Raritan Development Corp. v. Silva

Decision Date28 October 1997
Citation91 N.Y.2d 98,667 N.Y.S.2d 327,689 N.E.2d 1373
Parties, 689 N.E.2d 1373, 1997 N.Y. Slip Op. 8871 In the Matter of RARITAN DEVELOPMENT CORP. et al., Appellants, v. Gaston SILVA et al., Respondents.
CourtNew York Court of Appeals Court of Appeals

Tenzer Greenblatt, L.L.P., New York City (James G. Greilsheimer and Lawrence S. Feld, of counsel), for appellants.

Paul A. Crotty, Corporation Counsel of New York City (Virginia Waters, Leonard Koerner and Ellen B. Fishman, of counsel), for respondents.

Sean M. Walsh, Douglaston, for Federation of Civic Councils of the Borough of Queens, Inc., amicus curiae.

OPINION OF THE COURT

SMITH, Judge.

Respondents, the Commissioners of the Board of Standards and Appeals of the City of New York (BSA), argue that this Court should defer to the agency's interpretation of section 12-10 of New York City's Zoning Resolution. However, when an interpretation is contrary to the plain meaning of the statutory language, we have typically declined to enforce an agency's conflicting application thereof. We see no compelling reason to depart from that long-established rule in this case.

In calculating the Floor Area Ratio (FAR) for zoning purposes, floor area includes the total amount of "floor space used for dwelling purposes, no matter where located within a building, when not specifically excluded; * * * However, the floor area of a building shall not include * * * cellar space." Contrary to respondents' argument, we find that this language clearly provides that

"cellar space" is excluded from "floor area" without further qualification. We further conclude that such an interpretation is not "absurd." The Appellate Division's order should be reversed.
BACKGROUND

A development of two-family residences on Staten Island was planned in a R3-2 zoning district. That zoning district permits a "floor area ratio" of 0.50 for each building. That ratio means that the total floor area of each building may not exceed 50% of the area of the lot on which the residence is situated. One particular residence was designed to be a trilevel residential building with one dwelling unit comprised of the top two floors and another single dwelling unit on the ground floor. The architect calculated the FAR without including the floor space of the ground floor.

The relevant zoning provision, Zoning Resolution § 12-10, provides in relevant part:

" 'Floor area' is the sum of the gross areas of the several floors of a building or buildings, measured from the exterior faces of exterior walls or from the center lines of walls separating two buildings. In particular, floor area includes: * * *

"(g) any other floor space used for dwelling purposes, no matter where located within a building, when not specifically excluded; * * *

"However, the floor area of a building shall not include:

"(a) cellar space".

The Zoning Resolution defines "cellar" in R3 zoning districts as: "a space wholly or partly below the base plane with more than one-half its height (measured from floor to ceiling) below the base plane." It is conceded by both parties that the ground floor of the subject residence fits within this definition of a "cellar."

On October 14, 1993, the New York City's Department of Buildings (DOB) objected to the architect's FAR calculations because the ground level was a "dwelling unit" and should have been included in the FAR calculations notwithstanding the fact that the ground floor was a "cellar" as that term is defined in the Zoning Resolution. The DOB found that the cellar space exclusion only applied to "true cellar space, space used for nonhabitable purposes, such as for furnace rooms, utility rooms, auxiliary recreation rooms, etc." The DOB further claimed that this interpretation was consistent with the "Zoning Resolution's treatment of basement space and the Multiple Dwelling Law's treatment of cellar space."

The DOB also claimed that the "past practice and policy in interpreting the 1916 Zoning Resolution and the current Zoning Resolution has consistently been to require a habitable room at the zoning cellar level to be included as floor area." Previous approvals that did not conform to this interpretation were allegedly "given in error."

The DOB revoked petitioners' building permit and denied the architect's request for reconsideration. The development corporation of the residential community appealed to the BSA. The BSA noted that the Department of City Planning, "the drafters of the Zoning Resolution, strongly supports the determination of the Department of Buildings based upon the language of the Zoning Resolution, the legislative history of the definition of 'floor area' and the interpretation of the Zoning Resolution in conjunction with the Multiple Dwelling Law." The BSA denied the appeal and found that DOB's ruling had been "reasonable and rational."

