Ratchkauskas v. Kubini

• Decision Date: 12 February 2021
• Docket Number: Civil Action No. 20-1224
• Parties: DOV RATCHKAUSKAS, Plaintiff, v. GEORGE KUBINI, et al., Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Western District of Pennsylvania

DOV RATCHKAUSKAS, Plaintiff, v. GEORGE KUBINI, et al., Defendants.

Civil Action No. 20-1224

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

February 12, 2021

Judge Nora Barry Fischer

MEMORANDUM OPINION

I. INTRODUCTION

In this civil case, Plaintiff Dov Ratchkauskas brings claims of contribution and unjust enrichment against his co-conspirators seeking their pro rata shares of $862,358 of restitution, which he has now satisfied. (Docket No. 1). Presently before the Court are motions to dismiss by Defendants Arthur Smith, Daniel Sporrer, and Sandra Svaranowic, (Docket Nos. 5; 10; 12), Plaintiff Dov Ratchkauskas's responses thereto, (Docket Nos. 6; 15), and Smith's and Svaranowic's replies. (Docket Nos. 17; 18). After careful consideration of the parties' positions and for the following reasons, Defendants' motions [5], [10], and [12] are granted. Ratchkausakas's complaint is dismissed, with prejudice.

II. BACKGROUND

This Court is well familiar with the criminal cases against Ratchkauskas and the Defendants here, as the Court has presided over and written extensively on the matters. Relevant here, on February 24, 2015, Ratchkauskas pled guilty to two counts of the superseding indictment against him. See United States v. Kubini, Crim. No. 11-14, Docket No. 1 (W.D. Pa. Jan. 18, 2011).¹Ratchkauskas's co-conspirators, who are named as Defendants here, including Karen Atkison, George Kubini, Cynthia Pielin, Joel Reck, Arthur Smith, Daniel Sporrer, and Sandra Svaranowic, also pled guilty to similar charges. See id. at Docket Nos. 388; 394; see also United States v. Atkinson, Crim. No. 09-223, Docket No. 22 (W.D. Pa. Dec. 18, 2009); United States v. Sporrer, Crim. No. 09-311, Docket No. 23 (W.D. Pa. May 27, 2010); United States v. Pielin, Crim. No. 11-255, Docket No. 18 (W.D. Pa. Apr. 4, 2012); United States v. Reck, Crim. No. 11-221, Docket No. 28 (W.D. Pa. June 26, 2012).

Ratchkauskas was sentenced to 57 months' imprisonment and ordered to pay $862,358 of restitution to the identified victims. See Kubini, Crim. No. 11-14, at Docket No. 715; Docket No. 723. The Court ordered that the restitution was to be "joint and several[ly] liab[le] with any other party found to be responsible including the co-defendants at Criminal No. 11-14 and the defendants in the related cases, including the following defendants: Karen Atkison (Criminal No. 09-223); Daniel Sporrer (Criminal No. 09-311); Cynthia Pielin (Criminal No. 11-255); Rochelle Roscoe (Criminal No. 11-17) and Joel Reck (Criminal No. 11-221)." Id. In its restitution order, the Court credited Ratchkauskas with the $400,000 of restitution, which had been satisfied from property subject to forfeiture. See id. After being released from prison, on May 10, 2019, Ratchkauskas satisfied the balance of the restitution order. See id. at Docket No. 800.

Ratchkauskas filed a civil complaint in this Court on August 18, 2020, seeking contribution and claiming unjust enrichment against those who were joint and severally liable for the restitution. (Docket No. 1). Sporrer moved to dismiss the complaint on September 11, 2020, for failure to statea claim. (Docket No. 5).² On November 30, 2020, Smith and Svaranowic likewise moved to dismiss the complaint, with Svaranowic adopting Smith's argument. (Docket Nos. 10; 12). Ratchkauskas responded in opposition to each motion. (Docket Nos. 6; 15). On January 22, 2021, Smith and Svaranowic filed their respective replies. (Docket Nos. 17; 18). As such, the Court considers Defendants' motions to dismiss fully briefed and ripe for disposition.

III. LEGAL STANDARD

A motion to dismiss tests the legal sufficiency of the complaint. S.K. v. N. Allegheny Sch. Dist., 146 F. Supp. 3d 700, 708 (W.D. Pa. 2015) (Conti, C.J.) (citing Kost v. Kozakiewicz, 1 F.3d 176, 183 (3d Cir. 1993)). To survive a motion to dismiss, a plaintiff does not need to plead detailed factual allegations; rather, he must only show a plausible entitlement to relief. See id. at 709 (citing Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)). "A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged." Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 667 (2009) (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556).

