Rankin v. New York, N. H. & H. R. Co.

• Decision Date: 05 December 1958
• Citation: 154 N.E.2d 613,338 Mass. 178
• Court: United States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts Supreme Court
• Parties: Albert Edward RANKIN v. The NEW YORK, NEW HAVEN & HARTFORD RAILROAD CO.

Page 613

154 N.E.2d 613

338 Mass. 178

Albert Edward RANKIN v. The NEW YORK, NEW HAVEN & HARTFORD RAILROAD CO.

Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, Worcester.

Argued Sept. 22, 1958.

Decided Dec. 5, 1958.

John J. O'Connell, Northampton, for plaintiff.

Noel W. Deering, Boston, for defendant.

Before WILKINS, C. J., and RONAN, SPALDING, WILLIAMS, COUNIHAN, WHITTEMORE and CUTTER, JJ.

CUTTER, Justice.

This action of tort was brought under the Federal Employers' Liability Act, 45 U.S.C. (1952) § 51 et seq. [45 U.S.C.A. § 51 et seq.] (hereinafter called the act). The plaintiff's bill of exceptions presents the question whether the trial judge correctly directed a verdict for the defendant.

The case was referred to an auditor whose report, together with certain documentary evidence, was introduced in evidence at the jury trial. The facts, in their aspect most favorable to the plaintiff, are stated below.

The plaintiff was a track worker, subject to the act, employed by the defendant. On September 12, 1952, he was put in charge of three men and told to move some rails wthin the defendant's yards. Each rail weighed between six hundred and eight hundred pounds, and was carried by means of two pairs of tongs. One pair was used to lift each end of a rail and the plaintiff and each of the other three men in the group held one handle of a pair of tongs.

The four men moved several rails with difficulty. Before moving another rail, the plaintiff 'instructed his coworkers on the other end of the rail not to drop their end until he gave them a signal to do so.' While carrying this rail, 'suddenly without warning the two men on the other end of the rail dropped their end. * * * To avoid being struck by the rail, the plaintiff jumped and as he did his left foot * * * went into a hole * * * [about six inches deep and twelve inches square] recently * * * dug * * * causing the plaintiff severe injury.'

The plaintiff received hospital treatment and thereafter remained under regular treatment by a physician in the employ of the defendant. In June, 1954, he was again admitted to the hospital. 'The diagnosis of a ruptured disc was arrived at and on July 27, 1954,' he underwent an operation. His aggregate hospital and medical bills amounted to $1,420.60.

From October 9, 1952, to March 20, 1953, the defendant made a number of payments to the plaintiff amounting in the aggregate to $2,400. On March 20, 1953, the 'plaintiff signed a general release prepared by the defendant releasing the defendant 'on account of damages of whatever * * * description now existing or which may arise * * * out of the injuries * * * received by me at * * * Worcester * * * on * * * 12th * * * September, 1952.' * * * [T]he plaintiff also wrote on the release * * * 'I have read this release and understand it.''

Despite the release, the auditor found for the plaintiff and assessed damages in the sum of $12,400 from which the sum of $2,400 already paid was to be deducted. Further findings of the auditor about the release are discussed below in connection with the consideration of its validity.

The defendant at the trial before a jury introduced in evidence the release itself and an instrument, dated March 20, 1953, purporting to be signed by the plaintiff, reading, 'I have this day executed a general release for $2400.00 on account of injuries sustained by me on September 12, 1952. I agree that none of the amount received is payment for time lost, and that I have no right or claim to any payment for time lost.' There was also in evidence a letter, dated March 2, 1953, from the plaintiff reading in part, 'I am writing you on [sic] regards to a settlement that you and I were talking about the last time that you were here. I am ready to make a settlement for four months pay and I will not return to the Railroad. * * * If this agreement is agreeable with you drop me a line and I will sign all papers that will have to be taken care of.'

1. Federal law, and not the law of Massachusetts, applies to the issue under the act whether the evidence warrants a finding that the defendant was negligent. Labonte v. New York, N. H. & H. R. R. Co., 333 Mass. 420, 421-422, 131 N.E.2d 203, certiorari denied 351 U.S. 974, 76 S.Ct. 1033, 100 L.Ed. 420; Ellis v. Union Pac. R. R. Co., 329 U.S. 649, 653, 67 S.Ct. 598, 91 L.Ed. 572; Rogers v. Missouri Pac. R. Co., 352 U.S. 500, 507, note 13, 77 S.Ct. 443, 1 L.Ed.2d 493. Federal law also controls the determination whether the release of liability under the act is valid. Dice v. Akron, C. & Y. R. Co., 342 U.S. 359, 361-364, 72 S.Ct. 312, 96 L.Ed. 398. See South Buffalo Ry. Co. v. Ahern, 344 U.S. 367, 372, 73 S.Ct. 340, 97 L.Ed. 395. See also McCarthy v. New York, N. H. & H. R. R. Co., 285 Mass. 211, 215, 189 N.E. 30.

