Ratley v. Sheriff's Civil Service Bd. of Sedgwick County, 53199

• Decision Date: 17 June 1982
• Docket Number: No. 53199,53199
• Citation: 7 Kan.App.2d 638,646 P.2d 1133
• Parties: Robert J. RATLEY, Appellee, v. SHERIFF'S CIVIL SERVICE BOARD OF SEDGWICK COUNTY, Kansas, Appellant.
• Court: Kansas Court of Appeals

Page 1133

646 P.2d 1133

7 Kan.App.2d 638

Robert J. RATLEY, Appellee, v. SHERIFF'S CIVIL SERVICE BOARD OF SEDGWICK COUNTY, Kansas, Appellant.

No. 53199.

Court of Appeals of Kansas.

June 17, 1982.

Syllabus by the Court

1. Declaratory judgment has, historically, not been deemed an appropriate avenue for relitigation of a legal issue already decided by a tribunal in which an actual controversy is still pending and from which an orderly appeal process may be pursued.

2. The relief contemplated by the declaratory judgment act does not, in the absence of unusual circumstances or emergency features, include its use in pending actions to secure declarations on questions of law involved and in process of determination therein, nor as a substitute for ordinary actions which afford reasonably adequate remedies.

3. Where a district court has appellate jurisdiction to review the decisions of a quasi-judicial body, it has no jurisdiction in an independent equitable action to review alleged errors.

4. The term "quasi-judicial" is applied to administrative boards or officers empowered to investigate facts, weigh evidence, draw conclusions as a basis for official actions, and exercise discretion of a judicial nature.

5. When conducting a hearing pursuant to K.S.A. 19-4327, a sheriff's civil service board is exercising quasi-judicial functions. Therefore, any appeal from a decision or ruling by such a board must be taken exclusively under K.S.A.1981 Supp. 60-2101(d), and not by an independent action, such as one for declaratory relief.

6. Declaratory relief is ordinarily not available where the same issue can be determined in an ordinary action, and particularly where such an action is already pending.

7. The rule of paragraph 6 does not apply, however, where the issue involved in the declaratory judgment action is distinct from that involved in the pending action relied on to deny declaratory relief.

Richard A. Euson, Asst. County Counselor, Wichita, for appellant.

Ted L. Peters, Wichita, for appellee.

Before ABBOTT, P. J., and REES and MEYER, JJ.

MEYER, Judge:

This is a declaratory judgment action brought to determine certain procedural rules applicable to hearings before a sheriff's civil service board, pursuant to the provisions of K.S.A. 19-4327.

On September 9, 1980, the sheriff of Sedgwick County, Kansas, dismissed Robert J. Ratley (appellee) from employment with said sheriff's office. Appellee timely filed a request pursuant to K.S.A. 19-4327 for a hearing before the Sheriff's Civil Service Board of Sedgwick County, Kansas (appellant or Board). Appellee waived, in writing, his right to a hearing within fifteen days and agreed to a hearing date of November 25, 1980. On that date, the hearing began with substantial preliminary discussion as to whether the sheriff or the employee would bear the burden of proof, and whether the hearing should be open or closed to the public.

After considering the arguments of counsel, the Board determined that the employee had the initial burden to prove that the act of termination from employment was unreasonable, and that the proceedings should be held in closed session. Following said ruling, appellee's counsel requested that the meeting be adjourned so that appellee could prosecute an appeal to the district court for declaratory judgment.

On February 6, 1981, appellee filed the present action in the district court for the Eighteenth Judicial District of the State of Kansas. The purpose of the action was a determination of the proper burden of proof to be applied by the Board in a hearing held pursuant to K.S.A. 19-4327. The district court conducted a hearing, and subsequently, on April 6, 1981, entered its journal entry of judgment, granting to appellee the relief prayed for. The effect of this judgment was to reverse the earlier decision by the Board, and to cast upon the sheriff the initial burden of presenting evidence to establish a prima facie case that the termination was reasonable. The judgment also declared that the proceedings should be open to the public. Appellant has appealed only that portion of the judgment relating to burden of proof.

The first issue presented for our determination is whether declaratory judgment relief was proper under the circumstances of this case.

The rules pertinent to declaratory judgment are set out at K.S.A. 60-1701 et seq. Summarized, they include the following: (a) the case must involve an actual controversy; (b) the court has the power to make a binding adjudication of rights; and (c) declaratory relief may be granted even though no consequential relief is, or at that time could be, prayed for. K.S.A. 60-257 also pertains to declaratory judgments. That statute provides:

"The procedure for obtaining a declaratory judgment pursuant to article 17 of this chapter, shall be in accordance with this article, and the right to trial by jury may be demanded under the circumstances and in the manner provided in K.S.A. 60-238 and 60-239. The existence of another adequate remedy does not preclude a judgment for declaratory relief in cases where it is appropriate. The court may order a speedy hearing of an action for a declaratory judgment and may advance it on the calendar."

The issue then is whether, in the words of the statute, declaratory relief was "appropriate" under the facts of the instant case.

Declaratory judgment has, historically, not been deemed an appropriate avenue for relitigation of a legal issue already decided by a tribunal in which an actual controversy is still pending and from which an orderly appeal process may be pursued. See 26 C.J.S. Declaratory Judgments § 40, pp. 122 et seq., for an excellent discussion of this rule. See also Macht v. Hecht Co., 191 Md. 98, 59 A.2d 754 (1948); and Whitelaw v. Burke, Tax Com'r, 290 Ky. 372, 161 S.W.2d 595 (1942).

A leading Kansas case on this subject has held in conformity with the general rule. In Pugh v. City of Topeka, 151 Kan. 327, 99 P.2d 862 (1940), the court said:

"The relief contemplated by the declaratory judgment act (G.S.1935, 60-3127 to 60-3132) does not, in the absence of unusual circumstances or emergency features, include its use in pending actions to secure declarations on questions of law involved and in process of determination therein, nor as a substitute for ordinary actions which afford reasonably adequate remedies." 151 Kan. 327, Syl. P 3, 99 P.2d 862.

"An examination of many cases in other jurisdictions, under similar statutes, shows an overwhelming weight of authority in support of the proposition that declaratory relief is conditioned upon the absence of any other adequate or practicable remedy and that it is not to be used merely as a substitute for ordinary actions, either at law or in equity. Particularly is its use not sanctioned in another action where the same issues are actually being determined. The rule is thus stated in 16 Am.Jur. 295:

" 'The courts will ordinarily refuse to entertain an action for a declaratory judgment as to questions which are determinable in a pending action or proceeding between the same parties. A declaratory judgment is not a proper mode of determining the sufficiency of legal defenses to a pending action. A disputed question of law or procedure raised in a pending suit is not such an actual controversy as comes within the letter, reason, or spirit of the declaratory judgments act.' " 151 Kan. at 331, 99 P.2d 862.

Appellee points out that K.S.A....