Ransdell v. International Shoe Co.

• Decision Date: 20 November 1931
• Docket Number: 30376
• Citation: 44 S.W.2d 1,329 Mo. 47
• Parties: Thelma Fay Ransdell, Appellant, v. International Shoe Company
• Court: Missouri Supreme Court

44 S.W.2d 1

329 Mo. 47

Thelma Fay Ransdell, Appellant, v. International Shoe Company

No. 30376

Supreme Court of Missouri

November 20, 1931

Appeal from Marion Circuit Court; Hon. C. T. Hays, Judge.

Reversed and remanded.

Walter H. Juett and Roy Hamlin for appellant.

The injury arose out of and in the course of the employment. The Compensation Act provides that the employer is to "furnish compensation under the provisions of this act for personal injuries or death of employee by accident arising out of and in the course of his employment." It is the manifest purpose of the act to compensate all accidental injuries to workmen arising out of and in the course of their employment. Howe v. Nurseries & Orchard Co. (Mo. App.), 22 S.W.2d 844; Sec. 76, Laws 1927, p 522; M'Quibban v. Menzies, 10 N. C. C. A. 480.

Dean Moneymaker and Mahan, Mahan & Fuller for respondent.

(1) The accident and injury complained of did not arise out of and during the course of the employment, and there was no compensation due the appellant. The evidence disclosed that the accident did not occur where the claimant's services required her to be, nor while she was performing any duty of her employment. Cassidy v. Eternit Inc., 32 S.W.2d 78; Bise v. Tarlton, 35 S.W.2d 995; Wahlig v Grocery Co., 29 S.W.2d 130. (2) Findings of Workmen's Compensation Commission are conclusive if sustained by substantial and competent evidence. In determining sufficiency of evidence to sustain finding of facts by the commission, appellate courts will look only to evidence most favorable. Bricker v. Gille Mfg. Co., 35 S.W.2d 662; Woods v. Am. Coal & Ice Co., 25 S.W.2d 144; Bise v. Tarlton, 35 S.W.2d 994; State ex rel. Syrup Co. v. Workmen's Compensation Commission, 8 S.W.2d 897; Kinder v. Hannibal Car Wheel & Foundry Co., 18 S.W.2d 92; Stone v. Blackmer & Post Pipe Co., 27 S.W.2d 460.

OPINION

Gantt P. J.

An employee seeks to recover from her employer compensation for injury. In due time her claim was filed with the commission. The employer answered that the injury did not grow out of her employment.

On a hearing before a referee, a finding was made as follows:

"That Thelma Fay (Dowell) Ransdell on or about November 5, 1928, while in the employ of International Shoe Company, sustained an accidental injury arising out of and in the course of her employment resulting in permanent partial disability to her right (major) ring finger."

On motion of the employer, the commission reviewed the finding and disposed of the claim as follows:

"On review award dated October 19, 1929, is hereby reversed and set aside with the finding that the accident did not arise out of and in the course of claimant's employment."

Thereupon she appealed to the circuit court. On a hearing in said court the finding of the commission was affirmed and claimant appealed.

In the circuit court claimant challenged the validity of the Compensation Act on constitutional grounds. The record presents the questions to this court for determination. It will not be necessary to consider these questions, for we have recently ruled them against claimant in DeMay v. Liberty Foundry Co., 327 Mo. 495, 37 S.W.2d 641; State ex rel. Syrup Co. v. Compensation Commission, 320 Mo. 893, l. c. 898, 8 S.W.2d 897, l. c. 899.

Thus this review is reduced to a consideration of the contention of the employer that the injury did not arise out of and in the course of claimant's employment.

The undisputed facts follow: Claimant worked in the trimming department of the shoe factory. On the day in question she was casing tongues at a table near the embossing machine. The machine in operation stamped the name of the shoe company on "sock linings" used in lining shoes. It was heated by electricity and should be at a certain temperature while in operation. The regular operator of the machine was absent. In this situation an employee was assigned to the machine who was not an experienced operator. After turning on the power she waited for the machine to be heated to the proper temperature for embossing. After waiting for this purpose, she turned and said to claimant: "This machine is not heating." Thereupon claimant, who was an experienced operator, went to the machine. Usually the temperature was tested by stamping "sock linings" used for that purpose. In the absence of said linings, claimant proceeded in the customary way to test the temperature by placing her hand on the machine. When she did so the machine was in some way tripped, which caused it to operate, thereby injuring claimant's hand.

In construing the phrases "arising out of" and "in the course of employment" as used in the compensation acts, it was said:

"If a workman depart temporarily from his usual avocation to perform some act necessary to be done by someone for his master, he does not cease to be acting in the course of his employment. He is then acting for his master, not for himself. A rule of law which puts such an employee outside his usual course of employment and so deprived him of his right to compensation for an injury suffered, would punish energy and loyalty and helpfulness and promote sloth and inactivity in employees. It would certainly prove detrimental to industry, and such a spirit of disregard of the master's interest, if carried into all of the work, would in time...