Ratliff v. Sommers
| Decision Date | 16 February 1904 |
| Citation | 46 S.E. 712,55 W.Va. 30 |
| Parties | RATLIFF v. SOMMERS et al. |
| Court | West Virginia Supreme Court |
Submitted January 20, 1904.
Syllabus by the Court.
1. It is impracticable to lay down a rule in reference to amendments of equity pleadings which shall govern in all cases. Their allowance must at every stage of the cause rest in the discretion of the court, and that discretion must depend largely on the special circumstances of each case. The ends of justice should never be sacrificed to mere form, or by too rigid an adherence to technical rules of practice.
2. Courts are much stricter in permitting amendments to answers than to bills.
3. Where a purchaser under a parol contract has been placed in possession, and held under the contract, and paid all or part of the purchase money, and made valuable, permanent improvements upon the land, and such possession has been actual and exclusive, and not as a tenant of the vendor, he may maintain his bill in a court of equity for specific performance.
Appeal from Circuit Court, Lewis County; W. G. Bennett, Judge.
Bill by William Ratliff against Martha M. Sommers and others. Decree for plaintiff, and defendants appeal. Affirmed.
Linn & Bland, for appellants.
Edward A. Brannon and Louis Bennett, for appellee.
William Ratliff filed his bill in the circuit court of Lewis county against Martha M. Sommers et al., heirs at law and administrator de bonis non with the will annexed of G. D Camden, deceased, for the purpose of enforcing specific performance of a contract made with the said G. D. Camden in his lifetime for a tract of 88 3/4 acres of land on Oil creek, setting forth the metes and bounds thereof in his bill--alleging that negotiations were commenced as early as 1874 for the purchase of said land--and filed with his bill as exhibits, certain letters and fragments of letters from G. D. Camden indicating such negotiations, and also two letters as follows:
He alleged that said letters so received constituted a valid and binding contract against said Camden and his estate for the specific conveyance by deed to plaintiff of said tract of land; that plaintiff had control and management of quite a quantity of said Camden's lands in Lewis county, and was employed by Camden to watch and look after the same, and keep trespassers from cutting timber and doing damage to the same, and for which work Camden promised, verbally and in writing, to pay him therefor, and the same was to go as a credit on said land purchase, which work, with the cash shown by said receipts to have been paid on said land, had fully and more than paid for said tract at the price of $4 per acre; that, at the date of the letters written from Florida, Camden possessed a large number of tracts in Lewis county, and had extensive business interests generally, and about the date of the said letters his health became impaired, but he retained his mental vigor up to the time of his death, and during the period of 1884, and up to 1889, his wife, Mrs. Camden, was authorized by him to do and perform such work and acts as were represented by said letters, contracts, and receipts, which he would dictate to her, and she would write at his instance and request, and she would sign many of his important legal papers, such as contracts for sale of land, receipts for purchase money, and other papers, as appear by the contracts, letters, and receipts made a part of the bill; that Charles W. Lynch was appointed and qualified as administrator de bonis non with the will annexed of G. D. Camden-- and praying that the said heirs at law be required to execute and deliver a good and sufficient deed conveying to plaintiff the said tract of land, and for general relief.
The defendant Charles W. Lynch, administrator, filed his demurrer and answer to the bill, and for ground of demurrer said that Myra H. Camden, who was named in the process, but not made a party by the bill, but expressly stated therein not to be a necessary or material party, was a necessary party to the bill, and pleaded the statute of limitations, and answered, denying that G. D. Camden had ever sold the land to plaintiff as claimed in his bill, and averring that John J. Davis and T. B. Camden, trustees named in a settlement made between the heirs and Myra H. Camden concerning the contest of the will, by deed dated the 21st of March, 1895, conveyed to the said heirs at law, "all and singular, all the unsold and remaining lands that were conveyed to parties of the first part [[[trustees] by the deed aforesaid for the purposes in said deed mentioned, in the State of West Virginia, and elsewhere in any other state or country, and all the lands conveyed by said G. D. Camden to said Myra H. Camden and not sold and not conveyed by the said G. D. Camden, or sold and conveyed to her by parties of the first part."
The defendants Martha M. Sommers et al., heirs at law, also filed their demurrer and answer, insisting that Myra H. Camden was a necessary party to the suit, and denying the sale to the plaintiff as alleged in the bill.
Depositions were taken and filed in the cause, and on the 18th day of March, 1899, the plaintiff tendered his amended bill, which was filed, and remanded to rules, for the purpose of issuing process thereon and maturing the cause for hearing. The amended bill alleged that Myra H. Camden, who had intermarried with G. W. Atkinson, was a necessary party to the suit; and alleging in said bill that said G. W. Atkinson, by reason of his marital relations, had also become a necessary party, and asking that the original bill be read as a part of the amended bill, and alleging that the said G. D. Camden, being the owner thereof, at one time sold to one James Gay, by specific metes and bounds, which are set out in the bill, as well as the amended bill, the said 88 3/4 acres of land on Oil creek, which sale was afterwards canceled and annulled, and the same again became the property of Camden, who for many years owned this and other lands in that section, and employed Ratliff to look after the same for him, and to attend not only to his general interests there, but especially to his interests in a warmly litigated suit about land pending in the circuit court of Lewis county between the said Camden and one John Keith et al., and promised to pay Ratliff a proper consideration for his services; that, in pursuance of said employment, he had, at great inconvenience to himself, and at the loss of the friendship of many of his neighbors, done work and performed services up to the spring of 1884 to the amount of $150 and more, which said Camden then agreed to pay to him, and still continued in the service and employment of Camden, and his service thereabouts amounted to a large sum, which Camden agreed to pay; that about 1886 or 1887 he and said Camden had an oral agreement by which Camden sold him the land at $4 per acre, he to have credit for the amount due him for services, and the residue, when ascertained, to be paid by Ratliff, who took possession of said land under said purchase with full knowledge and by the express consent of Camden, and had continued in adverse possession under said sale ever since; that Camden then and repeatedly thereafter promised Ratliff to draw up and execute a writing setting out the sale and the terms thereof, but, being old and feeble in health, he put off and delayed the execution of the same until the 24th of June, 1888, when, plaintiff having fully paid up the entire purchase money on said land, said Camden authorized and directed W. B. McGary to execute and deliver for him to plaintiff a writing setting forth said sale and the payment of the purchase money, which he did, being general agent for Camden to sell his Oil creek lands, as well as other lands, and, in pursuance of his general as well as of his special authority, executed on behalf of G. D. Camden a writing selling said tract of land to said Ratliff at said $4 per acre, and stating that the entire purchase money had been duly settled with said Camden, signing the same with the name of G. D. Camden, by W. B. McGary, his attorney, and delivered the same to plaintiff; alleging that said Camden died on the 21st of April, 1891, without having made him a deed for said land, though he had repeatedly promised to do so; that he left surviving him the heirs at law named, and his wife, Myra H. Camden; that he left a will in which he devised all of his real estate to his said wife (now Myra H. Atkinson); that said will was duly admitted to probate; that proceedings to set aside the will were instituted by...
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