Raposa v. Johnson

• Decision Date: 27 June 1985
• Docket Number: No. 2-84-188-CV,2-84-188-CV
• Parties: Carol RAPOSA, Appellant, v. Donald W. JOHNSON, Appellee.
• Court: Texas Court of Appeals

Page 43

693 S.W.2d 43

Carol RAPOSA, Appellant, v. Donald W. JOHNSON, Appellee.

No. 2-84-188-CV.

Court of Appeals of Texas Fort Worth.

June 27, 1985.

Chancellor, Wood & Martin, Richard Martin, Dallas, for appellant.

Philips, White, Davidge, Griffin, Shelton, Eames, Wood & Duncan, David C. White, Denton, for appellee.

Before ASHWORTH, JOE SPURLOCK, II, and W.A. HUGHES, Jr. (Retired) (Sitting by Assignment), JJ.

OPINION

ASHWORTH, Justice.

Appellee, Donald W. Johnson, as plaintiff below, filed suit against appellant, Carol Raposa, as defendant below, seeking to determine the title to an undivided one-fourth ( 1/4) interest in a certain tract of real property located in Denton County, Texas. In his trespass to try title action, plaintiff based his claim of title and right to possession of the disputed one-fourth interest in the property upon a bona fide purchaser theory. After pleading all of the documents affecting title to the property, plaintiff asked the court to enter a judgment that appellant had no interest in the property. Appellant answered with a plea of "not guilty" and a general denial. The parties entered into a stipulation as to the common source of title and as to the authenticity and admissibility of various documents of title. Trial was to the court without a jury and no testimony was offered. The court entered judgment awarding title to appellee of the disputed one-fourth interest. From this judgment, appellant has perfected her appeal.

We reverse and render.

Findings of fact and conclusions of law were filed by the trial court, as follows:

FINDINGS OF FACT

1. The tract of land in controversy is 11.740 acres located in Denton County, Texas, described more fully in Exhibit "A" attached hereto.

2. That Robert E. Clark and wife, Sandra L. Clark, is the common source of title to the premises in controversy.

3. That Robert E. Clark and wife, Sandra L. Clark, conveyed to Edward P. Raposa full, fee simple title to the premises in controversy by warranty deed executed on the 10th day of February, 1971, and filed for record in the Deed Records of Denton County, Texas, on the 10th day of February, 1971.

4. That Edward P. Raposa conveyed to DONALD W. JOHNSON an undivided one-half ( 1/2), fee simple interest in and to the premises in controversy by warranty deed executed on the 10th day of February, 1971, and filed for record in the Deed Records of Denton County, Texas, on the 26th day of February, 1971.

5. That the marriage of Edward P. Raposa and CAROL RAPOSA was dissolved on or about the 3rd day of June, 1974.

6. That pursuant to an Agreement Incident to Divorce entered into by and between CAROL RAPOSA and Edward P. Raposa, the premises in controversy was to be held equally by CAROL RAPOSA and Edward P. Raposa as tenants in common.

7. That said agreement for division of marital property was adopted and made a part of the divorce decree.

8. That the Decree of Divorce of Edward P. Raposa and CAROL RAPOSA was filed for record in the Deed Records of Denton County, Texas, on March 10, 1976.

9. That Edward P. Raposa conveyed to DONALD W. JOHNSON all of his undivided interest in and to the premises in controversy by warranty deed executed on the 24th day of February, 1976, and filed for record in the Deed Records of Denton County, Texas, on the 24th day of March, 1976.

CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

1. As between Plaintiff and Defendant, RAPOSA, Plaintiff is entitled to legal and equitable title to the disputed one-fourth undivided interest in and to the subject real property.

2. As between Plaintiff and Defendant, RAPOSA, Plaintiff is entitled to possession of the subject real property to her exclusion.

3. As between Plaintiff and Defendant, RAPOSA, Plaintiff is entitled to release of the funds now held in the registry of the Court as they pertain to the compensation paid in that certain condemnation proceeding bearing No. 10652.

4. That Defendant, CAROL RAPOSA, does not have an interest in or a claim to possession of the premises in controversy.

Appellant asserts five points of error contending that the trial court erred in finding title in appellee, to the exclusion of the appellant, because:

1. Appellant acquired her title prior to appellee's acquisition of his claim of title;

2. Appellee failed to offer any proof of his status as an innocent purchaser;

3. Appellant's legal title vested prior to appellee's claim to legal title;

4. The trial court mistakenly placed the burden of proof on appellant to show appellee's innocent purchaser status;

5. The judgment and conclusions of law supporting it are not supported by the evidence or the facts found by the court.

Appellant's fifth point of error basically challenges the legal sufficiency of the evidence and because appellant's other points of error pertain to the evidence, we shall examine all points together.

Findings of fact entered in a case tried to the court are of the same force and dignity as a jury's verdict upon special issues. City of Clute v. City of Lake Jackson, 559 S.W.2d 391, 395 (Tex.Civ.App.--Houston [14th Dist.] 1977, writ ref'd n.r.e.). The trial court's findings of fact are reviewable for legal and factual sufficiency of the evidence to support them, First National Bank in Dallas v. Kinabrew, 589 S.W.2d 137, 146 (Tex.Civ.App.--Tyler 1979, writ ref'd n.r.e.), by the same standards as are applied in reviewing the legal or factual sufficiency of the evidence supporting a jury's answer to a special issue. Okon v Levy, 612 S.W.2d 938, 941 (Tex.Civ.App.--Dallas 1981, writ ref'd n.r.e.).

In deciding a challenge to the legal sufficiency of the evidence (a "no evidence" point), we must consider only the evidence and inferences tending to support the finding and disregard all evidence and inferences to the contrary. See Stedman v. Georgetown Savings and Loan Ass'n, 595 S.W.2d 486, 488 (Tex.1979). If there is any evidence of probative force to support the challenge finding, then it must be upheld. Id.

In order to determine who has title to the disputed one-fourth interest in the property, it is necessary to examine TEX.PROP.CODE ANN. sec. 13.001 (Vernon 1984) setting forth the requirements of the validity of an unrecorded instrument and providing as follows:

(a) A conveyance of real property or an interest in real property or a mortgage or deed of trust is void as to a creditor or to a subsequent purchaser for a valuable consideration without notice unless the instrument has been acknowledged or proved and filed for record as required by law.

(b) The unrecorded instrument is binding on a party to the instrument, on the party's heirs, and on a subsequent purchaser who does not pay a valuable consideration or who has notice of the instrument.

(c) This section does not apply to a financing statement, a security agreement filed as a financing statement, or a continuation statement filed for record under the Business & Commerce Code.

Id.

A review of the evidence reveals that on February 10, 1971, Robert E. Clark and wife, Sandra L. Clark, conveyed the subject property to Edward Raposa. This deed was filed for record on February 10, 1971. On the...