Ranta v. State, 97-216
| Decision Date | 01 October 1997 |
| Docket Number | No. 97-216,97-216 |
| Parties | Geramy RANTA, Petitioner, v. STATE of Montana, and Mike Mahoney, Warden, Montana State Prison, Respondent. . Heard |
| Court | Montana Supreme Court |
Jeffrey T. Renz, Peter Fashing, Legal Intern, Tara Javid, Legal Intern, School of Law Defender Project, Missoula, for Appellant.
Joseph P. Mazurek, Attorney General, Jennifer Anders, Assistant Attorney General, Helena, Montana; Dennis Paxinos, Yellowstone County Attorney, Billings, for Respondent.
¶1 This case comes to the Court on petitioner Geramy Ranta's petition for post-conviction relief. Ranta challenges the decisions and judgments of the Sentence Review Division of the Montana Supreme Court affirming and increasing his sentences in cause numbers DC 94-639, DC 94-543, and DC 95-278 as unconstitutional on the grounds that the State failed to appoint counsel to represent him in his sentence review. Ranta requests that his original sentences be reinstated. We grant Ranta the relief he requests, but we do so in the context of an extraordinary writ as opposed to granting post-conviction relief.
¶2 Ranta raises the following issues:
¶3 1. Was Ranta denied his right to counsel in violation of Article II, Section 24 of the Montana Constitution and the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution when the Sentence Review Division failed to appoint counsel to represent him during the sentence review process?
¶4 2. Was Ranta denied due process of the law in violation of Article II, Section 17 of the Montana Constitution and the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution when the Sentence Review Division failed to appoint counsel to represent him during the sentence review process?
¶5 3. Was Ranta denied equal protection of the law in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution when the Sentence Review Division failed to appoint counsel to represent him during the sentence review process?
¶6 4. Is Rule 14 of the Rules of the Sentence Review Division authorized by its enabling legislation and unconstitutional?
¶7 Because we determine the first issue to be dispositive, we do not address the remaining issues.
¶8 In 1995 Ranta pled guilty to and was convicted in three separate criminal prosecutions in Yellowstone County: DC 94-639 (criminal mischief), DC 94-543 (burglary and misdemeanor theft), and DC 95-278 (theft). The court sentenced him as follows: in cause number DC 94-639, his sentence was five years; in cause number DC 94-543, his sentence was five years for the offense of burglary and six months for the offense of misdemeanor theft to run concurrently with his sentence for burglary; and in cause number DC 95-278, his sentence was two years. All sentences in the three separate causes were to run consecutively with each other.
¶9 Ranta applied for sentence review before the Sentence Review Division in all three cases, and subsequently appeared at a hearing before the review division on March 8, 1996, seeking reductions in the sentences. At that hearing, the State was represented by the deputy county attorney for Yellowstone County. Ranta, however, who had previously been determined indigent by the District Court, did not have the assistance of counsel. The review division did not inform him that he had a right to be represented by counsel and did not appoint counsel to represent him at the hearing. Instead, it advised him that by appearing at the hearing without retained counsel, he waived any right to an ¶10 Subsequently, the review division affirmed the sentences imposed in cause numbers DC 94-639 and DC 94-543, and amended the judgment in DC 95-278 by increasing Ranta's sentence from two years to ten years, to run consecutive to the sentences imposed in the other cases.
attorney. The review division also advised him that it had the authority to affirm, reduce, or increase his sentences.
¶11 Ranta has challenged the decisions of the Sentence Review Division on constitutional grounds by filing a petition for post-conviction relief pursuant to § 46-21-101, MCA. In State v. Torres (1996), 277 Mont. 514, 516, 922 P.2d 1180, 1181, this Court held that a petition for post-conviction relief pursuant to § 46-21-101, MCA, or a petition for other extraordinary writ was the proper procedural mechanism for challenging a decision of the Sentence Review Division. Our conclusion that a petition for post-conviction relief was an appropriate mechanism was based in part upon the language of the post-conviction relief statute which provided that in certain circumstances a person could "petition the court that imposed the sentence or the supreme court to vacate, set aside, or correct the sentence...." Section 46-21-101(1), MCA(1995). However, that provision of the post-conviction relief statute was amended, effective April 24, 1997. The amendments deleted all provisions that allowed a person to file such a petition directly with this Court. Section 46-21-101(1) MCA (1997). Thus, Torres is no longer controlling to the extent that it holds that filing a petition for post-conviction relief with this Court is a proper mechanism by which to challenge a decision of the Sentence Review Division.
