Ranger Ins. Co. v. Air-Speed, Inc.

Decision Date20 March 1980
Docket NumberINC,AIR-SPEE
Citation9 Mass.App.Ct. 403,401 N.E.2d 872
PartiesRANGER INSURANCE COMPANY v.et al.
CourtAppeals Court of Massachusetts

Harold Jacobi, III, Boston (William Trafidlo, Boston, with him), for Air-Speed, Inc.

Abner R. Sisson, Boston (Mark L. Murphy, Boston, with him), for Arlene Fern, Barrett Greene, and others.

Franklin N. Cunningham, Boston, for plaintiff.

Before HALE, C. J., and GOODMAN and GRANT, JJ.

GRANT, Justice.

This is an action brought in the Superior Court by the plaintiff insurance company to secure a declaratory judgment to the effect that the plaintiff is not liable to any of the defendants under the bodily injury or the hull insurance provisions of a policy of aircraft insurance (with endorsements) issued by the plaintiff to the defendant Air-Speed, Inc. (Air-Speed), the named insured, covering a Beagle aircraft bearing Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) registration N992M (92M) 1 for the one-year period commencing June 1, 1977. The defendants fall into two groups. One (aircraft defendants) consists of Air-Speed, the holder of an air-taxi/commercial operator (ATCO) operating certificate issued by the FAA under Part 135 of its regulations, and Executive Airlines, Inc. (Executive), the owner 2 and lessor of 92M and of a second Beagle 3 bearing FAA registration N850EX (OEX). 4 The other group (passenger defendants) consists of three passengers who were injured and the heirs and personal representative of one passenger who was killed 5 when OEX crashed 6 in Connecticut on August 11, 1977, in the course of an Air-Speed flight from Hanscom Field in Bedford (BED) to Westchester County Airport in White Plains, New York (HPN). 7 Air-Speed and all but one of the passenger defendants have entered appeals from a judgment declaring that the plaintiff is not liable to any of the defendants under either the bodily injury or the hull insurance provisions of the policy and its endorsements.

In controversy are the effects which should be given to certain provisions found in an endorsement to the policy and to certain other provisions found in the policy itself. The provisions in the endorsement read as follows: "The Insurer further agrees that, while an aircraft owned by the named Insured and declared in this policy, is withdrawn from normal use because of its breakdown, repair, servicing, loss or destruction, such insurance as is afforded by this policy with respect to such aircraft applies also with respect to another aircraft of similar type, horse-power, and seating capacity, whether or not owned by the Insured while temporarily used as the substitute for such aircraft " (emphasis supplied). 8 It is that provision on which the passenger defendants stake their respective claims. Air-Speed relies on provisions in the policy which read in relevant part as follows: "Automatic Insurance for Newly Acquired Aircraft. If the Named Insured who is the owner of the aircraft acquires ownership of another aircraft certificated as 'Standard' by the (FAA) and so notifies the Company within thirty (30) days following the date of its delivery to him, such insurance as is afforded by this Policy applies also to such aircraft as of such delivery date . . . This Insuring Agreement does not apply : (a) unless (such newly acquired aircraft) replaces an aircraft described in this Policy . . ." (emphasis original). The basic question raised by the appeals is whether any of the defendants has sustained his (its) burden of proving coverage under the provisions relied on by him (it). Compare Mathews v. Bloomfield, 246 Mass. 510, 512, 141 N.E. 494 (1923); Silva v. Fid. & Cas. Co., 252 Mass. 328, 330, 147 N.E. 858 (1925); Salo v. North Am. Acc. Ins. Co., 257 Mass. 303, 304, 153 N.E. 557 (1926). 9

The following is a summary of the relevant evidence admitted with respect to both groups of defendants. 10

OEX and 92M were both owned by Executive and leased to Air-Speed, which used them to transport passengers in both directions between BOS and HPN. 11 Both aircraft were identical for the purposes of this case. Executive had acquired OEX in December, 1976, and on December 10, 1976, that aircraft was insured in the name of Air-Speed for a one-year period under a policy issued by a company other than the plaintiff and which was cancelled effective May 3, 1977, for nonpayment of premiums. OEX was not put into commercial service immediately, but was kept for some time at the airports in Norwood (OWD) and Worcester (ORH), where it underwent servicing, inspection by the FAA for the issuance of a standard airworthiness certificate, and the installation of avionics. Executive acquired 92M on April 15, 1977, but it was not then put into commercial service. It appears to have spent approximately a month on the ground at OWD undergoing inspections and the installation of equipment.

