Rankin v. State, 2D01-3990.
Decision Date | 12 December 2003 |
Docket Number | No. 2D01-3990.,2D01-3990. |
Citation | 861 So.2d 1222 |
Parties | Robert W. RANKIN, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee. |
Court | Florida District Court of Appeals |
Robert W. Rankin challenges the trial court's order summarily denying his motion and amended motion for postconviction relief filed pursuant to Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.850. We affirm without prejudice to Rankin filing a facially sufficient claim under rule 3.850 regarding two of the four grounds that he asserted in his motions.
The attachments to the trial court's order show that in trial court case number 97-9354, Rankin entered guilty pleas to aggravated battery of a law enforcement officer and aggravated assault on a law enforcement officer.1 At the plea hearing, Rankin's counsel objected to the sentencing guidelines scoresheet, stating, The trial court responded that Rankin would be able to litigate and discuss that issue, apparently at the time of sentencing, as long as he understood that it was an open plea.
The sentencing hearing was postponed to allow Rankin an opportunity to provide substantial assistance to law enforcement. Rankin was represented by substitute counsel at the sentencing hearing, and according to Rankin's own statements, he was unable to provide substantial assistance to law enforcement. Rankin's counsel stated to the trial court that he had advised Rankin that he wanted to challenge the scoring of victim injury but could not do so because "[t]he scoresheet that was submitted at the time of Mr. Rankin's pleas was agreed to by counsel for Mr. Rankin at that time."2 Counsel requested a downward departure on the basis that Rankin required specialized treatment for drug addiction and that he was amenable to such treatment. The State requested a guidelines prison sentence.
In his rule 3.850 motion, Rankin alleged that substitute counsel was ineffective for failing to object to the incorrect scoring of forty victim injury points on the sentencing scoresheet. The trial court denied the claim, finding that substitute counsel's performance was not defective because "counsel did bring the aforementioned 40 points to the Court's attention, and explained on the record, the presence of Defendant [sic], as to why he could not contest the aforementioned points on the sentencing guidelines scoresheet." The trial court found that because substitute counsel's performance was not deficient, it need not address the prejudice component of Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984). The trial court's reasoning was erroneous because at the plea hearing, Rankin's original counsel specifically objected to the scoring of victim injury points and the trial court agreed that the issue would be litigated and discussed at the sentencing hearing. Additionally, substitute counsel was incorrect in stating that Rankin's prior counsel had agreed to the scoresheet.
Although the trial court's analysis was incorrect, we must affirm the denial of relief on this ground because Rankin failed to state a facially sufficient claim of ineffectiveness of substitute counsel. A claim that a plea was involuntarily entered based on trial counsel's failure to object to an inaccurate scoresheet is a cognizable rule 3.850 claim. See Herman v. State, 795 So.2d 1000 (Fla. 2d DCA 2001)
. However, a defendant raising such a claim must allege that he would not have entered his plea had he been aware of the correct guidelines sentencing range. See Kleppinger v. State, 760 So.2d 1045, 1046 (Fla. 2d DCA 2000) (citing Skidmore v. State, 688 So.2d 1014 (Fla. 3d DCA 1997)); Smith v. State, 741 So.2d 579, 580 (Fla. 3d DCA 1999). Because Rankin failed to allege that he would not have entered his pleas had he been aware of the correct sentencing range, his claim is facially insufficient.
We note that Rankin may have a valid claim that his plea was involuntarily entered because he entered it in the mistaken belief that counse...
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...that a plea was involuntarily entered based on a scoresheet miscalculation falls within the purview of Rule 3.850); Rankin v. State, 861 So.2d 1222, 1224 (Fla. 2d DCA 2003) (confirming that Rule 3.850 governs a claim that a defendant would not have entered a plea had he been aware of the co......
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