Rankin v. State

• Decision Date: 14 July 1997
• Docket Number: No. CR,CR
• Citation: 329 Ark. 379,948 S.W.2d 397
• Parties: Roderick Leshun RANKIN, Appellant, v. STATE of Arkansas, Appellee. 96-1025.
• Court: Arkansas Supreme Court

Page 397

948 S.W.2d 397

329 Ark. 379

Roderick Leshun RANKIN, Appellant, v. STATE of Arkansas, Appellee.

No. CR 96-1025.

Supreme Court of Arkansas.

July 14, 1997.

Gene E. McKissic, Pine Bluff, for Appellant.

Winston Bryant, Attorney General, Brad Newman, Assistant Attorney General, Little Rock, for Appellee.

NEWBERN, Justice.

Roderick Leshun Rankin, the appellant, was sentenced to death for the capital murders of Zena Reynolds, her mother Ernestine Halford, and her stepfather Nathaniel Halford. Mr. Rankin raises six points on appeal. Most of Mr. Rankin's assignments of error are either meritless or procedurally barred from review. Mr. Rankin's argument concerning the admission of his incriminating custodial statements is, however, well taken. Mr. Rankin asserts that the Trial Court admitted his statements into evidence without first holding a hearing on his motion to suppress. As the record fails to reflect whether a hearing was held on the motion or whether a ruling was made, we reverse and remand. On remand, the Trial Court shall conduct a hearing on the record for the limited purpose of determining whether Mr. Rankin's statements were made after knowingly and intelligently waiving his right against self-incrimination.

At trial, the State introduced the testimony of Sonyae Reynolds, who was the sister of victim Zena Reynolds and the daughter of victim Ernestine Halford. Ms. Reynolds testified that she hid in a closet in the victims' home during the attack. She said that she believed the assailant was Mr. Rankin because she saw the assailant wearing clothes that she knew to be similar to Mr. Rankin's clothes. Ms. Reynolds admitted that she did not see the assailant's face and that she had previously told the police that the assailant was not Mr. Rankin because she thought the assailant had shorter legs than Mr. Rankin. The type of clothing described by Ms. Reynolds was later discovered at Mr. Rankin's home and admitted into evidence.

Ms. Reynolds's testimony established a motive for the murder. According to her testimony, Mr. Rankin had repeatedly threatened to kill Ms. Reynolds and her family if she left him. The testimony showed that Mr. Rankin and Ms. Reynolds were having "relationship problems" and that Mr. Rankin was often jealous of Ms. Reynolds's other male friends and had hit her on other occasions.

Sharon Carter, who lived next to the victims' home, testified that she saw someone fleeing after hearing the door being kicked open and then gunshots. She said that the person fleeing was tall. Her description of the clothes worn by this person was generally consistent with the description given by Ms. Reynolds and consistent with the type of clothes discovered at Mr. Rankin's home.

The scientific evidence established that a pistol found near the victims' home was used in the murder. That pistol, along with a VCR and some CDs, had been stolen from the home of Ernest R. Demmings, a local fireman. The evidence showed that the VCR and CDs were found at Mr. Rankin's home. The VCR in fact appeared to be hidden under dirty clothes. Although the evidence did not show that the pistol was ever seen at Mr. Rankin's home, the State argued that Mr. Rankin had come into possession of the murder weapon when he came into possession of the VCR and CDs.

Detective James Cooper of the Pine Bluff Police Department testified that he had been interrogating Mr. Rankin on the day of his arrest when he was told the murder weapon had been discovered. Detective Cooper testified that he relayed that information to Mr. Rankin. Another officer showed the pistol to Mr. Rankin, who responded, "you don't have to show me that because I'm going to talk to you." The police then began to record the interrogation. The jury received transcripts of the interrogation and heard the tape played in court.

In the interrogation, the police officers asked Mr. Rankin if he had kicked in the door to the victims' house and shot the victims. They asked Mr. Rankin if he had experienced problems with Sonyae Reynolds; whether such problems led him to commit the murders; whether he was wearing blue shoes on the morning of the murders; and whether he had seen blood on the shoes. They asked him whether the gun that they had shown him was the murder weapon and whether he had placed it at the location where it was discovered. Mr. Rankin's response to each of these questions was a simple "Yes, sir."

