Rangel v. Parkhurst
Decision Date | 24 July 2001 |
Docket Number | (AC 20426) |
Citation | 64 Conn. App. 372,779 A.2d 1277 |
Court | Connecticut Court of Appeals |
Parties | YAROSLAVA RANGEL ET AL. v. DOUGLAS PARKHURST ET AL. |
Schaller, Flynn and O'Connell, Js. Gerald M. Beaudoin, for the appellant (named plaintiff).
Andrew J. O'Keefe, with whom was Joseph M. Busher, Jr., for the appellees (named defendant et al.).
The plaintiff Yaroslava Rangel1 appeals from the summary judgment rendered in favor of the defendants, Douglas Parkhurst and Judy Parkhurst.2 On appeal, the plaintiff argues that the trial court improperly (1) granted the defendants' motion for summary judgment on the basis of its finding that the defendants were neither purveyors nor servers of alcohol to a minor and (2) determined that, as a matter of law, parents who know of and acquiesce in their minor child's storage of alcoholic beverages in their home are not liable for damages subsequently caused by the intoxicated minor. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.
The following facts are relevant to our resolution of the plaintiffs appeal. The plaintiff brought this action seeking damages for injuries that she and her son, Emmanuel Rangel, sustained in a two car accident involving the defendants' son, Michael Parkhurst (Michael). Michael was twenty years old at the time of the accident and, therefore, was not of legal drinking age. He had purchased beer from a package store two weeks prior to the accident. The defendants' home has two refrigerators. One is in the kitchen, and one is in the basement. Michael stored the beer in the basement refrigerator until the morning of the accident, when he removed it from his parents' home and engaged in a course of drinking and driving that culminated in the collision involving the plaintiffs automobile.
The plaintiff, in her revised complaint, alleged that Michael was a minor, age twenty, residing with his parents, the defendants. The plaintiff further alleged that (1) the defendants stored and made alcoholic beverages available to Michael, (2) the defendants knew or had reason to know that Michael's consumption of alcohol outside the home involved the use and operation of an automobile they had "assisted" in making available to him, and (3) on May 16, 1995, Michael removed substantially all of the alcoholic beverages from the defendants' basement refrigerator, and then, after drinking throughout the day and evening, operated his automobile. The plaintiff alleged that because Michael became impaired or intoxicated, his car collided with the plaintiff's car, causing the plaintiff personal injuries.
The plaintiffs complaint further alleges that the defendants were negligent in one or more of the following ways: "3 On October 27, 1997, the defendants filed a motion for summary judgment, contending that (1) they did not owe a duty to the plaintiff and (2) there was no basis on which to proceed against them on theories of negligent service of alcohol to a minor, and negligent entrustment of a motor vehicle or vicarious liability. On April 7, 1998, the court, Martin, J., denied the motion, finding that "[a]n issue of material fact exists as to whether the defendants provided or made alcohol available to their minor child."
The defendants filed a renewed motion for summary judgment, dated March 15, 1999, which the court, Parker, J., granted on December 7, 1999. In its memorandum of decision, the court found that The court concluded that "the law is not as [the plaintiff] would have it; parents are not liable to third persons even though they knew of and acquiesced in the minor child's keeping alcoholic beverages in their home." The court further concluded that "[i]n no sense can the [defendants] be considered to have supplied or purveyed the offending beer to Michael." The plaintiff thereafter appealed from the judgment of the court.
The plaintiff first claims that the court improperly granted the defendants' motion for summary judgment on the basis of its findings that the defendants were not purveyors of alcohol nor had they served alcohol to a minor. The plaintiff argues that the defendants' conduct falls within the broad interpretation of purveyor as discussed by our Supreme Court in Ely v. Murphy, 207 Conn. 88, 540 A.2d 54 (1988), and Bohan v. Last, 236 Conn. 670, 674 A.2d 839 (1996), because the defendants "affirmatively acted" when they made alcohol available to Michael by allowing him to store beer in their basement refrigerator. We disagree.
(Internal quotation marks omitted.) Saunders v. Stigers, 62 Conn. App. 138, 145-46, 773 A.2d 971 (2001).
To recover on a theory of negligence, the plaintiff must establish that the defendants owed a duty to her and breached that duty. See Leavenworth v. Mathes, 38 Conn. App. 476, 479, 661 A.2d 632 (1995). (Citation omitted.) Shore v. Stonington, 187 Conn. 147, 151-52, 444 A.2d 1379 (1982).
Our Supreme Court in Ely v. Murphy, supra, 207 Conn. 89-90, addressed a situation in which parental social hosts actually provided alcohol to minors at a graduation "keg" party for a fee of $3. As a result, one of the minor guests, who was intoxicated, struck and killed another guest while driving his vehicle after leaving the party. Id., 90. The court concluded that "a social host or other purveyor of alcohol will be liable, to the minor served or to innocent third parties thereafter injured, if a court or a jury finds, as a matter of fact, a proximate cause relationship between the service of alcohol and the damages ensuing from the minor's consumption of the alcohol."4Bohan v. Last, supra, 236 Conn. 677, citing Ely v. Murphy, supra, 97.
"The proposition that intoxication results from the voluntary conduct of the person who consumes intoxicating liquor assumes a knowing and intelligent exercise of choice, and for that reason is more applicable to adults than to minors." (Citation omitted.) Ely v. Murphy, supra, 207 Conn. 93.
The Ely court created a limited exception to the common-law rule that no cause of action in negligence arises from the furnishing of alcohol to intoxicated adults by holding that the consumption of alcohol by a minor does not "constitute the intervening act necessary to break the chain of proximate causation and does not, as a matter of law, insulate one who provides alcohol to minors from liability for ensuing injury." Id., 95....
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...some courts have recognized social host liability in cases where the host served alcohol to a minor. See, e.g. Rangel v. Parkhurst, 64 Conn.App. 372, 779 A.2d 1277, 1281-82 (2001) (where the court held that a social host or purveyor of alcohol was liable to the minor served or to innocent t......
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2001 Connecticut Appellate Review
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