Rankin v. Dept. of Children & Family Servs.
| Citation | 118 Ohio St.3d 392,889 N.E.2d 521,2008 Ohio 2567 |
| Decision Date | 04 June 2008 |
| Docket Number | No. 2007-0306.,2007-0306. |
| Parties | RANKIN et al., Appellees, v. CUYAHOGA COUNTY DEPARTMENT OF CHILDREN AND FAMILY SERVICES et al., Appellants. |
| Court | Ohio Supreme Court |
Levin Associates Co., L.P.A., Joel Levin, and Christopher M. Vlasich; and James A. Gay, for appellees.
William Mason, Cuyahoga County Prosecuting Attorney, and Shawn M. Mallamad, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for appellants.
Mazanec, Raskin, Ryder & Keller Co., L.P.A., John T. McLandrich, and Frank H. Scialdone, Cleveland, urging reversal for amici curiae County Commissioners Association of Ohio and County Risk Sharing Authority.
{¶ 1} Appellants, the Cuyahoga County Department of Children and Family Services, its director, James McCafferty, and its employee, Gina Zazzara, appeal from the judgment of the Court of Appeals for Cuyahoga County, which reversed the trial court's grant of summary judgment in their favor. For the following reasons, we reverse in part and affirm in part the judgment of the court of appeals.
{¶ 2} The facts of this case are troubling. D.M., a minor child, was committed to the temporary custody of the Cuyahoga Department of Children and Family Services pursuant to an order of the Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas. In re D.M. (Apr. 23, 2003), Cuyahoga C.P. No. 03900057. While D.M. was in the department's custody, D.M.'s father, Andre Martin, was permitted to have limited, supervised visits with D.M. at the Jane Edna Hunter Social Service Center. During one of Martin's supervised visitation sessions, Martin allegedly sexually assaulted D.M. Martin was indicted in connection with this alleged assault and pleaded guilty to a charge of gross sexual imposition and stipulated that he is a sexually oriented offender. State v. Martin (Oct. 21, 2003), Cuyahoga C.P. No. CR441511.
{¶ 3} Appellees, D.M.'s mother, as mother and next friend of D.M., and D.M.'s maternal grandmother, as guardian, filed a civil complaint against the appellants, alleging that appellants had breached the duty they owed to D.M. by failing to protect her from Martin's sexual abuse during the supervised visit at the center. The trial court granted appellants' motion for summary judgment, which had argued that pursuant to R.C. Chapter 2744, they were immune from liability.
{¶ 4} The court of appeals reversed the trial court judgment, holding that there were genuine issues of material fact pertaining to the liability of all appellants.
{¶ 5} The court of appeals determined that the "special relationship" exception discussed in Sawicki v. Ottawa Hills (1988), 37 Ohio St.3d 222, 525 N.E.2d 468, creates an issue of fact regarding the immunity of a political subdivision from civil liability. Rankin v. Cuyahoga Cty. Dept. of Children & Family Servs., Cuyahoga App. No. 86620, 2006-Ohio-6759, ¶ 2006 WL 3743728, ¶ 22.
{¶ 6} With respect to appellants McCafferty and Zazzara, the court of appeals held that reasonable minds could conclude that McCafferty and Zazzara had acted recklessly when they permitted the supervised visit between D.M. and her father to be conducted in such a manner that Martin was able to sexually assault his daughter during the visit. Id. at ¶ 28. The court determined that under R.C. 2744.03(A)(6)(b), if an individual's actions are proven to be conducted in a reckless manner, then individual immunity no longer applies. Rankin at ¶ 27. The cause is before us upon our acceptance of a discretionary appeal.
{¶ 7} The first question presented by appellants concerns the liability of the Cuyahoga County Department of Children and Family Services. The court of appeals concluded that the common-law special-relationship exception to a political subdivision's immunity granted pursuant to R.C. 2744.02(A)(1) may authorize a lawsuit to proceed. We hold that the exception does not apply.
