Rauch v. Chapman

• Decision Date: 12 March 1897
• Citation: 16 Wash. 568,48 P. 253
• Parties: RAUCH v. CHAPMAN, COUNTY TREASURER.
• Court: Washington Supreme Court

48 P. 253

16 Wash. 568

RAUCH v. CHAPMAN, COUNTY TREASURER.

Supreme Court of Washington

March 12, 1897

Appeal from superior court, Klickitat county; Sol Smith, Judge.

Suit by W. P. Rauch against A. C. Chapman, as treasurer of Klickitat county. Judgment for plaintiff, and defendant appeals. Reversed.

W. B Presby and Huntington & Wilson, for appellant.

C. H Spalding, for respondent.

REAVIS J.

Suit in equity, by a taxpayer of Klickitat county, against the county treasurer, to enjoin the payment of certain county warrants on the ground that they were issued after the constitutional limitation of county indebtedness had been incurred. The complaint, after other necessary allegations set forth that the indebtedness of the county was more than 1 1/2 per centum of the taxable property therein, and no validation by vote of the electors had been made of any additional indebtedness. The answer stated, among other defenses to the suit, that the warrants in controversy were compulsory obligations imposed upon the county by the constitution and laws of the state; and specified some of the purposes for which the warrants were issued, among which were services for jurors in the superior court, witness fees in criminal proceedings, and sheriff's expenses in serving criminal process, and expenses incurred at the general state election. Plaintiff demurred to this affirmative defense, which demurrer was sustained by the superior court, and the court thereupon, among other facts, found the following, which are material to the consideration of the cause by this court: "(7) That the total indebtedness of said county on the 9th day of March, 1893, and during all of the time of the issue of the warrants now called, was $85,441.92, and greatly exceeded the constitutional limit of indebtedness for said county, after deducting therefrom the cash in the treasury and all taxes levied and uncollected. (8) That the warrants now called by the county treasurer are the debts contracted after said 9th day of March, 1893, and were issued between the 2d day of April, 1893, and the 26th day of July, 1893, during all of which time said indebtedness of $85,441.92 was outstanding, and all of said warrants now called were and are in excess of the constitutional limit of indebtedness of said county, and were issued without the assent of the voters of said county first had and obtained at an election held for that purpose, and they have not been validated by any vote of the electors of said county since their issue." Judgment was rendered against the defendant, and a permanent injunction issued against the payment of the warrants designated in the complaint. The defendant appeals.

1. Respondent maintains here that the payment of the warrants is inhibited by section 6 of article 8 of the constitution of this state, of which the part material for consideration is as follows: "No county, city, town, school district or other municipal corporation shall for any purpose become indebted in any manner to an amount exceeding one and one-half per centum of the taxable property in such county," etc., "without the assent of three-fifths of the voters therein voting at an election for that purpose: *** provided, that no part of the indebtedness allowed in this section shall be incurred for any purpose other than strictly county, city, town, school district or other municipal purposes;" and with the further proviso that any city or town shall be allowed to become indebted to a larger amount, not exceeding 5 per centum additional, for supplying such city or town with water, light, and sewers, when the works for supplying the same shall be owned and controlled by the municipality. It will be observed that the question involved in this cause is the construction of the above section of the constitution. Without the aid of judicial interpretation which has been placed upon this or substantially the same constitutional provision in several state constitutions, we might be justified in reading the section plainly thus: "No county," etc., "shall become indebted;" and confine the reading to indebtedness incurred by the county itself. But evidently, from the conflicting adjudications that have been rendered upon this question, the language of the constitution in this section is susceptible of more than one reading. Assuming this to be correct, we must endeavor to determine its true intent and meaning. Judge Cooley, in his work on Constitutional Limitations (page 58), observes: "It is therefore a very proper rule of construction that the whole is to be examined with a view to arriving at the true intention of each part, and this Sir Edward Coke regards as the most natural and genuine method of expounding the statute. If any section of a law be intricate, obscure, or doubtful, the proper mode of discovering its true meaning is by comparing it with the other sections, and finding out the sense of one clause by the words or obvious intent of another. *** The rule applicable here is that effect is to be given if possible to the whole instrument, and to every section and clause. If different portions seem to conflict, the courts must harmonize them, if practicable, and must lean in favor of a construction which will render every word operative, rather than one which may make some words idle and nugatory. This rule is applicable with special force to written constitutions, in which the people will be presumed to have expressed themselves in careful and measured terms, corresponding with the immense importance of the powers delegated, leaving as little as possible to implication. It is scarcely conceivable that a case can arise where a court would be justified in declaring any portion of a written constitution nugatory because of ambiguity. One part may qualify another so as to restrict its operation, or apply it otherwise than the natural construction would require if it stood by itself; but one part is not to be allowed to defeat another, if by any reasonable construction the two can be made to stand together." And again the same authority, on page 37: "What is a constitution and what are its objects? *** It is not the beginning of the community, nor the origin of private rights; it is not the fountain of law, nor the incipient state of government; it is not the cause, but consequence, of personal and political freedom; it grants no rights to the people, but is the creature of their power, the instrument of their convenience. Designed for their protection in the enjoyment of the rights and powers which they possessed before the constitution was made, it is but the framework of the political government, and necessarily based upon the pre-existing condition of laws, rights, habits, and modes of thought. There is nothing primitive in it; it is all derived from a known source. It presupposes an organized society, law, order, property, personal freedom, a love of political liberty, and enough of cultivated intelligence to know how to guard it against the encroachments of tyranny. ***"

When the constitution of Washington was adopted by the people of the newly-born state, the various county governments in the territory were recognized, and their organizations and powers in a great measure continued. A large body of laws applicable to the new state, and which the people had for a long time been accustomed to, were found and continued in force. At this time some of the counties in the state were already indebted to an amount equal to the constitutional limitation of 1 1/2 per centum. The state itself inherited from its territorial form liabilities which very nearly equaled the limitation on state indebtedness prescribed in section 1 of article 8 of the constitution. The several counties, in addition to their organization for local purposes, and having conferred upon them the power to control and build county roads and bridges, erect public buildings for county purposes, and do many other things connected with the county as a corporation, also had imposed upon them certain duties by the state, and became governmental agencies, in the territory comprised in the county, for the state. Section 11 of article 11 authorizes any county, city town, or township to make and enforce within its limits all such local police, sanitary, and other regulations as are not in conflict with general laws. Section 12 of the same article provides: "The legislature shall have no power to impose taxes upon counties *** or upon the inhabitants or property thereof, for county *** purposes, but may by general laws vest in the corporate authorities thereof the power to assess and collect taxes for such purposes." The duty has been imposed upon the several counties in this state to provide for and pay certain necessary expenses for the enforcement of the criminal laws of the state, and for expenses incurred at the regular biennial state elections at which county and state officers are elected, and in carrying out other functions of the state, and also to make expenditures necessary for the existence of the county organization. Section 8, art. 6, of the constitution, provides for biennial elections. Section 5, art. 11, also provides for the election in the several counties of boards of county commissioners, sheriffs, county clerks, treasurers, prosecuting attorneys, and other county officers as public convenience may require, and devolves upon the legislature the power to prescribe their duties and fix their terms of office, and to regulate the compensation of all such officers in proportion to their duties, and that for that purpose the legislature may classify the counties by population. A similar limitation of county indebtedness as in this state is found in a number of the constitutions of the new states, and the...