Ransom v. Mellor

• Decision Date: 13 May 1941
• Docket Number: 44981.
• Citation: 297 N.W. 861,230 Iowa 451
• Parties: RANSOM et al. v. MELLOR et al.
• Court: Iowa Supreme Court

297 N.W. 861

230 Iowa 451

RANSOM et al. v. MELLOR et al.

No. 44981.

Supreme Court of Iowa.

May 13, 1941

Appeal from District Court, Des Moines County; Oscar Hale, Judge.

Action in equity for construction of will. Upon motions of defendants action was dismissed. From said rulings and judgment thereon, plaintiff appeals.

Affirmed.

Lane & Waterman, of Davenport, and Mark A. Walsh and Donald J Pierr, both of Burlington, for appellants.

Ben P Poor and C. C. Clark, both of Burlington, for appellees.

OLIVER, Justice.

Action in equity to construe the will and codicil of James J Ransom, deceased, which has been admitted to and is now in course of probate in the District Court of Des Moines County Iowa. Testator died in 1928. His heirs at law were William O. Ransom (the original plaintiff herein), who was the son of a deceased brother, and 7 daughters of a deceased sister. The will, after providing for the payment of debts and several bequests not material hereto, directs the executors to convert the residuary estate (then all personalty) into money, " or if not invested in such securities at the date of my death, into such securities as may be suitable to constitute a trust fund, and such money and securities shall be placed with a reliable trust company, to be selected by my said Executrix and Executors, and said trust fund shall be by said trust company carefully managed in such a manner as will produce the largest income consistent with safe and conservative investments, and the net income from said trust fund shall be divided into" shares which shall be paid (in the respective proportions therein specified) to the nephew, the 7 nieces and Lena Kurrle (a former employee) " for and during their lives." Upon the death of any beneficiary the share of said decedent shall be paid to the surviving beneficiaries proportionately to their original shares. The codicil, after revoking provisions of the will disposing of the real estate, provides that it shall become part of the residuary estate and be disposed of as above provided " with this limitation and restriction; I direct that said real estate shall not be sold until the death of the daughters of my said deceased sister, and each of them, the net income from said real estate, however, being part of the trust created by my Will, and disposed of as provided therein."

It will be noted that the will disposes only of the income of the residuary estate or trust during the lives of the aforementioned beneficiaries. It makes no disposition of the corpus of the trust after the death of the last beneficiary. That omission is the foundation of this action in equity instituted by William O. Ransom, nephew of decedent, against the executor, the beneficiary Lena Kurrle, the 6 surviving nieces and the heirs of the seventh niece, the latter having died after the death of James J. Ransom. Therein William O. Ransom prayed for decree construing the will and adjudicating him to be the owner of an undivided one-half interest in the reversion or undisposed of remainder of said residuary estate, and each of testator's 6 nieces and the heirs of the seventh niece a 1/14 interest therein. Subsequently, William died and his widow, Emma C. Ransom, as executrix and sole beneficiary under his will, was substituted as plaintiff.

Various petitions, amendments and amendatory petitions were, from time to time, filed and were assailed by motions to dismiss and to strike, all of which appear to have been sustained. Judgment was entered dismissing the action and plaintiff has appealed.

The briefs refer to certain procedural propositions involving the various motions and the rulings thereon. It does not appear necessary to consider these propositions in view of appellant's statement in argument, " Manifestly, the real question * * * is whether the lower court erred in its ruling on defendants' motion to dismiss the original petition, * * *."

The motion to dismiss asserts in part that the action is solely for the construction of a will; that the will is unambiguous in its terms and no interpretation or construction thereof is permissible, lawful or proper; that plaintiff has no such interest as to permit the bringing of the action; that the action is premature; that there is a defect in parties plaintiff and defendants; that the indispensible parties cannot be determined until the trust is terminated.

" The right of a court, whether equity or probate, to entertain an action solely for the construction of a will applies only to such actions as pertain to wills where the meaning is uncertain in its terms-ambiguous." Anderson v. Meier, 227 Iowa 38, 287 N.W. 250, 251. Where the language is plain and unequivocal there is no room for construction. In re Estate of Thomas, 220 Iowa 50, 54, 261 N.W. 622, 624; First Methodist Church v. Hull, 225 Iowa 306, 280 N.W. 531.

And the court, in the Meier case, quotes with approval statements in 69 C.J. 866 and 867, that " the court cannot acquire jurisdiction to construe a will by allegations that a question requiring construction exists when the record shows there is no such question. * * * The language of the will must be such that the parties may reasonably have...