Ravenscraft v. Sumner Coal Mining Co.
| Decision Date | 18 March 1924 |
| Docket Number | Case Number: 14721 |
| Citation | 100 Okla. 94,1924 OK 343,224 P. 497 |
| Parties | RAVENSCRAFT v. SUMNER COAL MINING CO. |
| Court | Oklahoma Supreme Court |
¶0 Judgment--Motions--Matters Concluded by Ruling--Receivers.
Where defendants file their joint motion to vacate, an order appointing a receiver, which motion is determined adversely to the movants, and is unappealed from, such judgment of the court becomes final as to all questions raised or which could or should have been raised therein, and it is not error of the court to strike from the files a separate motion of one of the joint movants, which separate motion presents no question of law or fact not determined in the former judgment or which could not have been presented for the court's consideration.
Commissioners' Opinion, Division No. 3.
Error from District Court, Rogers County; C. H. Baskin, Judge.
Action by Sumner Coal Mining Company against Caroline Ravenscraft and others. From the judgment, the above named defendant appeals. Affirmed.
Wm. H. Thompson, E. G. Wilson, and W. F. Thompson, for plaintiff in error.
Robson & Robson and Charles H. Garrett, for defendant in error.
¶1 This cause is brought to this court by the plaintiff in error, Caroline Ravenscraft, one of the defendants below, who appeals from an order of the district court of Rogers county, striking from the files her motion to discharge a receiver appointed by the court upon the application of the defendant in error, Sumner Coal Mining Company, plaintiff below, and for convenience the parties will be designated as they appeared in the trial court.
¶2 It appears from the record, the plaintiff, Sumner Coal Mining Company, is a corporation, and held certain automobiles, trucks, steam shovels, and equipment, and operated a "strip mine" from which coal was being taken. Lot Ravenscraft, as president of the plaintiff company, leased to Lot Ravenscraft, the individual, all the property, real, personal, or mixed, corporeal or incorporeal, belonging to or held by the Sumner Coal Mining Company for a period of five years, in consideration of the sum of $ 1, and the further consideration of the payment of a certain sum per ton for all coal mined or taken from plaintiff's premises. "Lot", the individual, then assigned the lease to H. L. Daugherty, a brother-in-law, who in turn assigned the lease to Caroline Ravenscraft, mother of Lot. The petition then alleges the Ravencrofts operated the "strip mine," contracted debts for labor, etc., amounting to $ 4,000; that laborers and others had filed liens against the property; that large quantities of coal had been mined and sold, but no rentals or royalties had been paid to the company; that all this had been done by "Lot" without the formality of calling a special meeting of the stockholders, or consulting with the board of directors. It is further alleged that the Ravenscrafts had, after getting in control of the property, sold a Ford car, Buick truck, Delco lighting system, and other property of the mining company, and it would appear from the pleadings that the mine being operated was not only a "strip" mine but the company was a "stripped" company. "Lot," however, must have overlooked the charter of the company and left it hanging on the wall, where it was found by the stockholders, who with that as a basis, brought action to annul the lease; for accounting; for royalties and rentals; for damages for the personal property sold and converted to the defendant's use, and for a receiver.
¶3 A receiver was duly appointed and Lot and Caroline Ravenscraft filed their motion to discharge the receiver. Upon hearing had, the motion was denied, and thereafter defendants filed their motion for rehearing, which was in due time by the court denied. It appears from the record that all parties were present either in person or by attorney, and no notice of appeal was filed or noted, and the order denying the motion to discharge the receiver, as well as the motion for a rehearing thereon, became final.
¶4 Section 525, Comp. Stat. 1921, provides in part as follows:
"In all cases in the district or superior court, in which a receiver may be appointed, or refused, the party aggrieved may, within ten days thereafter, appeal from the order of the court, or a judge thereof, refusing to appoint, or refusing to vacate the appointment of a receiver, to the Supreme Court, etc."
¶5 The section further provides that upon the applicant filing bond, the authority of the receiver shall be suspended until final determination of such appeal. After the expiration of the time for filing an appeal, no notice of appeal having been given, the defendant Caroline Ravenscraft, without joining Lot Ravenscraft, filed her separate "motion to discharge the receiver," wherein she sets up substantially the same matters just determined in the motion wherein she joined Lot Ravenscraft, and does not set up any further matter which could not have been set up in the joint motion. The plaintiff thereupon filed its motions to strike the last motion to discharge receiver from the files, for that the orders and judgment of the court denying the former motion to discharge the receiver "is a former adjudication of the matters and things...
To continue reading
Request your trial