Rankin Lumber Co v. Gravelet
| Decision Date | 28 April 1919 |
| Docket Number | (No. 10194.) |
| Citation | 99 S.E. 349 |
| Parties | RANKIN LUMBER CO. v. GRAVELET et al. |
| Court | South Carolina Supreme Court |
Appeal from Common Pleas Circuit Court of Williamsburg County; T. S. Sease, Judge.
Action by the Rankin Lumber Company against R. L. Graveley and others, and from an order of the common pleas circuit court, refusing a motion by the defendant, the Pee Dee Brick & Tile Company, a corporation, etc., to change the place of trial from Williamsburg county to Marion county, the defendants appeal. Order reversed.
A. F. Woods, of Marion, and Lee & Shuler, of Kingstree, for appellants.
P. H. Arrowsmith, of Florence, for respondent.
This is an appeal from an order of Judge Sease, refusing a motion made by the appellant, the Pee Dee Brick & Tile Company, to change the place of trial in this case from Williamsburg county to Marion county, in which last county the defendant, a corporation, has its principal place of business.
The exceptions, two in number, raise only one question, and that is, Shall the case be tried in Williamsburg county or Marion county?
The facts of the case show conclu-sively that the only parties to the suit who reside in Williamsburg county are the three trustees of the Hemmingway school district. The appellant is a citizen of Marion county and Graveley of Florence county. The trustees and Graveley made default. No judgment or relief of any kind is asked against the trustees. The complaint alleges that they are made parties defendant in this action, because of the fact that the bond in question was made payable to them. The trustees have no interest adverse to that of the plaintiffs. If they had sued they would have had to bring their action either in Florence or Marion county. The defendant in an action is entitled to be sued in the county in which he resides. Where there are more than one defendant residing in different counties the plaintiff can elect in which county he will sue, as the plaintiff cannot be required to sue one defendant in one county and try that case and be compelled to sue another defendant in another county and attend another trial, but he can elect which county in which a defendant resides as a place of trial. In this case we doubt whether the trustees were either necessary or proper parties. They could have sued and been plaintiffs in the action, and, had they refused, could have been made parties defendant, but there is no allegation to this effect in the complaint in this case. There is nothing in the...
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Jeter v. South Carolina Dept. of Transp., 26168.
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