Ransone v. Christian
| Decision Date | 31 January 1876 |
| Citation | 56 Ga. 351 |
| Parties | Julien Ransone, plaintiff in error. v. Hope H. Christian,defendant in error. |
| Court | Georgia Supreme Court |
[COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED]
Libel. Amendment. Torts. Justification. Practice in the Superior Court. Witness. Charge of court. Damages. Set-off.
Before fudge Wright. Early Superior Court. October Term, 1875.
Reported in the opinion.
John C. Rutherford, for plaintiff in error.
A. Hood; H. & I. E. Fielder; R. H. Powell, for defendant.
This is an action for libel. It was before this court before and the libel and general facts touching it will be found reported at full length in 49 Georgia Reports, 491. They need not, therefore, be repeated here. A new trial was then granted and the case was tried again; the jury found a verdict of $3,000 00 for the plaintiff; a motion was made for a new trial, overruled, and exception taken, and the case is before us for review. We shall take up the errors assigned and dispose of such as we deem necessary for the proper adjudication of the case.
*1. The defendant pleaded as a set-off injuries inflicted on him by the plaintiff from pistol wounds, by authority of section 3261 of the Code, and of the ruling of this court when the case was here before. The plaintiff thereupon moved to amend the declaration by alleging injuries to his person by defendant, in the same transaction. The court permitted the amendment, and defendant excepted. The trespass proposed to be inserted by way of amendment is a new and distinct cause of action, and cannot be allowed: Code, section 3480. Besides, it was clearly barred by the statute of limitations when offered, and for that reason it should have been refused by the court. It may be said that it did not become necessary to put it in until the defendant's plea was allowed, and that being allowed, plaintiff should be permitted to amend now, though his cause of amendment is distinct from his cause of action and barred too. The reply is, that the plea was in time, not barred; and that plaintiff had the right to join this action with the libel when he sued, or to sue on it at any time until he was barred. It was his own fault, if by his laches or mistakes of law as to defendant's right to plead the set-off. he has lost his right to sue on the tort to his person. The reasoning which defeats him, seems to us satisfactory; at all events, the statute is explicit and must be obeyed.
2. The defendant pleaded justification but withdrew his plea. Plaintiff then proved the publication of the libel. Defendant then renewed the plea of justification, assumed the burden of showing the libel to be true, and claimed the right to open and conclude the argument. The court held that he had not the right, but had forfeited it. When the plea of justification is made the defendant assumes the burden of proof, and is entitled to open and conclude: Code, section 3051. He may amend his plea at any stage of the trial: Code, section 3479. By exercising the right to amend, did he loose the right to conclude? It would be strange if the exercise of one legal right forfeited another. It is true that the court might have imposed terms upon himwhen he amended, but the terms should have been at that time prescribed. *It looks like an ex post facto punishment to fix the terms after the thing is done. Besides, the terms should not, we think, extend beyond continuance of the case, or payment of costs, or some such penalty. At all events they should be fixed at the time the amendment is proposed and allowed.
3. In the course of his argument, counsel for defendant stated to the jury: "Now, if Christian made the first attack upon Ran-sone, and Ransone acted in self-defense to repel the attack, then, under the law, Christian was liable for all injuries he inflicted on Ransone, and Ransone would not be liable for any injuries he might have inflicted on Christian;" whereupon the court stopped counsel, and said he was arguing law to the jury, which the court would not allow him to do, and he must argue the law to the court. This interruption and refusal by the court to permit counsel so to present his case is complained of. The interference of the court was doubtless based on the third rule of court, which requires questions of law to be argued exclusively to the court. Properly understood, the rule is a good one, and should be enforced. We take it to mean that in cases where counsel is making a legal argument or battling to establish a legal principle which he wishes the court to charge as the law of the case, he must argue to the court; but we cannot suppose it was intended to prevent counsel from stating legal propositions to the jury. If so, it would destroy all trial by jury by preventing counsel from intelligently discussing their cases before them, and the rule would be utterly void: Constitution, Code, section 5124. Counsel cannot know what the court will charge; they cannot lay down to the jury the law as he will charge it, unless they be gifted with fore-knowledge; they must, therefore, be allowed to lay down to the jury the law which they think the court will charge, or, in other words, their own view of the law; and in the light of that law argue the facts. To curtail this right within the narrow compass suggested by the ruling of the court below, would be to close the mouth of the counsel, and to overthrow allfair and full trial by jury. No harm can be done by the other course. All that counsel *says is in the hearing of the court; the law he lays down is subject to the correction of the court, and to make a practical speech to the jury he must exercise the right to state his legal points to them. "There is reason in roasting eggs;" and statutes and rules of court must be so construed as not to upset great and fundamental rights.
4.The court charged the jury that where there was but one witness to the proof of the truth of the libel, the corroborating circumstance "must be sufficient to amount to another witness or to support the one witness to that extent." To corroborate means to...
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... ... Williams, 160 Ga. 461, 128 S.E. 672 (1925); Ransone v. Christian, 56 Ga. 351 (1876); DeLoach v. Maurer, 130 Ga.App. 824, 204 S.E.2d 776 (1974); and Davidson v. Walter, 93 Ga.App. 290, 91 S.E.2d 520 ... ...
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...as nominal damages only are sued for, and a verdict for $250 nominal damages could not be upheld. It was long ago held in Ransone v. Christian, 56 Ga. 351 (6): "Nominal damages mean in law some small amount sufficient to cover and carry the costs, and when requested in writing so to charge ......
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...from which a loss of time of some value could be established. Where no actual loss is claimed, the true rule is to be deduced from Ransone v. Christian, supra, and Central of Georgia Ry. Co. v. Wood, 118 Ga. 172, 173, S.E. 1001. In the Stephens case the court referred to the Wood case as fo......
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...Railway Company v. Keating, 177 Ga. 345, 170 S.E. 493; Americus Gas & Electric Co. v. Coleman, 16 Ga.App. 17, 84 S.E. 493; Ransone v. Christian, 56 Ga. 351; v. Taylor & McCain, 108 Ga. 567, 33 S.E. 911, are distinguishable on their facts from the present case and do not authorize or require......
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