Rape v. Barker
| Decision Date | 12 May 1920 |
| Docket Number | 11415. |
| Parties | RAPE v. BARKER. |
| Court | Georgia Court of Appeals |
Syllabus by the Court.
Whether or not the owner of an automobile is liable for damage caused by it which results from the negligence of the person operating it depends upon whether the person driving it was the servant of the owner and engaged upon the business of the owner at the time the negligence occurred. If he was such servant and engaged upon such business, the owner is responsible for injuries to persons or property caused by his negligence in operating the automobile. Aliter, if he was not such servant or was not engaged upon such business.
(a) Thus, the owner of an automobile is not liable for injuries inflicted by his brother-in-law, in negligently operating the machine, where it appears that at the time of the injuries the brother-in-law was not using the car as the agent or servant of the owner nor engaged upon business of the owner.
The trial judge therefore did not err in granting a nonsuit.
Error from Superior Court, Dooly County; O. T. Gower, Judge.
Action by O. E. Rape against B. B. Barker. Judgment of nonsuit, and plaintiff brings error. Affirmed.
R Douglas Feagin, of Macon, and W. H. Lasseter, of Vienna, for plaintiff in error.
Powell Lumsden, of Vienna, and Crum & Jones, of Cordele, for defendant in error.
O. E Rape sued B. B. Barker, seeking to recover damages for personal injuries, alleged to have been the result of a collision, at a road crossing, between an automobile owned by the defendant but at the time of the collision driven by the defendant's brother-in-law, and another automobile driven by himself. There was no attack on the petition, and at the conclusion of the evidence for the plaintiff the court, upon motion of defendant's counsel, granted a nonsuit, to which ruling the plaintiff excepted. Only so much of the evidence as is material to an understanding of the rulings announced in the headnotes need be stated.
It is not disputed that the defendant was the owner of the car which was driven by his brother-in-law at the time of the collision with the plaintiff's car. Neither is it disputed that there might have been proof legally sufficient to make a jury question as to whether or not the defendant's car was operated negligently. However conceding it to be a fact, that the car was the property of the defendant, and might have been negligently driven by his brother-in-law, the defendant would still not be liable, unless the brother-in-law, in driving the car, was the agent or servant of the defendant and engaged in the performance of the defendant's business.
To continue reading
Request your trial