Raney v. Home Ins. Co.

• Decision Date: 03 December 1922
• Docket Number: No. 3145.,3145.
• Citation: 246 S.W. 57,213 Mo. App. 1
• Parties: RANEY v. HOME INS. CO.
• Court: Missouri Court of Appeals

246 S.W. 57

213 Mo. App. 1

RANEY v. HOME INS. CO.

No. 3145.

Springfield Court of Appeals. Missouri.

December 3, 1922.

Appeal from Circuit Court, Wright County; C. H. Skinker, Judge.

Action by William M. Raney and others against the Home Insurance Company. Judgment for defendant, and plaintiffs appeal. Affirmed.

A. K. Curtis, of Hartville, and G. H. Jackson, of Mountain Grove, for appellants.

E. L. Snider, of Chicago, Ill., and Lamar & Lamar, of Houston, for respondent.

COX, P. J.

Action upon a fire insurance policy covering a dwelling house and certain personal property. Trial by jury; verdict for plaintiffs as to the personal property and for defendant as to the dwelling house. The verdict for defendant on the issues joined as to the dwelling house was the result of a peremptory instruction by the court that plaintiffs could not recover for the loss of the dwelling house. From that action of the court plaintiffs appealed. No appeal was taken from the judgment in plaintiffs' favor for the loss of the personal property.

The only question before us is the propriety of the trial court's action in instructing the jury that plaintiffs could not recover for loss of the dwelling house. The issuance of the policy and the destruction of the property by fire was admitted and the defense was misrepresentation by the insured in the application for insurance and that the applicant, Wm. M. Raney, had no insurable interest in the property at the time the policy was issued nor at the time of the fire. The action of the trial court in giving a peremptory instruction to find for defendant as to the claim for the loss of the dwelling house appears to been founded on the proposition that the applicant for the insurance, Wm. M. Raney, had no insurable interest in the property, and it is to that question we shall direct our attention.

The plaintiff Williams was interested in the personal property only. Plaintiff Candler came into the case as a mortgagee with a loss clause, making the loss payable to him but subject to all the terms of the policy, so the question involved, as before us, is in the same form as if Wm. M. Raney were the only party plaintiff.

The application for this insurance was signed by Wm. M. Raney, and among the questions to be answered were questions as to the title to the land on which the dwelling house was located, and the answers were to the effect that Mr. Raney was the owner. Raney claimed that he detailed all the facts to the agent of defendant, who wrote in the answers to the questions, and that he did not read the application after it was filled out, but signed it without examining it. While he testified that he gave the agent all the facts relating to the title, he also testified that he told the agent the property belonged to him and as to this latter statement he seems to be of the opinion now that he in fact owns the land.

Assuming as true the statement of plaintiff Wm. M. Raney, that he has claimed all the time that he was the owner of the land and that he was in possession of it by tenant and collected the rents, and had the land assessed in his own name and paid the taxes thereon, we then have the following additional facts admitted by Mr. Raney to consider in determining whether or not he had any insurable interest in the property. In 1904 Mr. Raney was the owner of the land. In that year he was sued by one William Brown, and fearing that Brown might recover a judgment against him, he conveyed this land to his minor son, C. E. Raney, and placed that deed on record for the purpose of preventing Brown from selling it to collect any judgment that might be rendered in that case. The son was then nine years old, and the title remained in him until he became of age, and then the father requested him to reconvey the property. The son did execute a deed in 1916, but instead of conveying it to his father, he conveyed it to his mother, Phurnia Raney. Just how the deed came to be made to the mother alone instead of to the father or to both does not clearly appear, but the father learned that the deed had been made to the wife, Phurnia Raney, and had been recorded long before this insurance was applied for, and he had taken no steps to have it corrected. He testified, as did others, that he claimed all the time to own the property, and neither the wife nor the son ever made any claim to it. Some other testimony was offered by plaintiff but excluded, which we shall notice later.

On the above recited facts, plaintiff Raney contends that he had an insurable interest in the property on several grounds: First. By adverse possession, which he claims had ripened into title under the Statute of Limitations. Second. That if the legal title had not vested in him by limitation, he was at least the equitable owner of the land and that his wife and son, in whom the legal title was held, were trustees for him. Third. That he was in possession, holding adversely under a bona fide claim of ownership, and if he had no title in fact, yet the facts relating to the deeds to his son and wife were detailed to the agent of defendant, and the defendant is now estopped to deny that Raney had an insurable interest in the property.

It is apparent at a glance that Wm. M. Raney had not acquired any interest in the land under the statute of limitations. Having himself conveyed the land to his minor son to defeat a possible judgment against him, the full and complete title was conveyed to the son. While this deed was void as against creditors, it was binding between the father and son, and completely divested the father of all ownership in the land. When he made that deed, he knew that neither he nor the minor son would be able, of their own volition, to change the title or ownership of the land until the minor son should reach his majority. After making that deed, he could not hold the land adversely to his minor son who, by reason of his minority, was incapacitated, to assert his own ownership of it. The statute of limitations, therefore, could not be set in motion until the son reached his majority. When the son did come to full age, the father requested a reconveyance of the land, and the son acceded to the request, but the notary, in writing the deed, placed the name of Phurnia Raney, the mother of this son and wife of plaintiff Wm. M. Raney, as grantee in the deed, instead of plaintiff Wm. M. Raney. The most that can be said in his favor as to the statute of limitations is that it may have begun to run as soon as the son came of age but that was in 1916, only four years prior to the time this policy was issued. It is not necessary for us to determine in this case whether or not the statute of limitations could run in plaintiff's favor against his wife, for, if we concede that it could and did run against her, a question which we do not decide, yet it had not run a sufficient length of time to give plaintiff any rights under it. The contention of plaintiff Wm. M. Raney, that he had acquired an interest in or title to the property under the statute of limitations, must be ruled against him.

Wm. M. Raney's next contention is that he was the equitable owner and that his son and wife, who held the legal title, held as trustees for him. This contention is based on the fact that neither the son nor, the wife paid anything for the land and never asserted any claim to it and that he used it as his own, claimed it as his own, improved it with his own means, paid the taxes on it, and with his own money had built the house that was insured; that when he applied for the insurance,...