Raunela v. Hertz Corp.
| Decision Date | 06 March 1972 |
| Parties | Helena M. RAUNELA, administratrix, et al. v. The HERTZ CORPORATION et al. |
| Court | United States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts Supreme Court |
Francis H. George, Worcester, for defendants.
John M. O'Connor, Fitchburg, for plaintiffs.
Before CUTTER, SPIEGEL, REARDON, QUIRICO and HENNESSEY, JJ.
This is an action in tort for negligence in which Helena M. Raunela, individually, seeks to recover for personal injuries sustained by her in an automobile accident, and in which she also seeks recovery, in her capacity as administratrix of the estate of her late husband, Mauno Raunela, for his conscious suffering and death resulting from the same accident. The defendants are The Hertz Corporation (Hertz) and Agnes D. Leahey as administratrix of the estate of her late husband Philip M. Leahey (Leahey) whose death also resulted from the same accident. The accident involved a collision between a Vokswagen automobile driven by Mrs. Raunela and owned by her husband who was a passenger therein at the time of the collision, and an International van body truck owned by Hertz and driven by Leahey. The case is before us on the defendants' exceptions to the denial of their motion for directed verdicts and the denial of their motion for a new trial.
The plaintiffs' declaration is in six counts, the first four by Mrs. Raunela as administratrix, and the last two by her individually. The jury returned verdicts for the plaintiffs on all counts as follows: count 1: $40,000 against Leahey for the death of Mauno Raunela; 1 count 2: $2,000 against Leahey for the conscious suffering of Mauno Raunela; count 3: $40,000 against Hertz for the death of Mauno Raunela; count 4: $2,000 against Hertz for the conscious suffering of Mauno Raunela; count 5: $18,000 against Leahey for personal injuries to Mrs. Raunela; and count 6: $18,000 against Hertz for personal injuries to Mrs. Raunela. In counts 3, 4 and 6 against Hertz, the plaintiffs alleged that Leahey negligently operated the truck as an agent, servant or employee of Hertz. The defendants' single answer to all counts consisted of a general denial, plea of contributory negligence, denial of agency, violation of law, statute of limitations, and denial of public way.
On the defendants' exceptions to the denial of their motion for directed verdicts the test is whether 'anywhere in the evidence, from whatever source derived, any combination of circumstances could be found from which a reasonable inference could be drawn in favor of the plaintiff.' Kelly v. Railway Exp. Agency, Inc., 315 Mass. 301, 302, 52 N.E.2d 411, 412. Adams v. Herbert, 345 Mass. 588, 589, 188 N.E.2d 577. We hold that such a combination of circumstances could be found in the evidence and that the case was therefore properly submitted to the jury for decision.
The Volkswagen and the truck were traveling in opposite directions on the same highway, both approaching an intersection formed by another road crossing the highway. As the Volkswagen attempted to make a left hand turn into the cross road called Rindge Road, its right side and the left front of the truck collided within the intersection and in the lane in which the truck had been traveling. The car was pushed sideway for an unspecified distance and the truck turned over on its left side. There are no traffic controls at the intersection. The truck left brake marks on the pavement for a distance of over thirty-five feet to the point of impact. There was nothing to obstruct the truck driver's view of the intersection for a distance of 400 feet as he approached it. Before making the turn, Mrs. Raunela put on her directional lights, stopped and looked in both directions, and then looked straight ahead. She saw nothing coming so she made her left turn and had almost completed the turn into Rindge Road when struck by the defendants' truck. The jury could thus find that the truck was not in the 400 foot range of view when the car started to make its turn, and that the truck thereafter came into a position where its driver could have seen the car making the twin and could have stopped the truck before it struck the car.
It is now almost seventy years since the Legislature enacted the first general statute regulating the operation of motor vehicles. See St.1903, c. 473. 2 It is also almost seventy years since the first motor vehicle tort cases started to appear in the reports of the decisions of this court. See Hennessey v. Taylor, 189 Mass. 583, 76 N.E. 224, decided in 1905. From those earliest decisions to the present time we have rendered numerous decisions reciting in detail the evidence which either did or did not warrant the submission of the case to the jury. Except in unusual cases it is doubtful whether it would add much to our jurisprudence to continue with such detailed recitals of evidence in passing on exceptions to the allowance or denial of motions for directed verdicts. The barest outline of the evidence should suffice for such purpose except in unusual cases.
The day after the jury returned their verdicts, the defendants filed a motion for a new trial. The motion is not reproduced in the record, and the bill of exceptions does not state the grounds upon which the new trial was sought. The bill shows only that A copy of the docket entries received by this court from the clerk of courts for Worcester County reflects only that the motion for a new trial was allowed 'on count I on grounds I & 3 in motion' and that it was 'Denied as to all other counts.' It also shows the order for remittitur. This still leaves us with a record which gives no information as to the grounds of the motion or the basis for the action of the court thereon.
It is only by resort to the briefs that we are able to discern what the defendants are attempting to place before us by their exception to the judge's action on the motion for a new trial. The judge instructed the jury that if they found for the plaintiff administratrix on the two...
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