Ranieri v. Ranieri

• Decision Date: 20 March 1989
• Parties: , 57 USLW 2595 Rae Brandt RANIERI, Respondent, v. Rocco J. RANIERI, Appellant.
• Court: New York Supreme Court — Appellate Division

Page 382

539 N.Y.S.2d 382

146 A.D.2d 34, 57 USLW 2595

Rae Brandt RANIERI, Respondent, v. Rocco J. RANIERI, Appellant.

Supreme Court, Appellate Division Second Department.

March 20, 1989.

Shaw, Licitra, Eisenberg, Esernio & Schwartz, P.C., Garden City (J. Stanley Shaw, George P. Esernio and Andrew D. Greene, of counsel), for appellant.

Reynolds, Caronia & Gianelli, Hauppauge (Peter R. Caronia and Lisa R. Smith, of counsel), for respondent.

Before MANGANO, J.P., and BRACKEN, KUNZEMAN and BALLETTA, JJ.

MANGANO, Justice Presiding.

The primary question to be resolved on the instant appeal is whether a purported marriage solemnized in the State of New York by a minister of the Universal Life Church, Inc. (hereinafter the ULC) is void. This question must be answered in the affirmative.

I

On October 18, 1986, the plaintiff and the defendant were purportedly married by one James J. Corrigan, Jr., a "minister" of the ULC, in a "civil" ceremony performed in Suffolk County. At the time of the marriage, the plaintiff was 40 years old and the defendant was 57 years old. Both parties had been previously married, and those marriages had ended in divorce. On October 17, 1986, the day before the purported marriage, the plaintiff and the defendant executed an antenuptial agreement. In the agreement, the parties agreed, inter alia, that each party waived any and all claims and rights which he or she acquired by reason of the marriage. The consideration for this agreement was "the marriage about to be solemnized". By further agreement dated October 17, 1986, the plaintiff and the defendant agreed that the defendant would pay the plaintiff the sum of $90,000 within 90 days of the marriage. The consideration for this agreement was set forth as follows:

"WHEREAS, the parties plan to marry and to execute a prenuptial agreement whereby [the plaintiff] will relinquish valuable marital rights that she may have".

The parties cohabited after the marriage for a period of 84 days, i.e., until January 10, 1987, when the plaintiff left the marital residence.

II

In the instant matrimonial action commenced on or about February 10, 1987, the plaintiff alleges three causes of action. The first cause of action is for a judgment of divorce against the defendant based on the defendant's alleged cruel and inhuman treatment of the plaintiff. In a second cause of action, the plaintiff seeks a judgment declaring that the marriage between the parties is "a nullity and void ab initio". In support of this second cause of action, the plaintiff alleges as follows:

"11. On October 18, 1986 plaintiff and defendant were married in a civil ceremony in Bell Terre, County of Suffolk, State of New York by James J. Corrigan, Jr., a 'Minister' of the Universal Life Church, Inc.

"12. Plaintiff married defendant in good faith and with the genuine belief that said minister was lawfully able to solemnize the marriage of plaintiff and defendant.

"13. Upon information and belief said Universal Life Church minister had no statutory authority to perform a marriage ceremony".

In a third cause of action, the plaintiff seeks recovery of the sum of $90,000 which the defendant had agreed to pay her, pursuant to the antenuptial agreement dated October 17, 1986. The defendant, in his first counterclaim, seeks a judgment declaring that the marriage, the antenuptial agreement, and the agreement to pay the plaintiff $90,000, are void. Specifically, the defendant alleges as follows:

"30. That the plaintiff and defendant were purportedly married in a 'religious' ceremony on the 18th day of October 1986 by a 'Minister' of the Universal Life Church, Inc., whose principal place of business is located at 601 3rd Street, Modesto, California. Said purported marriage ceremony was performed at 56 Old Homestead Road, Port Jefferson, New York.

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"32. That a minister of the Universal Life Church does not fall within the statutory definition of clergyman or minister.

"33. The minister who purportedly solemnized the marriage between the plaintiff and the defendant did not have the authority from, or in accordance with, the rules and regulations of the governing ecclesiastical body of any denomination or order nor from any church or synagogue to preside over and direct the spiritual affairs of a church or synagogue.

"34. Universal Life Church, Inc. is not an ecclesiastical body or denomination or order and does not have an actual church or stated meeting place of worship or any form of religious observance. Accordingly the minister who purportedly authorized the marriage between the plaintiff and the defendant was not authorized under Section 11 of the Domestic Relations Law to solemnize said marriage.

