Ratzlaff v. State

Decision Date16 September 1924
Docket Number15081.
PartiesRATZLAFF v. STATE.
CourtOklahoma Supreme Court

Syllabus by the Court.

A bastardy proceeding, under article 3, c. 70, C. O. S. 1921 is a "civil action," and the allegations of the initial pleading of the plaintiff must be so definite and certain as to advise the defendant of "the precise nature of the charge," so that he may advisedly and intelligently prepare his defense.

We approve the rules announced by Chief Justice Marshall, where he said:

"Courts are the mere instruments of the law, and can will nothing. When they are said to exercise a discretion, it is a mere legal discretion, a discretion to be exercised in discerning the course prescribed by law; and, when that is discerned, it is the duty of the court to follow it. Judicial power is never exercised for the purpose of giving effect to the will of the judge; always for the purpose of giving effect to the will of the Legislature; or, in other words, to the will of the law." Osborn v. U.S Bank, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 738, 6 L.Ed. 204.

Errors of a trial court clearly appearing and which, from the record, it appears may have been materially prejudicial, will not ordinarily be excused by an undue extension and application of the doctrine of harmless error, merely because it does not affirmatively and clearly appear from the record that a contrary ruling of the lower court would have produced a different verdict or judgment.

Rarely in a case should the court permit a child to be exhibited to the jury for the purpose of making its appearance evidence of its paternity, and in no case should this be done unless the child has reached that age and point of development where its features and corporal traits have become well and finally fixed and settled.

In a complaint in bastardy proceedings, filed under article 3, c 70, C. O. S. 1921, an allegation that the mother of the child is a resident of the state at the time of the filing of the complaint is sufficient to state a cause of action in this regard, as it is not necessary that she be such resident at the time of conception, during pregnancy, or when she was delivered of the child.

Appeal from County Court of Major County; J. Dawson Houk, Judge.

Bastardy proceedings by the State against Harrison Ratzlaff. From a judgment of guilty, defendant appeals. Reversed and remanded.

Simons, McKnight & Simons, of Enid, and Tom E. Willis, of Fairview, for plaintiff in error.

A. R. Hughes, Co. Atty., and C. K. Cary, both of Fairview, J. Q. A. Harrod, of Oklahoma City, and C. B. Wood, of Fairview, for the State.

LYDICK J.

This is a proceeding instituted in the county court of Major county, under article 3 of chapter 70, C. O. S. 1921, to charge Harrison Ratzlaff, the alleged father of a bastard child, with its maintenance. The complaint was verified by Dorothy Kliever, mother of the child, and the proceedings were in the name of the state. Defendant was found guilty by a jury and judgment rendered against him by the court accordingly. He appeals to this court.

In the complaint the sole allegation as to the mother's conception of this bastard child is "that Harrison Ratzlaff is the father of her said child." The defendant filed a motion to require the complaint to be made more definite and certain so as to allege the time and place where it was claimed that there took place the sexual intercourse between the parties by which the mother was conceived with this child. This motion was overruled, the defendant excepted, and now assigns this ruling as error here.

A bastardy proceeding under article 3, c. 70, C. O. S. 1921, is a civil action, and the allegations of the initial pleading of the plaintiff must be so definite and certain as to advise the defendant of "the precise nature of the charge" so that he may advisedly and intelligently prepare his defense. See Anderson v. State, 42 Okl. 151, 140 P. 1142.

This requirement is of special importance in a case like this, for when a man is charged with improper relations with a woman, and she testifies that he is guilty, it too often appears that the jury, notwithstanding the law and the court's instructions to the contrary, finds him not guilty only when he has established his innocence by affirmative proof beyond a reasonable doubt.

The defendant must be permitted to frame the issues and prepare for trial on the theory that he is not guilty. If the charge be false that he is the father of the child, how can he intelligently procure witnesses to show that he was not present perhaps a year before, at some particular place which the prosecuting witness may, on the witness stand in the trial and for the first time, disclose as the place where she claims the crime was committed? Or, if admittedly present, produce witnesses that no such act occurred? Evidence of admissions of the prosecuting witness against her interests and proof of various kinds may be available and effective to meet such issue, but without knowing the material issue to be presented by the state the defendant may be made helpless to defend, no matter how innocent he may be. Such motion is "addressed largely to the discretion of the court," as we held in the case of Frear et al. v. State, 76 Okl. 213, 184 P. 771. The rule announced in this case is a correct statement of the law, but this discretion is a legal one.

We approve the rules announced by Chief Justice Marshall when he said:

"Courts are the mere instruments of the law, and can will nothing. When they are said to exercise a discretion, it is a mere legal discretion, a discretion to be exercised in discerning the course prescribed by law; and, when that is discerned, it is the duty of the court to follow it. Judicial power is never exercised for the purpose of giving effect to the will of the judge; always for the purpose of giving effect to the will of Legislature; or, in other words, to the will of the law." Osborn v. U.S. Bank, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 738-866, 6 L.Ed. 204.

This error of the lower court deprived the defendant of a substantial right, and from the record it appears same may have been highly prejudicial to his defense. Errors of a trial court clearly appearing, and which from the record it appears may have been materially injurious, will not ordinarily be excused by an undue extension and application of the doctrine of harmless error, merely because it does not affirmatively and clearly appear from the record that a contrary ruling of the lower court would have produced a different verdict or judgment.

The defendant demurred to this complaint, alleging it to be insufficient because it contained no...

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