. Kohler and assistant state attorney Alexander may have been improper, it did not deal in any way with the judge's independent weighing of the aggravating and mitigating circumstances and his determination to impose a sentence of death. This contact was purely ministerial in nature concerning the wording of the Judgment and Sentence on one narrow issue to express the judge's wishes.[7] There was no evidence presented that Judge Perry failed to independently weigh the aggravating and mitigating circumstances to determine whether the death penalty should be imposed or that he failed to do so before directing his law clerk to prepare the Judgment and Sentence.
We conclude the postconviction court's findings are supported by competent, substantial evidence in...
To continue reading
Request your trial
-
Davis v. State
... ... Little robber, cagey little thief." Although this Court has continually expressed intolerance for improper prosecutorial arguments and comments, when the comments are isolated and not overly prejudicial this Court recognizes the trial court's discretion. See Randolph v. State, 853 So.2d 1051, 1068-69 (Fla.2003). The record reveals that in referring to Davis as a "cagey little murderer" the prosecutor was elaborating on the testimony of Beverly Castle: ... Mr. White said that Beverly Castle referred to the Defendant as a little character of ... ...
-
Farina v. State, SC04-1610.
... ... See LeCroy v. Dugger, 727 So.2d 236, 240 (Fla.1998) (upholding the summary denial of a postconviction motion because the defense alleged no facts to substantiate its conclusory ... Page 618 ... claims of ineffective assistance of counsel); see also Randolph v. State, 853 So.2d 1051, 1063 n. 12 (Fla.2003) ("[T]he purpose of an appellate brief is to present arguments in support of the points on appeal.") (quoting Duest v. Dugger, 555 So.2d 849, 852 (Fla. 1990)). Other claims are clearly meritless. 5 Finally, some claims were raised on direct appeal ... ...
-
Hunter v. State, SC06-1963.
... ... As stated earlier, the "and/or" error was preserved as to the criminal conspiracy and abuse of a dead human body counts. If the error is preserved, the issue on appeal is whether the instructional error was harmless. Randolph v. State, 853 So.2d 1051, 1065 (Fla.2003); Jennings v. State, 782 So.2d 853, 862-863 (Fla.2001). An error is deemed harmless where there is no reasonable possibility that the faulty instruction contributed to the verdict. State v. DiGuilio, 491 So.2d 1129, 1135 (Fla.1986). Here, the error was ... ...
-
Troy v. Sec'y of Dep't of Corr., Case No. 8:11-cv-796-T30-AEP
... ... UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT MIDDLE DISTRICT OF FLORIDA TAMPA DIVISION ... DONE: January 2, 2013 ORDER John Troy, a State of Florida inmate under sentence of death, seeks habeas corpus relief pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 and challenges the validity of his state ... A trial court's ruling on the admission of evidence is reviewed by an appellate court under an abuse of discretion standard. Randolph v. State, 853 So. 2d 1051, 1062 (Fla. 2003) ("The admissibility of evidence lies in the sound discretion of the trial court and trial court ... ...
-
Ex parte blogging: the legal ethics of Supreme Court advocacy in the Internet era.
...canon to the activities of clerks. See, e.g., Kennedy v. Great Atl. & Pac. Tea Co., 551 F.2d 593 (5th Cir. 1977); Randolph v. State, 853 So. 2d 1051, 1057 n.6 (Fla. 2003); see also State v. Marcopolos, 572 S.E.2d 820, 824 (N.C. Ct. App. 2002) (prosecutor who gave document to judge's cle......