"35. The marriage between the plaintiff and the defendant was not valid pursuant to Domestic Relations Law, Section 11 and plaintiff [sic] is entitled to judgment declaring said marriage to be invalid.

"36. On the 17th day of October, 1986, one day prior to the purported marriage between the plaintiff and the defendant, the plaintiff and the defendant entered into an Antenuptual Agreement * * * in contemplation of the purported marriage.

"37. That the sole consideration for the Antenuptual Agreeme entered into on the 17th day of October, 1986, was the contemplated marriage between the plaintiff and the defendant, which purportedly took place on the 18th day of October, 1986 by a minister of the Universal Life Church, Inc.

"38. That since the purported marriage on the 18th day of October, 1986 was invalid, no valid marriage as contemplated by the Antenuptual Agreement has taken place.

"39. Since the parties' purported marriage was not valid, the Antenuptual Agreement is null and void and of no force and effect.

"40. That on or about October 17, 1986, in contemplation of the marriage purportedly performed on the 18th day of October, 1986, the defendant executed an alleged Agreement * * * and incident thereto a Promissory Note in the sum of $90,000.00 in favor of the defendant" [sic].

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"42. That the sole consideration for the execution of the aforesaid Agreement and Promissory Note was the contemplated marriage between the plaintiff and the defendant and the execution of an Antenuptual Agreement by the parties * * *

"43. That since the purported marriage entered into between the plaintiff and the defendant on the 18th day of October, 1986 was not a valid marriage and the Antenuptual Agreement was null and void, there was no consideration for the aforesaid Agreement and Promissory Note.

"44. The aforesaid Agreement and Promissory Note executed by the defendant on or about the 17th day of October, 1986, is null and void and of no force and effect".

By notice of motion dated August 18, 1987, the plaintiff moved, inter alia, for awards of temporary maintenance in the sum of $1,288 per week, temporary medical, hospital and dental insurance, and interim counsel fees in the sum of $3,500.

By notice of cross motion dated September 21, 1987, the defendant moved for summary judgment on his first counterclaim. In his papers submitted in support of his cross motion, the defendant also opposed the plaintiff's motion for pendente lite relief. In support of his demand for summary judgment on the first counterclaim, the defendant argued that (1) in Ravenal v. Ravenal, 72 Misc.2d 100, 338 N.Y.S.2d 324, it was held that a minister of the ULC was not a "clergyman" or "minister" authorized to solemnize a marriage pursuant to Domestic Relations Law § 11, therefore the instant marriage is void, and (2) the ant nuptial agreement, and the agreement to pay the plaintiff the sum of $90,000 are also void. With respect to the plaintiff's motion for pendente lite relief, the defendant argued that, as a matter of law, such relief could not be granted to the plaintiff, since an action for a judgment declaring a marriage void does not come within the statutory definitions of a matrimonial action set forth in Domestic Relations Law §§ 236 B(2) and 237. In opposition, the plaintiff argued, inter alia, that (1) the lack of ecclesiastical authority to perform a marriage ceremony does not affect the validity of a marriage where either or both parties in good faith assumed such authority existed, and (2) in any event, the antenuptial agreements are enforceable. In addition, both parties, in their respective affidavits, addressed the issue of whether the plaintiff was entitled, on the merits, to pendente lite relief.

In the order appealed from the Supreme Court, Suffolk County, disposed of the motion and cross motion, insofar as is relevant to the instant appeal, as follows:

"ORDERED that this motion and cross motion are determined as follows:

"(1) Cross motion for an order granting summary judgment is denied there being a triable issue of fact as to whether the parties knew whether the marriage celebrant had the requisite authority to perform marriages in the State of New York or not and whether they believed themselves to be husband and wife;

"(2) Plaintiff is awarded and defendant is directed to pay the sum of $500.00 per week, pendente lite, for her support and maintenance. The obligation for said payments is retroactive to the date of this application, and shall be sent to plaintiff at the marital residence or such other place she may designate in writing. Furthermore, this obligation shall cease on July 1, 1988 or upon the signing of a divorce judgment, whichever comes sooner. At the expiration of this obligation as aforestated, plaintiff may make application for further support. It appears to the court that plaintiff is engaged in her own business and that this is a marriage of short duration;

"(3) During the pendency of this action, defendant is directed to maintain medical, hospital and dental insurance for plaintiff and shall pay any medical, hospital and dental expenses which are reasonable and necessary, including prescription drugs incurred for treatment rendered to plaintiff during...