Ratcliffe v. Apantaku
Decision Date | 29 December 2000 |
Docket Number | No. 1-99-1461.,1-99-1461. |
Parties | Sherry RATCLIFFE and Glen Ratcliffe, Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. Dr. Frank APANTAKU, Barbara McGee, Administrator of Illinois Home Health Care, Inc., Trinity Hospital and University of Chicago Hospital, Defendants-Appellees. |
Court | United States Appellate Court of Illinois |
Sherry Ratcliffe (pro se), Chicago, for Appellants.
Luisa F. Trujillo, Bollinger, Ruberry & Garvey, Chicago, for Appellee (Dr. Frank Apantaku).
Lord, Bissell & Brook, Chicago (Hugh S. Balsam and Gerald W. Huston, both of counsel), for Appellee (Trinity Hospital).
Swanson, Martin & Bell, Chicago (Kay L. Schichtel and Laura A. Zehner, both of counsel), for Appellee (University of Chicago Hospital).
This appeal arises from the dismissal of plaintiff's complaint for failure to file a physician's report as required by 735 ILCS 5/2-622 (West 1998). Plaintiff's complaint alleged numerous acts of medical negligence committed by defendants that resulted in the death of Irma Ratcliffe ("Decedent"). Plaintiff-Appellants are Sherry and Glen Ratcliffe who are husband and wife (collectively referred to as "Ratcliffe"). Decedent was Sherry Ratcliffe's mother. Sherry Ratcliffe filed this action on behalf of Decedent and was later appointed Special Administrator of Decedent's Estate by the trial judge. Ratcliffe has not retained counsel and is representing Decedent's interests in the matter pro se as she did below.
The Defendants-Appellees are Dr. Frank Apantaku ("Apantaku"); Trinity Hospital ("Trinity"); University of Chicago Hospital ("UCH"); and Illinois Home Health Care, Inc. ("Home")(hereinafter collectively referred to as "Defendants"). We state only those facts necessary for disposition of this appeal. Ratcliffe's complaint alleges that Apantaku's negligent treatment of Decedent resulted in her death due to urosepsis. According to Ratcliffe, the urosepsis developed because of an un-checked urinary tract infection which both Apantaku and Trinity negligently failed to detect and promptly treat. Ratcliffe also alleges that Trinity and Home failed to acknowledge and respond to complaints made by Ratcliffe concerning the negligent care administered to Decedent by Apantaku. Because of Apantaku and Trinity's alleged negligence concerning Decedent's care, Ratcliffe brought Decedent into the emergency room at UCH. Ratcliffe further asserts that UCH was also negligent in failing to administer proper care and effectively hastened the death of Decedent. Based on the above allegations, Ratcliffe, on behalf of Decedent's estate, sought monetary damages in excess of fifty-thousand dollars against each Defendant.
Ratcliffe filed her complaint in the circuit court on April 10, 1998. On July 6, 1998, Trinity filed a motion to dismiss Ratcliffe's complaint and UCH was granted leave by the trial court to join in that motion. Apantaku also filed a motion to dismiss the complaint on August 13, 1998. One of the grounds alleged in the Defendants' motion to dismiss was Ratcliffe's failure to file a physician's report as required by 735 ILCS 5/2-622.
Section 2-622 states in relevant part:
On September 18, 1998, the trial court granted Ratcliffe until November 9, 1998, to file a physicians report pursuant to 735 ILCS 5/2-622. On November 9, 1998, Ratcliffe was appointed special Administrator of Decedent's estate and she complained that she had yet to receive medical records from Trinity and, thus, could not file her physician's report as required under the above statute.
In a variety of different orders, the trial court instructed the Defendants to produce copies of Decedent's records to Ratcliffe. Based upon a review of the orders and Defendants' allegations, it appears that Ratcliffe received UCH's records on October 7, 1998; Trinity's records on November 30, 1998; and Home's records on February 17, 1999. Additionally, Apantaku represented to the court on September 28, 1998, that he possessed no independent office letters concerning the Decedent and would indicate so in a letter to Ratcliffe. Ratcliffe admits receiving all of Defendants' records by February 18, 1999.
Despite having UCH and Trinity's records for months, Ratcliffe did not file a physician's report pursuant to 735 ILCS 5/2-622. On February 16, 1999, prior to hearing Defendants' motions to dismiss, the trial court ordered Ratcliffe to produce a physician's report by March 22, 1999, or the case would be dismissed in accordance with the statute. On March 22, 1999, Ratcliffe had not filed the physician's report and the trial court dismissed Ratcliffe's complaint with prejudice. Ratcliffe appeals from the order dismissing the complaint.
The two main questions raised by this appeal are: (1) whether the trial court abused its discretion in granting Defendants' motions to dismiss pursuant to 735 ILCS 5/2-622; and (2) whether the trial court's dismissal of the complaint was justified based on the fact that it was improper for Ratcliffe, a pro se litigant, to represent Decedent's estate in a wrongful death or survivor action.
We apply an abuse of discretion standard of review concerning the trial court's dismissal of a complaint based on failure to comply with section 2-622. Mueller v. North Suburban Clinic, Ltd., 299 Ill.App.3d 568, 572, 233 Ill.Dec. 603, 701 N.E.2d 246 (1998). As the second question involves a question of law, our standard of review will be de novo. Daley v. American Drug Stores, Inc., 294 Ill. App.3d 1024, 1026, 229 Ill.Dec. 373, 691 N.E.2d 846 (1998)
.
Because we conclude that it was improper for Ratcliffe, a pro se litigant, to represent the legal interests of Decedent's estate in the action below and because we find this fact is dispositive of the appeal, we will only address this issue. At a court hearing on September 18, 1998, in the instant case the trial judge advised Ratcliffe that under Blue v. People of the State of Illinois, 223 Ill.App.3d 594, 165 Ill.Dec. 894, 585 N.E.2d 625 (1992), he did not believe Ratcliffe could represent Decedent's estate in a pro se capacity. The trial judge however did not dismiss the action at that time and on a subsequent court date appointed Ratcliffe as special administrator of Decedent's estate.
In Blue, a pro se plaintiff filed a complaint for an order of habeus corpus in the name of his minor child alleging that the plaintiff was being held in his mother's custody in violation of due process of law. The trial court dismissed the complaint based on the fact that another action was pending between the same parties for the same cause under section 2-619(a)(3) of the Illinois Code of Civil Procedure. Plaintiff appealed the trial court's dismissal. The appellate court dismissed plaintiff's appeal and vacated the circuit court's judgment. Blue, 223 Ill.App.3d at 597, 165 Ill.Dec. 894, 585 N.E.2d 625.
In Blue, the appellate court noted that under "Ill.Rev.Stat.1989, ch. 13, par. 1 [now codified as 705 ILCS 205/1]," "One not duly authorized to practice law may not represent another in a court of law." Blue, 223 Ill.App.3d at 596, 165 Ill.Dec. 894, 585 N.E.2d 625. Further, the court held that:
Blue, 223 Ill.App.3d at 596, 165 Ill.Dec. 894, 585 N.E.2d 625.
The court then held that plaintiff could not represent the interests of another, his son, without being authorized to practice law. Thus, although a pro se litigant is entitled to represent his or her own personal interest, a non-attorney cannot represent another's legal interests on behalf of that individual. Part of the rationale behind the court's ruling was that an individual (a minor) who lacks the capacity to represent himself is entitled to the protection and expertise of an attorney.
In further support of their position that the trial court's...
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