Rausch v. Rausch, 95-2512
| Decision Date | 11 October 1996 |
| Docket Number | No. 95-2512,95-2512 |
| Citation | 680 So.2d 624 |
| Parties | 21 Fla. L. Weekly D2169 Donald William RAUSCH, Jr., Appellant, v. Terri Lynn RAUSCH, Appellee. Fifth District |
| Court | Florida District Court of Appeals |
Patricia M. Myers of Myers & Moring, P.A., Crystal River, for Appellant.
Paul M. Hawkes, Crystal River, for Appellee.
Donald Rausch appeals the final judgment dissolving his marriage to Terri Rausch, claiming that the trial court erred in awarding Terri rehabilitative alimony and attorneys' fees. We vacate the alimony award because the dissolution judgment fails to include the specific findings of fact required under section 61.08(1), Florida Statutes (1993). In all other respects, the final dissolution judgment is affirmed.
Section 61.08(1) states that, "in all dissolution actions, the court shall include findings of fact relative to the factors enumerated in subsection (2) supporting an award or denial of alimony." 1 The failure to comply with this statutory duty requires reversal by the appellate court and remand with instructions that proper findings be provided. Ingle v. Ingle, 640 So.2d 223 (Fla. 5th DCA 1994). Here, although evidence concerning the statutory factors was presented by the parties, the dissolution judgment must be reversed because no findings of fact were set forth therein.
We are aware that there are ever increasing demands being placed on the trial bench and that the requirements of section 61.08 are somewhat burdensome. Nevertheless, compliance with the statute is essential in order to ensure that litigants have access to meaningful appellate review. In this regard, without proper findings of fact, a reviewing court is unable to determine the weight given the section 61.08(2) factors, and more importantly, whether the factors were even considered.
Furthermore, complete findings of fact will necessarily reduce the number of appeals. First, compliance will reduce the number of appeals filed alleging reversible error based upon the failure of the trial court to technically comply with the statutory requirements. Second, proper findings of fact explain to litigants and their attorneys how and why the trial court reached its decision regarding a party's claim for alimony. As a result, such rulings are easier to understand and therefore, less likely to be challenged.
Mr. Rausch also argues that the trial court erred in ruling that, since he has a "greater ability" to pay attorneys' fees, he "shall be obligated to pay a reasonable contribution for the wife's attorneys' fees and costs." We agree with Mr. Rausch that this is not the proper standard for determining an award of attorneys' fees. 2 However, the instant record does not yet contain an order requiring that Mr. Rausch make a specific contribution toward Ms. Rausch's fees. An order determining only the right to receive attorney's fees without setting the amount of such fees is a nonappealable order. Trans Atlantic Distributors, L.P. v. Whiland & Co. S.A., 646 So.2d 752 (Fla. 5th DCA 1994). Accordingly, the issue of Mr. Rausch's obligation to pay attorney's fees is not yet ripe for appellate review.
In conclusion, Ms. Rausch's award of alimony is vacated and this case is remanded to the trial court with directions that the trial court set forth findings of fact supporting the award of alimony. In all other respects, the final dissolution judgment is affirmed.
AFFIRMED in PART; VACATED in PART; and REMANDED.
1 Section 61.08(2) of the Florida Statutes (1993) provides:
§ 61.08(2) Alimony.-
(2) In determining a proper award of alimony or maintenance, the court shall consider all relevant economic factors, including but not limited to:
(a)...
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