The police also asked Mr. Rankin who he saw first when he entered the house. He answered that he first saw Zena Reynolds and her children on the couch. The officers asked Mr. Rankin what happened next, and he answered, "I don't know. It just--then everybody start running out and I--I guess I got scared." The officers asked him if he then started shooting, and he answered "Yes, sir." Mr. Rankin told the police that he shot Zena Reynolds, then Mrs. Halford, then Mr. Halford. He told the officers that he knew Sonyae Reynolds was also in the house but that he got scared and left. At the conclusion of the first interrogation, Mr. Rankin stated that "this is not what I meant to happen and I'm sorry, but I know that won't bring them back." In the second interrogation that occurred on the afternoon of Mr. Rankin's arrest, the police asked Mr. Rankin how he arrived at the victims' home. He answered, "I walked." Thereafter, Mr. Rankin reached for the tape recorder, turned it off, and indicated that he no longer wished to talk with the police.

1. Sufficiency of the evidence

Mr. Rankin argues that the evidence was insufficient to support his capital-murder convictions and that the Trial Court therefore erred in denying his motion for directed verdict. We must address this point before considering other assignments of trial error in order to preserve Mr. Rankin's right to freedom from double jeopardy. Bradford v. State, 325 Ark. 278, 283, 927 S.W.2d 329, 331 (1996). We conclude that Mr. Rankin has failed to preserve the question of the sufficiency of the evidence for review and thus affirm on this point without reaching the merits.

Arkansas Rule of Criminal Procedure 33.1 requires a defendant to renew his motion for directed verdict at the "close of the case" in order to preserve for review any question pertaining to the sufficiency of the evidence to support the jury verdict. Even if a defendant renews his motion at the close of his case-in-chief, the requirement of the rule to renew the motion at the "close of the case" obligates the defendant to renew the motion again at the close of any rebuttal case that the State may present in order to preserve the sufficiency issue for appeal. Heard v State, 322 Ark. 553, 557, 910 S.W.2d 663, 665 (1995); Christian v. State, 318 Ark. 813, 816, 889 S.W.2d 717, 719 (1994). The renewal of the motion for directed verdict must occur before the jury is charged. Webb v. State, 326 Ark. 878, 879, 935 S.W.2d 250, 251 (1996). An "attempt to renew a motion for directed verdict after the jury has been charged is not timely and is not in compliance with the rule." Claiborne v. State, 319 Ark. 602, 603, 892 S.W.2d 511, 512 (1995). See Marshall v. State, 316 Ark. 753, 875 S.W.2d 814 (1994); Thomas v. State, 315 Ark. 504, 868 S.W.2d 483 (1994).

Counsel for Mr. Rankin moved for a directed verdict at the close of the State's case and renewed the motion at the close of Mr. Rankin's case-in-chief. The motions were denied. The State then presented its rebuttal case. The State rested, and defense counsel indicated that he had no "surrebuttal." The judge told the jury that the evidence-taking portion of the trial had concluded, and he read the jury instructions. The State made its closing arguments, and defense counsel made his closing arguments. After a recess, the State presented a rebuttal argument.

Defense counsel did not attempt to renew the motion for directed verdict until after the State had completed its rebuttal argument. By that time, the jury had been charged, and closing arguments had been concluded. The attempt to renew the motion therefore was not timely. Because the motion was made after the jury had been charged, the motion was not renewed "at the close of the case," and thus the sufficiency argument was not preserved for review.

2. Mistrial

Mr. Rankin also argues that his conviction should be reversed because two of the State's witnesses, apparently in violation of an order of the Trial Court granting a motion in limine, testified that blood or possible blood stains were found on Mr. Rankin's tennis shoe. Mr. Rankin contends that this testimony was prejudicial and required the Trial Court to order a mistrial. Prior to trial, Mr. Rankin moved in limine to exclude any laboratory reports or testimony showing that human blood had been found on Mr. Rankin's tennis shoe and blue jeans. The motion stated that the Arkansas State Crime Laboratory was unable to determine whether blood found on these items was related to the murders. The record does not contain a ruling from the Trial Court on Mr. Rankin's motion in limine.

During the State's case-in-chief, Cathy Ruhl, a forensic crime-scene technician with the Pine Bluff Police Department, testified that she received a pair of navy blue Reeboks and a pair of black-top tennis shoes that the police had taken from Mr. Rankin's home during a consensual search. Ms. Ruhl identified the Reeboks in court and testified without objection that they "were sent to the State Crime Lab to have serology done on them" because one of the shoes contained "possible blood stains." Ms. Ruhl testified without objection that the black-top tennis shoes were not sent to the Lab because "[t]here were no visible signs of stains on the shoes."

Detective Daniel Dykes of the Pine Bluff Police Department later testified that he participated in a consensual search of Mr. Rankin's home along with other officers on the morning of the murders. Detective Dykes stated that the police located one pair of tennis...