Ratkovich v. Randell Homes, Inc.

• Decision Date: 13 March 1961
• Citation: 169 A.2d 65,403 Pa. 63
• Parties: Joseph RATKOVICH and Mary Ratkovich, his Wife, v. RANDELL HOMES, INC., Appellant.
• Court: Pennsylvania Supreme Court

Page 65

169 A.2d 65

403 Pa. 63

Joseph RATKOVICH and Mary Ratkovich, his Wife, v. RANDELL HOMES, INC., Appellant.

Supreme Court of Pennsylvania.

March 13, 1961.

Rehearing Denied April 17, 1961.

Cohen, Shapiro & Cohen, Reuben E. Cohen, Nathan B. Feinstein, Philadelphia, for appellant.

Duane, Morris & Heckscher, Henry T. Reath, John, M. Ross, Philadelphia, for appellees.

Before CHARLES ALVIN JONES, C. J., and BELL, MUSMANNO, BENJAMIN R. JONES, COHEN, BOK and EAGEN, JJ.

BENJAMIN R. JONES, Justice.

The sole question presented on this appeal is whether a restrictive covenant in a deed which provides that 'not more than one house exclusive of a private garage shall be erected on each lot' prohibits in any manner the erection of a duplex and/or four-unit multi-family house.

Randell Homes, Inc. [Randell] owns three lots in a tract of land called Griffith Manor located on the southeast corner of Hartel and Large Streets in the northeast section of Philadelphia. Joseph and Mary Ratkovich [Ratkovich] own three adjacent lots on Hartel Street in Griffith Manor upon which they have constructed a onestory ranch type house.

Griffith Manor is comprised of some 751 lots. In 1925, a deed restriction was created on all the lots, the pertinent provisions of which state: '* * * that not more than one house exclusive of a private garage shall be erected upon any one lot * * * and no house erected shall cost less than $3000 to build and the front line of each home to be built is to set back at least eight feet from the front building line.'

Randell began the construction ¹ of two buildings [duplex] each containing two apartments and one building containing four apartments.

On April 16, 1959, Ratkovich filed a complaint in equity in the Court of Common Pleas (No. 4) of Philadelphia County against Randell. ² This complaint alleged 'that the erection of such buildings' was in violation of the 'building restrictions' and prayed that Randell be ordered to 'discontinue and cease the erection of buildings for occupancy by more than one family' and 'for such further relief as the court may deem proper.' (Emphasis supplied.)

The chancellor in his adjudication decided that the covenant restricted only the type and not the use or occupancy of the buildings to be erected. The chancellor further found that the restriction had been neither abandoned nor waived by Ratkovich that it was still of substantial benefit to them and decreed nisi 'that any house erected by [Randell] on any of its lots shall be substantially the same as [Ratkovich's] house at 2107 Hartel Street, Philadelphia, or other houses in the immediate vicinity, in size and outward appearance, design and type of construction, and that each house built by [Randell] sahll confrom in every way to the popular idea or conception of a house.' Randell's exception to this decree on the ground of vagueness was sustained by the court en banc. The court en banc concluded that the words 'immediate vicinity' in the chancellor's decree meant the lots adjacent to and across the street from Randell's lots, and, since there were ranch type houses one story in height on those lots, the court decreed that any building erected on Randell's lots would be required to be 'a ranch type house substantially the same as [Ratkovich's] house in size and outward appearance.' From that final decree, Randell appeals.

Randell contends: (1) that, the special relief prayed for not being grantable, the complaint should have been dismissed; (2) that the restrictive covenant permits the erection of the structures contemplated for construction; (3) that the final decree of the court below constitutes an unwarranted and erroneous judicial extension of the terms of this restrictive covenant.

In regard to the first contention, we agree with the court below in its conclusion that the present restrictive covenant was directed not against the use and occupancy but the type of building which might be erected and that Ratkovich was not entitled to have the erection of the proposed structures restrained solely on the ground that it was a 'building for occupancy by more than one family' as requested in the prayer for special relief. Randell now urges that, since Ratkovich's prayer in the complaint was directed to the use and occupancy rather than type of construction, and since the court found against Ratkovich on this issue, the court should have dismissed the complaint. While it has been generally stated that relief in equity must be limited to the specific relief prayed for in the complaint (Cumberland Valley Railroad Company's Appeal, 62 Pa. 218, 230; Zook v. Pennsylvania Railroad Co., 206 Pa. 603, 609, 56 A. 82; Spangler Brewing Company v. McHenry, 242 Pa. 522, 528, 89 A. 665; Ebur et al. v. Alloy Metal Wire Co., 304 Pa. 177, 185, 186, 155 A. 280), yet, where there is a prayer for general relief, the rule enunciated by this Court in Meth v. Meth, 360 Pa. 623, 62 A.2d 848 governs. In Meth we said (360 Pa. at pages 625, 626, 62 A.2d at page 849): 'Under the prayer for general relief, a decree which accords with the equities of the cause may be shaped and rendered; the court may grant any appropriate relief that conforms to the case made by the pleadings although it is not exactly the relief which has been asked for by the special prayer.'

In the instant case, the complaint alleges 'that the erection of such buildings is in violation of the conditions and building restrictions imposed' upon the lots owned by Randell. It is thus obvious that the pleadings questioned not only the use and occupancy but also the legality and validity of the proposed structures. The decision not to dismiss the complaint was a matter peculiarly within the province of the court below and it committed no error in this respect. This contention of Randell is without merit.

Randell's second contention is directed to the interpretation and construction of the word 'house' as used in the restrictive covenant and the court's conclusion in that respect as embodied in its final decree.

The scope and meaning of the restrictive phrase 'not more than one house shall be erected' is primarily a question of intention. In considering this question and endeavoring to determine the scope of this particular restriction, certain well settled legal principles are to be applied, keeping in mind a public policy to encourage rather than discourage the unrestricted use of property.

The applicable legal principles were succinctly set forth by Chief Justice Stern, in Jones v. Park Lane for Convalescents, Inc., 384 Pa. 268, at page 272, 120 A.2d 535, at page 537: 'Restrictions on the use of land are not favored by the law because they are an interference with an owner's free and full enjoyment of his property; that nothing will be deemed a violation of a restriction that is not in plain disregard of its express words; that there are no implied rights arising from a restriction which the court will recognize; that a restriction is not to be extended or enlarged by implication; that every restriction will be construed most strictly against the grantor and every doubt and ambiguity in its language resolved in favor of the owner.'

The word 'house' is susceptible of various meanings. It has been said that 'house'...