Rankin v. Burnham
| Decision Date | 05 February 1929 |
| Docket Number | 21567. |
| Citation | 150 Wash. 615,274 P. 98 |
| Parties | RANKIN v. BURNHAM et ux. |
| Court | Washington Supreme Court |
Department 2.
Appeal from Superior Court, Thurston County; John M. Wilson, Judge.
Action by J. H. Rankin against C. A. Burnham and wife. Judgment of dismissal, and plaintiff appeals. Affirmed.
Alexander Mackel, of Centralia, for appellant.
Dysart & Ellsbury and Lloyd B. Dysart, all of Centralia, for respondents.
This action was instituted to recover damages claimed to have been suffered by the plaintiff resulting from false and fraudulent representations made to him by the defendants. The appeal is from the judgment of dismissal rendered upon the plaintiff's refusal to plead further after a demurrer had been sustained to his complaint.
The complaint, the allegations of fact therein being admitted by the demurrer to be true, discloses that the respondents, a marital community, owned a two-story brick building in Centralia, the second floor of which was leased by the respondents to the appellant for hotel purposes April 1 1926, for a two-year period expiring March 31, 1928, at a monthly rental of $75. There was no agreement, oral or written, for renewal of the lease upon expiration of the two-year term. The F. W. Woolworth Company conducted a mercantile business on the first floor of the same building having rented from respondents all of the premises except the second floor. A short time subsequent to the leasing of the second floor to appellant, the Woolworth Company offered $2,000 to appellant for his hotel, furniture, and the unexpired term of his lease. Appellant countered with an offer to sell for $4,000. Appellant informed respondents of his negotiations with the Woolworth Company, and in reply to his inquiry whether the entire building would be leased to that company upon the expiration of appellant's lease of the second floor, March 31, 1928, respondents advised appellant not to sell to the Woolworth Company for less than $4,000, promising they would not lease all of the building to the company unless it paid appellant the price he demanded for his furniture and lease.
On March 24, 1927, respondents leased to the Woolworth Company all of the building for the term April 1, 1928 to May 1, 1945, at an annual rental of $3,900. Appellant did not learn until December 8, 1927, that the lease had been executed, although the same was duly and regularly recorded. Relying until December 8, 1927, upon the promise of the respondents, the appellant failed to sell his business and property, which he alleges are now valueless as a result of the fraudulent representations of respondents.
The question is, as we view the facts: Is fraud predicable upon the respondents' breach of their gratuitous promise to the appellant not to lease to the Woolworth Company both floors of respondents' building upon the expiration of appellant's lease unless appellant succeeded in obtaining from the company a certain price for his furniture and unexpired lease of the second floor?
Respondents' promise to not lease all of their building until appellant had sold his property to a third person for $4,000 imposed no liability upon the appellant, the promisee, therefore not binding upon the respondents, the promisors. It was nothing more or less than a gratuitous promise. Respondents may in good faith have asserted their intention to so aid their lessee. Their change of mind, their failure to keep the offer open, does not amount to a fraud. True, the failure of performance of a promise may be without excuse or justification in morals, yet not cognizable as a fraud in law. This statement of intention merely cannot be construed as a fraudulent representation. At most, it is only an assertion of a present mental condition. The general rule relating to promises and assertions of intention is stated in 12 R. C. L. p. 254, § 21, as follows: ...
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Shook v. Scott, 34888
...to do it, from its nature cannot be true or false at the time when it is made;' 23 Am.Jur. 799, 801, § 38; See, also, Rankin v. Burnham, 150 Wash. 615, 274 P. 98, 99; and (c) '* * * were the rule otherwise, any breach of contract would amount to fraud; and that to permit a rescission for fr......
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Sweeny v. Sweeny Inv. Co.
...do something in the future, and as such, under the facts as alleged herein, cannot be the basis of an action for deceit. Rankin v. Burnham, 150 Wash. 615, 274 P. 98. rely on the case of Kritzer v. Moffat, 136 Wash. 410, 240 P. 355, 44 A.L.R. 681, as sustaining their contention that a cause ......
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Nyquist v. Foster, 32481
...to do it, from its nature cannot be true or false at the time when it is made'; 23 Am.Jur. 799, 801, § 38; see, also, Rankin v. Burnham, 150 Wash. 615, 274 P. 98, 99; and (c) '* * * were the rule otherwise, any breach of contract would amount to fraud; and that to permit a rescission for fr......
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Dalen v. Hansen, 23463.
...in their nature, and hence fraud cannot be predicated thereon, and cites Hanlon v. Nelson, 140 Wash. 123, 248 P. 59, and Rankin v. Burnham, 150 Wash. 615, 274 P. 98. These authorities have no application to the facts in case. The false and fraudulent representations made by Hansen and Kuehl......