Ratliff v. State
| Decision Date | 11 August 1975 |
| Docket Number | No. 48490,48490 |
| Citation | 317 So.2d 403 |
| Parties | George RATLIFF, Jr. v. STATE of Mississippi. |
| Court | Mississippi Supreme Court |
McTeer, Walls & Bailey, Greenville, Carver A. Randle, Greenwood, for appellant.
A. F. Summer, Atty. Gen. by Karen Gilfoy, Asst. Atty. Gen. and John C. Ellis, Sp. Asst. Atty. Gen., Jackson, for appellee.
Before PATTERSON, INZER and WALKER, JJ.
The appellant was indicted and tried for murder in the Circuit Court of Sunflower County, Mississippi. From a conviction of manslaughter and a sentence of fifteen years in the state penitentiary, he takes this appeal.
Appellant's primary contention is that the trial court erred in denying appellant's motion to suppress a written statement given by him detailing his involvement with the deceased on the night of the homicide. In his brief, he contends that the written statement which was introduced in evidence and considered by the jury was in fact 'coerced, induced, and otherwise involuntarily given thereby rendering it unlawful and inadmissible at the trial court level. . . .' The appellant testified on the motion to suppress that J. M. 'Skeeter' Robertson, a close friend and former employer of appellant and also vice-mayor of the Town of Ruleville, stated '. . . if you make a statement, you can go home, you can get out on bond and they can have the charge reduced to manslaughter and you can beg for mercy of the Court and you can go home . . .'; and that the reason he signed the statement was '. . . Mr. Robertson had promised me that I would get out on bail, the charge would be reduced to manslaughter, that I can beg for mercy of the Court and I would be able to go home. . . .'
A lengthy hearing on the motion to suppress appellant's statement was had in the absence of the jury as required by Agee v. State, 185 So.2d 671 (Miss.1966), and there is no complaint that the hearing was not properly conducted. The officers who were present when the statement was signed, and J. M. 'Skeeter' Robertson who allegedly made the promises to the appellant during interrogation, were placed on the stand and denied that any such promises were made. The trial court entered a finding of fact that the statement was freely and voluntarily given and was not the result of any threats, force coercion or intimidation exerted against the defendant; and, that there were no promises or hopes of reward made to the defendant and particularly found that appellant was not told by Mr. Robertson that, 'It is best to make a statement and maybe you can get out on bond and have it reduced to manslaughter.' The evidence presented on the motion to suppress by the appellant and the state was conflicting and was therefore for the court to resolve, which it did contrary to appellant's contention. Moreover, the appellant submitted to the jury by his instruction number 15, the issue of whether the statement was freely and voluntarily given. That instruction reads as follows:
The Court instructs the jury for the defendant that if you believe from the evidence that the alleged confession was induced by Mr. J. M. 'Skeeter' Robinson (sic) and Officer Willie Martin by a promise to the defendant that the charge of murder would be reduced to manslaughter; that if he confessed to a charge of manslaughter he could be released on bond and allowed to go home; or that leniency would be shown him, then you should disregard the alleged confession.
It is evident from the verdict that the jury also decided the issue of whether the statement was voluntary against appellant's contention.
We would point out that having the issue of whether the statement was freely and voluntarily given submitted to the jury was more then the defendant was entitled. The voluntariness of a statement and its admissibility in evidence is a question for the court to determine and not a question for the jury. Norwood v. State, 258 So.2d 756 (Miss.1972); Rhone v. State, 254 So.2d 750 (Miss.1971); Buckler v. State, 171 Miss. 353, 157 So. 353 (1934); Whittaker v. State, 169 Miss. 517, 142 So. 474 (1932); Tyler v. State, 159 Miss. 223, 131 So. 417 (1930); Stepney v. City of Columbia, 157 Miss. 193, 127 So. 687 (1930); Stubbs v. State, 148 Miss. 764, 114 So. 827 (1927); Brown v. State, 142 Miss. 335, 107 So. 373 (1926); Lee v. State, 137 Miss. 329, 102 So. 296 (1924); Hunter v. State, 74 Miss. 515, 21 So. 305 (1897); Ellis v. State, 65 Miss. 44, 3 So. 188 (1887); Lego v. Twomey, Warden, 404 U.S. 477, 92 S.Ct. 619, 30 L.Ed.2d 618 (1972).
However, after the court has ruled that a defendant's statement or confession is admissible in evidence, the defendant may nevertheless show all the attendant circumstances surrounding the taking of the statement that would have a bearing on its strength or weakness.
In Rhone v. State, 254 So.2d 750 (Miss.1971), this Court, speaking through Justice Inzer, said:
It has long been the law of this state, that before a confession can be received in evidence, it must be shown to be competent in that it was freely and voluntarily given. This is a legal question to be determined by the court on a preliminary investigation out of the presence of the jury. If, after hearing all the testimony pertinent to the inquiry, the court is satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt that the confession was freely and voluntarily given, it becomes competent evidence. However, after a confession has been held by the court to be competent evidence either party has a right (but is not required) to introduce before the jury the same evidence which was submitted on the preliminary inquiry as well as any other evidence relative to the weight and credibility of the confession. The jury does not pass upon the competency of the confession, but the jury does pass upon the weight and credibility of the confession. The jury has the same freedom of action in relation to confessions which they have in regard to other testimony. . . . Harvey v. State, 207 So.2d 108 (Miss.1968); Wright v. State, 212 Miss. 491, 54 So.2d 735 (1951); ...
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