Rautenstrauch v. Bakhru
Decision Date | 07 July 2009 |
Docket Number | 2008-10446. |
Citation | 64 A.D.3d 554,884 N.Y.S.2d 77,2009 NY Slip Op 05757 |
Parties | JOHN P. RAUTENSTRAUCH, Appellant, v. ARUNA BAKHRU, Respondent, et al., Defendant. |
Court | New York Supreme Court — Appellate Division |
Ordered that the order is affirmed insofar as appealed from, with costs.
The plaintiff and the defendant Aruna Bakhru (hereinafter the defendant) both own and reside in single-family residences on adjacent properties. The parcels derive from a common grantor. The defendant, a medical doctor, admittedly uses a portion of her home to treat a limited number of patients, for which she obtained a special use permit from the Town of Poughkeepsie Zoning Board of Appeals. The plaintiff commenced this action to permanently enjoin the defendant from using a portion of her home to attend to patients by enforcing restrictive covenants in the respective deeds to the properties, which provide, in relevant part, that "1. The premises hereby conveyed shall be used for residential purposes only. 2. No building shall be erected ... on any lot other than one detached single family dwelling, to be occupied by not more than one family for residential purposes ...
The plaintiff argues that the restrictive covenants, separately and together, prohibit the subject activity. Despite the special use permit, "a particular use of land may be enjoined as in violation of a restrictive covenant, although the use is permissible under the zoning ordinance" (Chambers v Old Stone Hill Rd. Assoc., 1 NY3d 424, 432 [2004]). Unless unambiguous, however, such restrictive covenants do not prohibit the incidental use of a primary residence for professional work conducted in a manner which does not disturb the residential character of the neighborhood (see Schnibbe v Glenz, 245 NY 388, 392 [1927]; 9394 LLC v Farris, 10 AD3d 708, 710 [2004]; Ginsberg v Yeshiva of Far Rockaway, 74 Misc 2d 391, 394 [1973], affd 45 AD2d 334 [1974], affd 36 NY2d 706 [1975]). Where a restrictive covenant is ambiguous, the covenant is strictly construed against those seeking to enforce it and the court must interpret the covenant to limit its restriction (see 9394 LLC v Farris, 10 AD3d at 709; Premium Point Park Assn., Inc. v Polar Bar, Inc., 282 App Div 735 [1953], affd 306 NY 507 [1954]). A covenant is ambiguous when it is capable of more than one interpretation or, in other words, when it does not unequivocally prohibit a use (see Turner v Caesar, 291 AD2d 650, 652 [2002]). "[A]ll doubts and ambiguities must be resolved in favor of the natural right to the free use and enjoyment of property and against restrictions" (Kjerner v Hayhurst, 193 App Div 908, 909 [1920]; see Schoonmaker v Heckscher, 171 App Div 148, 151 [1916], affd 218 NY 722 [1916]). Whether a writing is ambiguous is a question of law to be resolved by the court (see 9394 LLC v Farris, 10 AD3d at 709-710).
On her cross motion, the defendant made a prima facie showing of entitlement to judgment as a matter of law by demonstrating that the subject covenants in the deed are ambiguous and do not unequivocally prohibit the subject activity (see 9394 LLC v...
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...LLC v. Vasile , 147 A.D.3d 1377, 1378, 46 N.Y.S.3d 720 [4th Dept. 2017] [internal quotation marks omitted]; see Rautenstrauch v. Bakhru , 64 A.D.3d 554, 556, 884 N.Y.S.2d 77 [2d Dept. 2009] ). Inasmuch as plaintiff did not establish that the restrictions contained in the UPR prohibited defe......
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...it is capable of more than one interpretation or, in other words, when it does not unequivocally prohibit a use" ( Rautenstrauch v. Bakhru, 64 A.D.3d 554, 555, 884 N.Y.S.2d 77 ). Under such circumstances, "where the language used in a restrictive covenant is equally capable of two interpret......
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