Ransom v. State

• Decision Date: 03 December 1902
• Parties: RANSOM v. STATE.
• Court: Texas Court of Criminal Appeals

70 S.W. 960

RANSOM v. STATE.

Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas.

December 3, 1902.

Appeal from district court, Williamson county; F. G. Morris, Judge.

John Ransom was convicted of murder, and appeals. Affirmed.

W. W. Nelms, for appellant. Robt. A. John, Asst Atty. Gen., for the State.

HENDERSON, J.

Appellant was convicted of murder in the first degree, and his punishment assessed at death.

Appellant assigns as error the action of the court overruling his motion for continuance. This is based on the absence of Maria Van Zandt. The diligence used for this witness is sufficient. Appellant says he expected to prove by said witness an alibi; that is, that at the time of the alleged homicide he was at another and different place. In answer to the motion, the state filed an affidavit of the witness Maria Van Zandt from which it will be seen that she would not testify as set up by appellant. Consequently there was no error in overruling the motion for continuance, and in refusing a new trial based on that ground.

In this connection, appellant insists that the court committed an error in setting aside the order of the court overruling the motion for new trial, and allowing the state to introduce and set up the affidavit of the witness Maria Van Zandt in regard to the motion for continuance treated of in the above paragraph. It appears from the bill that appellant filed a motion for new trial on August 12th. Said motion was acted on by the court on the same day, and overruled. It appears from the contest set up by the district attorney that he was absent at the time the court acted on said motion, and had no knowledge that the same would then be acted on; the cause of his absence being to secure the affidavit of said Maria Van Zandt in regard to her testimony. Motion to set aside the order of the court overruling the motion for new trial was made on August 13th and said amended motion was accompanied by the affidavit of Maria Van Zandt. The court set aside its former order, on motion of the district attorney, granted the motion to reinstate, and then heard the motion, and overruled the same. The only effect of said motion and of the action of the court was to bring before the court the affidavit of Maria Van Zandt. However, appellant himself took advantage of the reopening of the case, and filed an amended motion for new trial. It is claimed by appellant that this action of the court was erroneous; and he cites us to the case of Matthews v. State (Tex. Cr. App.) 50 S. W. 368, to sustain his contention. This case holds that, where a new trial has been granted to a defendant in a felony case, it is not competent for the court afterwards, though at the same term, to recall the order granting a new trial, and then rehear the motion, and overrule the same. It is held that in such case the action of the court granting a new trial is final. But we do not believe the same rule applies where the court has overruled a motion for new trial. Certainly a defendant could not complain of the action of the court in setting aside an order refusing a new trial, and afterwards at the same term granting appellant's motion. Such action would be for his benefit. We understand it to be a cardinal principle, both in civil and criminal jurisprudence, that the court has control over its orders during the term, and the case above referred to is an exception to this rule in favor of defendant, and predicated on our statutes relating to the subject; but the rule will not be extended to deprive either the state or the defendant of any right to which it is justly entitled,—certainly not to deprive a defendant of the right to a new trial, although his motion may have been overruled at a former day of the term. And moreover, in a proper case, neither will the state nor the defendant be deprived of the right to amend or strengthen the motion for new trial during the term. In this case, had the defendant's counsel been absent when the motion for a new trial was acted on by the court, in an effort to procure an affidavit of the witness in order to strengthen his motion, and during his absence the court had overruled his motion, it would certainly have operated a great hardship to have refused to set aside the order of the court and permit him to file an amended motion, accompanied by the affidavit of the absent witnesses. To have refused his request would have deprived him of a right, and, in our opinion, the same rule applies to the state. The district attorney was absent when the motion for new trial was acted on. At the earliest opportunity he asked that the order of the court overruling the motion be set aside. He then filed his contest to appellant's motion, and set up the affidavit of Maria Van Zandt, as before stated. To this defendant's counsel filed an amended motion for new trial. This the court overruled. In this action of the court there was no error.

Appellant assigns as error the action of the court admitting his alleged confession. This confession was testified to by the witnesses Sampson Connell, sheriff of Williamson county, and Howard Davidson, assistant county attorney. The bill shows: That appellant was arrested in Brazos county, and that the sheriff of Williamson county went to Brazos county and took charge of appellant, and brought him to Williamson county and lodged him in jail. That he warned defendant that anything he might say would be used against him, but could not be used for him. He talked a good deal to appellant about the case, and told him that he had discussed his case with several witnesses, and that he had evidence against him, and that he wanted him to tell the truth about the transaction. That defendant did not tell him at first, but denied it. After he placed him in jail in Williamson county, and the appellant confessed to him that he had killed deceased, he then sent for Davidson to come to the jail. Davidson stated that he warned appellant after he got to the jail; that, after he so warned him, appellant made a statement, which he reduced to writing. He says he did not put down all of the exact words, but the substance of what the defendant stated; that, during the progress of taking down his statement, witness failed to remember what appellant had said, and he would repeat the question, when Connell would reply, and tell him what appellant had said. He then asked defendant if it was correct, and he replied, "Yes." After writing it out, the statement was read over to defendant, and he asked him if he understood it, and he stated that he did. And appellant then signed it. The witness Cordon testifies on this subject, substantially, that he was justice of the peace of precinct No. 1 of Williamson county, and, on the next morning after appellant had confessed to the sheriff and others in jail, the sheriff brought appellant into his office, together with the written confession. Witness then told defendant that it was a very serious matter, and that he should be very careful about making any statement, and warned defendant that the statement could be used against him, but not for him. He then read over the confession to him, and asked him if it was correct. He stated it was, and that he had signed it. Witness then took appellant's affidavit to the same. It is not necessary to copy the confession itself. It is, in effect, a detailed statement directly inculpating appellant in the murder of deceased, Wesley Rucker, and that he killed him at night with an ax, and that his motive for doing so was to rob him of his money. Appellant objected to this evidence: (1) Because it did not appear that the statement was a voluntary statement. On the contrary, the same was procured by questions and coercion on the part of the sheriff and other officers. (2) Because it appeared from the testimony of witness Howard Davidson that the confession was not the words of defendant, but was his (Davidson's) interpretations of statements made by defendant. (3) That the statement was sworn to before J. G. Gordon, justice of the peace holding the preliminary examination, and the same was not voluntary. The questions here presented were thoroughly discussed in Grimsinger v. State (Tex. Cr. App.) 69 S. W. 593, and, under the rule there laid down by the majority of the court, the evidence was admissible. In this connection it may be stated that the appellant himself took the stand as a witness, and denied, in effect, the confession, or that it was true, and, in addition, stated that he was coerced by the sheriff to make the confession, and that he did it to save his life. The court instructed the jury on this issue; that is, unless they found that the confession was freely and voluntarily made by appellant after he had been duly warned, to disregard the same. So, if there was any doubt as...