{¶ 8} R.C. Chapter 2744 directs our analysis. "In Cater v. Cleveland (1998), 83 Ohio St.3d 24, 28, 697 N.E.2d 610, this court noted that the Political Subdivision Tort Liability Act, codified in R.C. Chapter 2744, sets forth a three-tiered analysis for determining whether a political subdivision is immune from liability for injury or loss to property." Hortman v. Miamisburg, 110 Ohio St.3d 194, 2006-Ohio-4251, 852 N.E.2d 716, ¶ 9. Before determining whether a political subdivision is entitled to immunity from a civil action, a court must determine whether the political subdivision was engaged in a governmental or proprietary function when the alleged tort occurred. See R.C. 2744.02(A)(1). R.C. 2744.01 defines "governmental function":
{¶ 9} "(C)(1) `Governmental function' means a function of a political subdivision that is specified in division (C)(2) of this section or that satisfies any of the following:
{¶ 10} "* * *
{¶ 11} "(2) A `governmental function' includes, but is not limited to, the following:
{¶ 12} "* * *
{¶ 13} "(m) The operation of a job and family services department or agency, including, but not limited to, the provision of assistance to aged and infirm persons and to persons who are indigent.
{¶ 14} "* * * {¶ 15} "(o) The operation of mental health facilities, mental retardation or developmental disabilities facilities, alcohol treatment and control centers, and children's homes or agencies."
{¶ 16} Under either R.C. 2744.01(C)(2)(m) or (o), Cuyahoga County Department of Children and Family Services is a political subdivision performing a governmental function. We next apply the three-tiered analysis provided in R.C. Chapter 2744 to determine whether the department may be held liable in a civil action for injury.
{¶ 17} The first tier of the analysis provides that political subdivisions are generally not liable in damages for causing the personal injuries or death of a person. R.C. 2744.02(A)(1) states: 1
{¶ 18} " " Hortman, 110 Ohio St.3d 194, 2006-Ohio-4251, 852 N.E.2d 716, ¶ 12, quoting Cater, 83 Ohio St.3d at 28, 697 N.E.2d 610.
{¶ 19} R.C. 2744.02 provides:
{¶ 20} "(B) Subject to sections 2744.03 and 2744.05 of the Revised Code, a political subdivision is liable in damages in a civil action for injury, death, or loss to person or property allegedly caused by an act or omission of the political subdivision or of any of its employees in connection with a governmental or proprietary function, as follows:
{¶ 21} "(1) Except as otherwise provided * * *, political subdivisions are liable for injury, death, or loss to person or property caused by the negligent operation of any motor vehicle by their employees when the employees are engaged within the scope of their employment and authority. The following are full defenses to that liability:
{¶ 22} "* * * {¶ 23} "(2) Except as otherwise provided * * *, political subdivisions are liable for injury, death, or loss to person or property caused by the negligent performance of acts by their employees with respect to proprietary functions of the political subdivisions.
{¶ 24} "(3) Except as otherwise provided * * *, political subdivisions are liable for injury, death, or loss to person or property caused by their negligent failure to keep public roads in repair and other negligent failure to remove obstructions from public roads * * *.
{¶ 25} "(4) Except as otherwise provided * * *, political subdivisions are liable for injury, death, or loss to person or property that is caused by the negligence of their employees and that occurs within or on the grounds of, and is due to physical defects within or on the grounds of, buildings that are used in connection with the performance of a governmental function * * *.
{¶ 26}
{¶ 27} "`Finally, under the third tier of analysis, immunity can be reinstated if the political subdivision can successfully argue that any of the defenses contained in R.C. 2744.03 applies.'" Hortman, 110 Ohio St.3d 194, 2006-Ohio-4251, 852 N.E.2d 716, ¶ 12, quoting Cater, 83 Ohio St.3d at 28, 697 N.E.2d 610.
{¶ 28} Applying the three-tiered analysis, we conclude that the department cannot be held liable for appellees' injuries. Pursuant to R.C. 2744.02(A)(1), the department cannot be subjected to liability for D.M.'s injuries unless one of the exceptions provided in R.C. 2744.02(B) applies to the case.
{¶ 29} R.C. 2744.02(B) lists five exceptions to the general denial of liability; however, none of the exceptions applies to these facts. The injuries in this case did not involve the operation of a...
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