Ratliff v. Beale

• Decision Date: 30 November 1896
• Citation: 74 Miss. 247,20 So. 865
• Court: Mississippi Supreme Court
• Parties: W. T. RATLIFF, TAX COLLECTOR, v. AMBUS BEALE

20 So. 865

74 Miss. 247

W. T. RATLIFF, TAX COLLECTOR, v. AMBUS BEALE

Supreme Court of Mississippi

November 30, 1896

October 1896

FROM the chancery court, first district, of Hinds county HON HENRY C. CONN, Chancellor.

The facts are fully stated in the opinion of the court.

Decree affirmed.

Wiley N. Nash, Attorney-general, for appellant.

Upon the decision of this case depends (1) the amount of poll tax to be hereafter collected in this state for all time to come (2) the construction of the lien clause in sec. 243 of the state constitution; (3) whether our free public school system is to suffer by a strained construction of the instrument by which it is created. The importance of these matters to the state is so great that I do not hesitate to appear in the case, and that, too, though entertaining some doubt as to whether or not it is my official duty to do so.

The bill claims that, under a clause in sec. 243 of the state constitution, no property which is exempt from taxation can be seized or charged in any manner for the payment of the poll tax, the particular clause being "said tax (i. e poll tax) to be a lien only on taxable property."

Over one hundred years ago, in England, it was said by a full court, "that the sheriff, by the levying of goods by fiere facias, as he seizes the goods, gets a property in the goods against all persons, " etc. Clerk v. Withers 6 Modern Reports, 298.

So it is evident that in the seizure of the goods, in the case at bar, the sheriff did not get a lien, but more than a lien. He got a property in the goods, to be divested only upon payment of the poll tax and all legal costs and charges. Whenever the sheriff or other officer makes a valid levy, seizure or distraint of goods, he has a vested right, a legal property, in such goods. This property is acquired under the law and by the valid levy, seizure or distraint, and the property becomes revested in the general or original owner only when the demand, the execution or other process, is satisfied. In cases of levy, seizure or distraint of property, the sheriff or other officer asserts title to the property under the process or mode of proceeding. By taking the property under the levy, seizure or distress, the officer acquires a certain special legal property in and to the goods so levied, seized or distrained, which property or title holds good until the satisfaction of the particular debt, charge, demand or claim.

If the framers of the present constitution intended, that, for the payment of the poll tax, nontaxable property should be liable to no process whatever, why, in the name of common sense, did they not say so? What language does the code use in reference to personal property exempt? This is the language used: "The following property shall be exempt from seizure under execution or attachment, to wit, " etc. Code 1892, § 1963. What uncertainty is there here? Is there any mistaking of this language? What is the language used by the legislature in regard to homestead exemptions? It is this: "Every citizen of this state, male or female, being a householder and having a family, shall be entitled to hold, exempt from seizure or sale under execution or attachment, " etc. Code 1892, § 1970. There is nothing uncertain about this--there is no mistaking such language. In these two sections, 1970 and 1963, the legislature said there was some virtue in the words "seizure and sale." In the one case the law says certain property shall not, and in the other that it shall, be sold.

It does seem that if it had been intended in § 243 of the constitution to exempt all nontaxable property from distraint, seizure or sale for the nonpayment of the poll tax, the framers thereof would have used the same or similar language to that used to exempt personal property and the homestead from seizure or sale under execution or attachment. It could have been done in the same number of words.

The public policy proposition of appellee's counsel can be answered conclusively by saying to those who contend that every effort should be made to uphold in every possible way the franchise scheme as announced in the new constitution, that every effort should be made to uphold in every possible way the free public school system as announced in the new constitution. Admitting that both are equally important, then certainly the court will not, by a construction, and a strained construction, pull down one to build up the other. Placing both on flat-footed equality, then the meaning of the word lien, used in § 243 of the new constitution, will not be enlarged, but will be considered in its ordinary, primary, and obvious sense.

