Ransom v. City of Burlington

• Decision Date: 13 April 1900
• Citation: 82 N.W. 427,111 Iowa 77
• Parties: WM. OTIS RANSOM, Appellant, v. THE CITY OF BURLINGTON
• Court: Iowa Supreme Court

82 N.W. 427

111 Iowa 77

WM. OTIS RANSOM, Appellant, v. THE CITY OF BURLINGTON

Supreme Court of Iowa, Des Moines

April 13, 1900

Appeal from Des Moines District Court.--HON. W. S. WITHROW, Judge.

ACTION in equity to cancel an assessment for paving a street, made against real estate belonging to plaintiff. The answer put plaintiff's right to the relief in issue. There was a trial to the court, and from a decree dismissing the petition at plaintiff's costs, he appeals.

Affirmed.

E. S Huston for appellant.

Geo. S Tracy for appellee.

OPINION

WATERMAN, J.

The facts are not in dispute. Plaintiff was the owner of a tract of land in Burlington which had a north frontage on Grand street of two hundred and ninety-three feet. In August, 1895 a resolution to pave Grand street was duly adopted by the city council. September 6, 1895, plaintiff executed to one Charles G. Perkins a deed for the north fifteen feet of said tract. September 30, 1895, the resolution to pave Grand street was vetoed by the mayor. On May 3, 1897, a further resolution to pave said street was adopted by the council. Bids were solicited for the work, and on May 16th following the contract was let. Later an assessment for a part of the cost of such work was levied against the land of plaintiff, no regard being had to the conveyance of the fifteen-foot strip. Plaintiff's claim is that the strip conveyed to Perkins is alone subject to assessment, no part of the remaining real estate abutting on the street while defendant contends that the conveyance to Perkins was merely pretended, that it was fraudulent, being voluntary, without consideration, and made for the express purpose of defeating the assessment, and therefore it should be disregarded. It will be noticed that a resolution ordering the paving of Grand street had been adopted when the conveyance to Perkins was made. It was vetoed thereafter Plaintiff admits that his purpose in making the deed was to relieve his property from the burden of an assessment that seemed pending. The assessment here amounts to seven hundred and seventy-nine dollars and fifty-eight cents. The value of the fifteen-foot strip is about one hundred dollars. If plaintiff's claim is sustained, his property practically escapes liability for the improvement made.

While one may lawfully dispose of his property to escape taxation,--even taxation of a general character,--the law will not uphold any mere manipulation, under the guise of disposition, the only effect of which is to defeat a tax. Mitchell v. Board, 91 U.S. 206, 23 L.Ed. 302; Shotwell v. Moore, 129 U.S. 590, 32 L.Ed. 827, 9 S.Ct. 362 (9 S.Ct. Rep. 262.) Unless the conveyance to Perkins was valid as against plaintiff, he surely has no standing in court; and we think, in a case of this kind, after the grantor's intent is shown, the burden rests upon him to...