92M first went into commercial service on the BOS-HPN run on May 17, 1977. There were one or more round trips daily on each business day between that date and May 27, with the number of round trips per day varying from one to three. On May 31, which was the first business day following the Memorial Day weekend, OEX flew from ORH to BOS, flew one passenger to HPN, and returned to BOS without passengers. On June 1, which was the effective date of the policy in controversy, OEX made two round trips with passengers between BOS and HPN. 92M did not fly on either May 31 or June 1, although it appears to have been operational on both days. The operations and maintenance records on both aircraft strongly suggest that the reason for using OEX on both days was that it had less than one third of the total time in service that 92M had and was encountering fewer maintenance problems. 12

On June 2 it was discovered that OEX had a fuel leak. It made one round-trip without passengers between BOS and OWD for repairs. On June 3 it was certified as airworthy following a fifty-hour inspection but was then returned to OWD, where it remained until released after repair of the fuel leak on July 14. 92M flew two passengers from BOS to HPN on the evening of June 2 and returned without passengers. Thereafter, except for three days when it was grounded for engine repairs, it carried passengers on the BOS-HPN run on from one to four round trips each business day through July 13.

On July 14, 92M made nine flights between HPN and BOS. 13 Passengers were carried on all flights except the first flight in the morning (from HPN to BOS) and the last flight in the evening (also from HPN to BOS). On that same day OEX was ferried from OWD to BOS and made an evening flight with passengers to HPN, where it remained overnight. The operations records disclose that at one point on July 14 both aircraft were airborne and carrying passengers at the same time. It will also be noted that at the end of the day Air-Speed had an aircraft at each end of the run, one (92M) in BOS and the other (OEX) in HPN. Air-Speed had known since June (at the latest) that there was no specific insurance coverage on OEX.

On July 15, 92M departed from BOS with two passengers at 7:35 A.M. and arrived at HPN at 8:50 A.M. OEX departed from HPN with three passengers at 8:30 A.M. and arrived at BOS at 9:45 A.M. Once again, both aircraft were airborne and carrying passengers at the same time, with only one of the aircraft specifically insured. 92M returned to BOS without passengers at 11:15 A.M. Tracings of ferrous and nonferrous metals were found in the oil filter and oil sump of the left engine, a sure indication of impending difficulty. 92M was thereupon withdrawn from service; the bad engine was replaced on September 8. OEX continued as the only aircraft in service on the BOS-HPN run between July 15 and the time of the crash on August 11.

1. The passenger defendants. It is agreed that 92M was owned by Air-Speed for the purposes of the policy (see note 2, supra ), that 92M and OEX were similar in all material respects, and that on the date of the crash 92M had been withdrawn from service for a reason comprehended by the policy. Accordingly, the only question for decision in the case concerning the passenger defendants is whether OEX was being "temporarily used as the substitute" for 92M within the meaning of the policy at the time of the crash.

The purpose of the quoted provision is to allow the insured to continue his business when the aircraft named in the declarations has to be taken out of service for repairs, or is destroyed. Compare Central Natl. Ins. Co. v. Sisneros, 173 F.Supp. 757, 760 (D.N.M.1959). The provision is not intended to allow the insured to escape paying premiums on another aircraft which is ordinarily used in addition to the one which is named in the declarations. Compare Lloyds America v. Ferguson, 116 F.2d 920, 923 (5th Cir. 1941). 14 We have found no case construing the "substitute" provision of a policy of aircraft insurance. The cases construing analogous provisions of automobile liability insurance policies have uniformly held that the test for coverage under such a provision is whether the vehicle named in the policy would have been used, if it had been operational for the particular trip which ended in the accident. See, e. g., Western Cas. & Sur. Co. v. Norman, 197 F.2d 67, 68-69 (5th Cir. 1952); Lumbermens Mut. Cas. Co. v. Harleysville Mut. Cas. Co., 367 F.2d 250, 254 (4th Cir. 1966); Fulton v. Woodford, 17 Ariz.App. 490, 495-496, 498 P.2d 564 (1972); Sellers v. Allstate Ins. Co., 25 Ariz.App. 482, 485, 544 P.2d 699, vacated on other grounds, 113 Ariz. 419, 555 P.2d 1113 (1976); Little v. Safeguard Ins. Co., 137 So.2d 415, 420 (La.App.1962); Lewis v. Bradley, 7 Wis.2d 586, 591-593, 97 N.W.2d 408 (1959); Strozewski v. American Family Mut. Ins. Co., 46 Wis.2d 123, 128-130, 174 N.W.2d 550 (1970). This is a question of fact on which the passenger defendants had the burden of proof, as we have already said.

In our judgment th...

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