When assessing the plausibility of a complaint, the Third Circuit Court of Appeals has articulated a three-step process. See Connelly v. Lane Constr. Corp., 809 F.3d 780, 787 (3d Cir. 2016). The first step involves articulating the necessary elements of the plaintiff's claims. See id; see also Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 675. The second step scrutinizes the allegations in the complaint, calling for the Court to identify and disregard any "formulaic recitation of the elements of a claim or other legal conclusion" and "allegations . . . [that] are . . . so threadbare or speculative that they fail tocross the line between the conclusory and the factual." Connelly, 809 F.3d at 789-90 (alteration, internal quotation marks, and citations omitted). The third and final step requires the Court to evaluate the remaining allegations, assuming their veracity and viewing them in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, to determine whether plaintiff has plausibly pled a claim. See id. And while courts generally do not consider affirmative defenses at the motion-to-dismiss stage of a case, they may be addressed when they appear on the face of the complaint. See Morrison v. Chatham Univ., 2016 WL 4701460, at *4 (W.D. Pa. Sept. 8, 2016) (citing Ball v. Famiglio, 726 F.3d 448, 459 n.16 (3d Cir. 2013), abrogated on other grounds)).

IV. DISCUSSION

Having considered the parties arguments and in light of the relevant standards, the Court finds that Ratchkauskas's two-count complaint fails to allege a plausible entitlement to relief and is subject to dismissal. As is more fully explained below, his first claim for contribution fails to allege a cognizable theory of recovery because no right of contribution exists among criminal co-conspirators, and his second claim for unjust enrichment is barred by his own criminal conduct. Moreover, when the Court imposed its restitution order, it did not apportion the amounts on each individual defendant. See 18 U.S.C. § 3664(h) ("If the court finds that more than 1 defendant has contributed to the loss of a victim, the court may make each defendant liable for payment of the full amount of restitution or may apportion liability among the defendants to reflect the level of contribution to the victim's loss and economic circumstances of each defendant."). Instead, the Court ordered that each defendant shared "joint and several liability," meaning that the victims could recover their losses from "all or some of the wrongdoers." See United States v. Diaz, 245 F.3d 294, 312 (3d Cir. 2001). Accordingly, the victims were entitled to recover the entire $862,358from Ratchkauskas and his claims for contribution and unjust enrichment fail as a matter of law. The Court will address the deficiencies of each claim in turn.

A. Contribution

At the outset, contribution has been defined as a "tortfeasor's right to collect from others responsible for the same tort after the tortfeasor has paid more than his or her proportionate share, the shares being determined as a percentage of fault." United States v. Atl. Rsch. Corp., 551 U.S. 128, 138 (2007) (quoting Black's Law Dictionary 353 (8th ed. 2004) (internal quotation marks omitted)). "Typically, a right to contribution is recognized when two or more persons are liable to the same plaintiff for the same injury and one of the joint tortfeasors has paid more than his fair share of the common liability." Nw. Airlines, Inc. v. Transp. Workers Union of Am., AFL-CIO, 451 U.S. 77, 87-88 (1981). But, there is no "general federal right to contribution." See id. at 96. Rather, in order to have a cognizable right to contribution, the right must be either: (1) statutory (express or implied); or (2) judicially created as a part of federal common law. See id. at 90.

Ratchkauskas's first count in his complaint pleads a statutory entitlement to contribution under Pennsylvania's Uniform Contribution Among Tortfeasors Act ("UCATA"). See 42 PA. CONST. STAT. ANN. § 8324; see also (Docket No. 1). Under the UCATA, "[t]he right of contribution exists among joint-tortfeasors." 42 PA. CONST. STAT. ANN. § 8324(a). "Joint tort-feasors" are defined "two or more persons jointly or severally liable in tort for the same injury to persons or property, whether or not judgment has been recovered against all or some of them." Id. § 8322. "Under Pennsylvania law, two actors are joint tortfeasors if their conduct 'causes a single harm which cannot be apportioned . . . even though [the actors] may have acted independently.'" Rabatin v. Columbus Lines, Inc., 790 F.2d 22, 25 (3d Cir. 1986) (citing Capone v. Donovan, 480 A.2d 1249, 1251 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1984)).

The operative phrase for the purposes of the UCATA's right to contribution is that it exists among joint tort-feasors who are jointly and severally liable for a civil judgment grounded in tort. Ratchkauskas cannot state a plausible claim for contribution under the UCATA because, as Defendants point out, he does not fall within the statute's purview. First, he and Defendants are criminal co-conspirators, not joint tort-feasors, who engaged in criminal, not tortious conduct. See United States v. Zarra, 2011 WL 3667313, at *4, n.6 (W.D. Pa. Aug. 22, 2011) (Conti, C.J.) ("A claim for contribution . . . is only proper when it arises between joint tortfeasors."). And his restitution liability arises from a criminal judgment as a result of his criminal conduct, not a civil one grounded in tort. See Paroline v. United States, 572 U.S. 434, 453 (2014) ("Aside from the manifest procedural differences between criminal sentencing and civil tort lawsuits, restitution serves purposes that differ from . . . the purposes of...