2. The subsidiary findings of the auditor would warrant a jury in finding that the defendant was chargeable with negligence under the act. 'Under this statute the test of a jury case is simply whether the proofs justify with reason the conclusion that employer negligence played any part, even the slightest, in producing the injury or death for which damages are sought. * * * The statute expressly imposes liability upon the employer to pay damages for injury or death due 'in whole or in part' to its negligence.' Rogers v. Missouri Pac. R. Co., 352 U.S. 500, 506-507, 77 S.Ct. 443, 448, 1 L.Ed.2d 493. 45 U.S.C. (1952) § 51 [45 U.S.C.A. § 51]. The act expressly makes the employer liable, to persons entitled to benefits of the act, for the negligent acts of fellow employees (Hietala v. Boston & Albany R. R. Co., 295 Mass. 186, 187-188, 3 N.E.2d 377, certiorari denied 299 U.S. 589, 57 S.Ct. 116, 81 L.Ed. 434). Recent decisions of a majority of the Supreme Court have held that, under this act, very slight evidence, from which negligence might conceivably be inferred, requires the submission of the case to a jury. Webb v. Illinois Cent. R. R. Co., 352 U.S. 512, 77 S.Ct. 451, 1 L.Ed.2d 503; Herdman v. Pennsylvania R. R. Co., 352 U.S. 518, 77 S.Ct. 455, 1 L.Ed.2d 508; Moore v. Terminal R. R. Ass'n of St. Louis, 358 U.S. 31, 79 S.Ct. 2, 3 L.Ed.2d 25. See Rogers v. Missouri Pac. R. R., supra, 352 U.S. at pages 503-504, 77 S.Ct. 443; McBride v. Toledo Terminal R. R. Co., 354 U.S. 517, 77 S.Ct. 1398, 1 L.Ed.2d 1534; Ringhiser v. Chesapeake & O. Ry. Co., 354 U.S. 901, 77 S.Ct. 1093, 1 L.Ed.2d 268. See also Arnold v. Panhandle & S. F. Ry. Co., 353 U.S. 360, 77 S.Ct. 840, 1 L.Ed.2d 889; and cases collected in Sinkler v. Missouri Pac. R. R. Co., 356 U.S. 326, 332-333, note 1, 78 S.Ct. 758, 2 L.Ed.2d 799.

The presence of a newly dug hole (six inches deep and twelve inches square) in a railroad yard, where minor changes in conditions and slight irregularities in ground surface might well be expected, by itself hardly seems sufficient basis for a finding that the railroad provided the plaintiff with an unsafe place to work. Labonte v. New York, N. H. & H. R. R. Co., 333 Mass. 420, 424, 131 N.E.2d 203, certiorari denied 351 U.S. 974, 76 S.Ct. 1033, 100 L.Ed. 1492. The jury, however, would have been warranted in finding that the sudden dropping, without warning and despite the plaintiff's instructions to his coworkers, of one end of the rail was negligent conduct for which the defendant was responsible under the act. See McCurry v. Thompson, 352 Mo. 1199, 1204-1206, 181 S.W.2d 529; Cules v. Northern Pac. Ry. Co., 105 Wash. 281, 285, 177 P. 830. See also New York Cent. R. R. Co. v. Marcone, 281 U.S. 345, 349-350, 50 S.Ct. 294, 74 L.Ed. 892. This conduct could be found to have caused the plaintiff to jump to avoid being hit, without opportunity to select his landing place carefully. See Kane v. Worcester Consol. St. Ry. Co., 182 Mass. 201, 202, 65 N.E. 54; Rollins v. Boston & Maine R. R., 321 Mass. 586, 589, 74 N.E.2d 664; Holmes v. New York Cent. R. R. Co., 330 Mass. 155, 160, 111 N.E.2d 745; Chicago Great Western Ry. Co. v. Scovel, 8 Cir., 232 F.2d 952, 957, certiorari denied 352 U.S. 835, 77 S.Ct. 53, 1 L.Ed.2d 54; Prosser, Torts, 2d Ed., 137-138; Harper and James, Torts, § 16.11. See also Rogers v. Missouri Pac. R. R. Co., 352 U.S. 500, 502-504, 77 S.Ct. 443.

3. The defendant pleads in its answer that the plaintiff is barred from recovery by his general release dated March 20, 1953, which the auditor found that the plaintiff signed. This finding was not contradicted by other evidence. The plaintiff contends, however, that there was evidence upon the basis of which (under the Federal decisions) the jury would have been warranted in finding that the circumstances were such as to enable the plaintiff to avoid the release. See Shaw v. Victoria Coach Line, Inc., 314 Mass. 262, 264, 50 N.E.2d 27.

The pertinent findings of the auditor with respect to the release were as follows: (1) Weekly payments of $100 each were made to the plaintiff, over a period of twelve weeks. A $300 payment was made on March 1, 1953. The claim adjuster 'told the plaintiff that he was paying him the wages which he would have earned if * * * employed' and the plaintiff believed this. (2) The claim agent 'represented' that a payment of $900 to the plaintiff, made on March 20, 1953, when the general release was signed, 'was likewise for additional wages.' The plaintiff was 'not aware that he was signing a release of all claims.' (3) 'At the time that the plaintiff signed this release, he believed that it was for back wages due to him.' (4) The plaintiff then 'was not aware of the extent or nature of his injuries * * * nor did the defendant's physician who attended him at that time tell him to what extent * * * the plaintiff was injured.' (5) 'On the day that the plaintiff signed the release he did not read' it and he 'was under the influence of intoxicating liquor.' (6) The plaintiff underwent substantial medical treatment after March 20, 1953, for spinal injuries, the true nature of which appears to have been disagnosed in June or July, 1954. The...