Petitioners filed this CPLR article 78 proceeding to annul the BSA's decision. Supreme Court examined the legislative history of the provision and determined that cellar space to be used as dwelling space should be included in the FAR calculation. The court also found that DOB had consistently adhered to that interpretation which reflected standard industry practice. The Appellate Division affirmed and found BSA's interpretation rational and supported by legislative history. This Court granted leave to appeal.

ANALYSIS

Contrary to the parties' assertions, this Court has consistently applied the same standard of review for agency determinations. Where "the question is one of pure legal interpretation of statutory terms, deference to the BSA is not required" (Matter of Toys "R" Us v. Silva, 89 N.Y.2d 411, 419, 654 N.Y.S.2d 100, 676 N.E.2d 862). On the other hand, when applying its special expertise in a particular field to interpret statutory language, an agency's rational construction is entitled to deference (see, Matter of Jennings v. New York State Off. of Mental Health, 90 N.Y.2d 227, 239, 660 N.Y.S.2d 352, 682 N.E.2d 953; Kurcsics v. Merchants Mut. Ins. Co., 49 N.Y.2d 451, 459, 426 N.Y.S.2d 454, 403 N.E.2d 159). Even in those situations, however, a determination by the agency that "runs counter to the clear wording of a statutory provision" is given little weight (Kurcsics v. Merchants Mut. Ins. Co., 49 N.Y.2d, at 459, 426 N.Y.S.2d 454, 403 N.E.2d 159; see also, Matter of Toys "R" Us v. Silva, 89 N.Y.2d, at 418-419, 654 N.Y.S.2d 100, 676 N.E.2d 862).

The statutory language could not be clearer. As noted above, a cellar is defined within the Zoning Resolution in term of its physical location in a building. "Floor area" includes dwelling spaces when not specifically excluded and "cellar space," without qualification, is expressly excluded from FAR calculations. 1 Thus, FAR calculations should not include cellars regardless of the intended use of the space. BSA's interpretation conflicts with the plain statutory language and may not be sustained.

BSA urges this Court to ignore the obvious interpretation of the Zoning Resolution and, instead, to look beyond the pages of statutory text. BSA attempts to justify its reading by first referring this Court to the language of a former version of the regulation. In 1916, the Zoning Resolution defined "floor area" as "the sum of the gross horizontal areas of the several floors * * * but excluding * * * basement and cellar floor areas not devoted to residence use." BSA is correct that the 1916 Zoning Resolution supports its contention that cellar space is only excluded from FAR calculations when not used for residential purposes.

However, the provision was changed in 1961 to its present text. In the amended text, cellar spaces were excluded from floor area without qualification. There is no evidence that the changed meaning was accidental or superfluous (see, Mabie v. Fuller, 255 N.Y. 194, 201, 174 N.E. 450 ["We must assume that the Legislature in enacting the section intended that it should effect some change in the existing law and accomplish some useful purpose"] ). Still, BSA insists that the amendment did not change the law.

For example, BSA argues that it has always interpreted the resolution a particular way so, presumably, it should be allowed to continue to do so. Such evidence might be more compelling if the present text of the Zoning Resolution offered any support. It should also be noted that BSA concedes that it has not consistently interpreted the statute in the same manner as it did here.

Perhaps most telling is BSA's contention to Supreme Court that its interpretation of the Zoning Resolution is consistent with the Multiple Dwelling Law which applies to residential buildings for three or more families. As BSA notes in its answer, which was verified by its Commissioner:

"Section 26 of Title I in Article 3 of the Multiple Dwelling Law reads (under paragraph 2 Definitions):

"b. 'Floor area': the sum of the gross horizontal areas of all of the several floors of a dwelling or dwellings and accessory structures on a lot measured from the exterior faces of exterior walls or from the center line of party walls, except:

"1. cellar not used for residential purposes."

Unfortunately, BSA relies upon a version of the law which was amended over a decade ago. In 1985, the definition of the exclusion was modified from "cellar not used for residential purposes" to the unqualified "cellar space" (see, L 1985, ch 857, § 1). According to the legislative memorandum which accompanied the text of the new law, the "amendment resolves [a] conflict by correlating the bulk of yard regulation requirements of the Multiple Dwelling Law with those of the Local Zoning Resolution, thus providing one clear set of guidelines for professionals and administrators" (1985 McKinney's Session Laws of NY, at 3171). The memorandum concludes that "the Mayor urges upon the Legislature the earliest possible favorable consideration of this proposal" (id.) Thus, it was thought in 1985 that the unqualified exclusion of cellar space from floor...

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