¶12 The proper basis on which this Court is now authorized to address Ranta's request is solely through a petition for extraordinary relief. Because the Sentence Review Division functions as an arm of this Court, this Court has the supervisory authority to ensure that it complies with statutes and rules governing its operations as well as the Montana Constitution and the United States Constitution. Section 46-18-901(1), MCA; Art. VII, Sec. 2, Mont. Const. Additionally, Rule 17(a), M.R.App.P., codifies this Court's power to "hear and determine such original and remedial writs as may be necessary or proper to the complete exercise of its jurisdiction." It is on that basis that we are authorized to review the decision of the Sentence Review Division. We thus accept Ranta's petition for post-conviction relief as a petition for extraordinary relief pursuant to Rule 17, M.R.App.P. His petition is not being considered as a petition for post-conviction relief.
¶13 Was Ranta denied his right to counsel in violation of Article II, Section 24 of the Montana Constitution and the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution when the Sentence Review Division failed to appoint counsel to represent him during the sentence review process?
¶14 When a defendant files an application for review of his sentence before the review division, the review division has the power to affirm, reduce, or increase the sentence originally imposed by the district court. Specifically, § 46-18-904(1), MCA, states:
[T]he review division shall review the judgment so far as it relates to the sentence imposed, either increasing or decreasing the penalty, and any other sentence imposed on the person at the same time and may order such different sentence or sentences to be imposed as could have been imposed at the time of the imposition of the sentence under review or may decide that the sentence under review should stand.
¶15 During the review process, however, the review division will not appoint counsel to represent indigent defendants. Rule 14 of the Sentence Review Division Rules, which was recently amended effective January 1, 1995, provides in part:
The defendant is not entitled to counsel at the expense of the State of Montana.... BY REQUESTING A REVIEW OF HIS OR HER SENTENCE BY THE SENTENCE REVIEW DIVISION, AND
PROCEEDING WITHOUT AN ATTORNEY, THE DEFENDANT WAIVES THE RIGHT TO BE REPRESENTED BY AN ATTORNEY, AND HIS OR HER SENTENCE MAY BE INCREASED, DECREASED, OR LEFT UNCHANGED BY THE DIVISION.
(Emphasis in original.)
¶16 Ranta appeared at the hearing before the review division, without the assistance of counsel. He contends that he was constitutionally entitled to representation of counsel during the review process because (1) he faced the potential for an increase in sentence, and (2) the lack of counsel to present his case on his behalf prejudiced his attempt to move the review division's discretion to reduce the sentence. Regardless of which way the issue is analyzed, Ranta argues that potential substantial prejudice was present in the absence of counsel.
¶17 The Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article II, Section 24 of the Montana Constitution guarantee a criminal defendant the right to counsel in criminal proceedings. This right to counsel arises at every critical stage of the proceedings against him. United States v. Wadsworth (9th Cir.1987), 830 F.2d 1500, 1510 (citation omitted); State v. Finley (1996), 276 Mont. 126, 144, 915 P.2d 208, 220. Pursuant to Montana's constitution, this Court has defined a "critical stage" as " 'any step of the proceeding where there is potential for substantial prejudice to the defendant.' " Finley, 276 Mont. at 144-45, 915 P.2d at 220 (citing State v. Robbins (1985), 218 Mont. 107, 111, 708 P.2d 227, 231). In Robbins, we stated that a defendant may question the court's failure to appoint counsel "where potential substantial prejudice inheres in the absence of counsel." Robbins, 218 Mont. at 111, 708 P.2d at 230 (citations omitted).
¶18 This Court has not yet addressed whether sentence review is a critical stage of the proceedings. However, the United States Supreme Court has held that the original sentencing itself is a "critical stage" (Townsend v. Burke(1948), 334 U.S. 736, 740-41, 68 S.Ct. 1252, 1255, 92 L.Ed. 1690, 1693-94), and other state courts have concluded that like the original sentencing, sentence review is also a critical stage. For example, in Consiglio v. Warden, State Prison (1966), 153 Conn. 673, 220 A.2d 269, 272, the Connecticut Supreme Court held that a hearing before the...
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