Where the constitution is not entirely explicit within itself, it ought not to be so construed as to cripple the government and render it unequal to the objects for which it was instituted. Chief. Justice Sharkey, in Smith v. Halfacre, 6 Howard, 600, citing 9 Wheat., 1; Leachman v. Musgrove, 45 M., 511.

We cannot say too much in behalf of our schools. Mississippi--the people of Mississippi--cannot do too much in their behalf. Through them, up to this good hour, much has been accomplished--much that ennobles and elevates the human race. By these in this country, in a large measure, are to be drilled and mustered those forces with which is to be fought, in the years to come, every moral, social, political and religious conflict.

In conclusion, and without recapitulation, it is believed that this court, in view of the facts, the law and the constitution, and after considering the case fully and in all its phases, will reverse the decree and judgment of the court below, sustain the motion to dissolve the injunction and dismiss the bill.

J. A. P. Campbell, on same side.

The real question is as to the meaning of the clause in sec. 243 of the constitution, in these words: "Said tax to be a lien only upon taxable property." In what sense was the word "lien" used? Was it in the sense of liability or right to resort to it as means of payment? This is repelled by the fact that the poll tax was imposed by the constitution "in aid of the common schools, " and, in order to be an aid, it must be collected; and it is not to be charged that the convention falsely pretended to be aiding common schools, when at the same time it was scheming to prevent this aid, by providing against the collection of the poll tax; that it professed a purpose to aid the common schools, but this was a mere pretense, and the poll tax was not to be enforced as to the very large majority of those subject to it. The prohibition of criminal proceedings to collect poll tax strongly suggests the admissibility of civil proceedings, and can it be that it was intended that the vast majority liable should escape payment? Is the constitution as to this a sham and fraud, professing one thing and intending another? Is the grant to boards of supervisors of power to increase the poll tax by one dollar, to aid the common schools of their counties, of like delusive character? That tax is not subject to the provision as to lien.

Can it be that it is a part of the constitutional plan to exclude negroes from the ballot box, to make the poll tax uncollectible, and yet put it in the power of the legislature to thwart the plan by making all property taxable, when no question as to a lien would arise? The convention refused to commit to the legislature any power over the matter of establishing and maintaining common schools. It provided for them and their support, and levied a poll tax, as part of the means of their support, and, if it was not guilty of deception and double dealing, the poll tax was meant to be collected. The tax is upon the person--it could not be a lien on him--and were it a lien on nontaxable property, it would fetter exchanges and produce embarrassment as to the transfer of articles not taxable, which, if subject to a charge, would, for purposes of transfer, be reduced in value.

The constitution was made in the midst of existing institutions and in view of a body of statute law relating to many things, and, among them, to taxation. For a long time it had been provided by statute, in force when the constitution was made, that "taxes assessed shall be a lien upon and bind the property assessed from the first day of February, " etc., and it must have been in view of this and to limit this lien or charge to tax the property that the clause was adopted. The term lien was used, not in any general or loose and unusual sense, as argued, but in its usual sense, and in the sense well understood from long usage and existing statutes on the subject of taxes and their collection. Our statutes not only made taxes on property a lien, but declared that no property should be exempt from distress and sale for taxes. If it was the purpose of the convention to free nontaxable property from liability for poll taxes in civil proceedings, why was it not so said? Why employ an equivocal expression? Why leave the matter in doubt? Is it not manifest that it is an afterthought to seek to use the clause under consideration as a deep-laid scheme to fool the public and exclude negroes from voting? It will not do to interpret the constitution by its practical operation as to this.

One thing is certain, if schools are to be aided, the poll tax is to be collected; and if nontaxable property is not liable the tax is a sham and delusion, for probably nine-tenths of those liable to poll tax will escape payment. They who pay taxes on property will be the only persons paying poll tax, and the vast majority of heads of families will escape payment of poll tax, almost the only tax by which they can be made to contribute to the enormous burden of educating their children. A lien is a tie that binds property, such...