Rawlett v. Runyun

• Decision Date: 20 April 1994
• Docket Number: Civ. A. No. 93-1279-A.
• Citation: 849 F. Supp. 449
• Parties: Thomas RAWLETT, Plaintiff, v. Marvin RUNYUN, Postmaster General, U.S. Post Office, Defendant.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Virginia

849 F. Supp. 449

Thomas RAWLETT, Plaintiff, v. Marvin RUNYUN, Postmaster General, U.S. Post Office, Defendant.

Civ. A. No. 93-1279-A.

United States District Court, E.D. Virginia, Alexandria Division.

April 20, 1994.

Thomas Rawlett, pro se.

Dennis E. Szybala, U.S. Attorney's Office, Alexandria, VA, for defendant.

MEMORANDUM OPINION

CACHERIS, Chief Judge.

At issue in this case is the appropriate statute of limitations for an ADEA claim brought by a federal employee. Plaintiff, Thomas Rawlett, has brought this action for relief under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act ("ADEA"), as amended, 29 U.S.C. § 633a. Defendant, Marvin Runyun, has filed a motion to dismiss or, in the alternative, for summary judgment. As plaintiff and defendant have asked the Court to look at material outside the pleadings the Court will treat the entire motion as one for summary judgment. For reasons set forth below the Court adopts the two year/three year statute of limitations of the Fair Labor Standards Act, 29 U.S.C. § 255. Accordingly, defendant's motion for summary judgment is GRANTED.

I.

Plaintiff was an Auto Mechanic, PS-6, in the former Northern Virginia Division of the U.S. Postal Service. On January 30, 1989, plaintiff, who was over forty, applied for one of two positions of Lead Automotive Mechanic. Also applying for the positions were three other candidates over forty, Harry Hakenson, Roger Killinger and Nelson Sitton, and one under forty, Dana Long.

Hakenson, Sitton, Killinger and plaintiff were all full time employees. Long was a part-time employee.¹ The Postal Service appointed a three member promotion panel, which screened the candidates on their written applications only. The panel was notified that it was to send its top three names to the selecting official, Louis Frantz.

The panel disqualified Mr. Sitton because he failed to complete all of his applications forms. The panel then met and compared each remaining candidate's application against twelve published Postal Service "proficiency requirements" for the Lead Mechanic Position. After discussion and deliberation, the committee selected Hakenson, Long and Killinger, in that order, as the best qualified candidates to forward to Frantz. Frantz then selected Hakenson and Long.

On March 25, 1989, plaintiff was notified he had not been selected. Plaintiff then filed an informal administrative EEO complaint with the Postal Service on April 13, 1989, alleging that his non-selection was based on his age, and that he had been discriminated against when Long, a younger, less qualified applicant, was selected.

Plaintiff's administrative complaint eventually went to a hearing. An EEOC Administrative Judge issued a Recommended Decision that found the Postal Service had discriminated against plaintiff based upon his age. The Postal Service rejected the Recommended Decision and plaintiff appealed to the EEOC. On April 10, 1991, the EEOC upheld the decision of the Postal Service and found no discrimination.

Incorporated in the EEOC decision was a section headed "Right to Request Reopening." In that section the EEOC informed plaintiff that he could request such a reopening or reconsideration within thirty (30) calendar days of the date he received the EEOC decision. The EEOC also put plaintiff on notice of the thirty (30) calendar day time limitation in filing a civil action in the District Court. Plaintiff was told that the time limitation for an age discrimination case may differ from that of other discrimination claims. See Defendant's Ex. A, pp. 7-8.

Plaintiff alleges that he filed a Request for Reconsideration within thirty (30) days of receiving the EEOC's decision. After an extended time had passed plaintiff alleges that he contacted Congressman Bateman and requested that he look into the matter. According to plaintiff, the Request for Reconsideration that the EEOC ruled on as untimely was the inquiry from Bateman. Defendant alleges that on December 29, 1992, twenty (20) months after the original EEOC decision was made, plaintiff filed a Request for Reconsideration with the EEOC. The EEOC docketed the request January 11, 1993. In its letter to plaintiff the Commission again cautioned him as follows:

NOTE TO APPELLANT:

If your appeal includes an allegation of AGE DISCRIMINATION, the statute of limitations begins on the date of the violation. Filing this appeal will not stop that time from running. If the time limit is close to expiring, you should consider whether or not you wish to file a civil suit. You may be barred from filing such a suit, should you allow the time limit to expire, EVEN IF YOU HAVE AN APPEAL IN PROCESS WITH THIS OFFICE.

See Defendant's Ex. B (capitalization on original).

On September 10, 1993, the EEOC rejected plaintiff's Request for Reconsideration. In denying the request on the grounds of untimeliness, the EEOC noted that plaintiff's representative of record received the original EEOC decision on April 17, 1991. It also noted that plaintiff "offers no explanation for the length of time between the previous decision and the request for reconsideration." See Defendant's Ex. C, p. 2. Accordingly, the EEOC found plaintiff's Request for Reconsideration untimely. Plaintiff filed his Complaint in this Court on October 12, 1993, approximately four and one-half years after the alleged employment practice which gave rise to plaintiff's claim.

II.

Summary judgment is appropriate only if "`the pleadings, depositions, answer to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.'" Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 247, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 2510, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986); Baber v. Hospital Corp. of America, 977 F.2d 872, 874 (4th Cir.1992); Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c). "A district court must grant summary judgment if, after an adequate time for discovery, a party fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an essential element of that party's case." Baber, 977 F.2d at 874 (citing Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 2552, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986)).

In summary judgment proceedings, the moving party must demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact. Baber, 977 F.2d at 874. Once the moving party has met its burden, the nonmoving party must come forward with some evidence beyond the mere allegations contained in the pleadings to show that there is a genuine issue for trial. Id. at 874-75. "While this does not require the non-moving party to submit evidence in a form that would be admissible at trial ... `unsupported speculation is not sufficient to defeat a summary judgment motion.'" Id. at 875 (quoting Felty v. Graves-Humphreys Co., 818 F.2d 1126, 1128 (4th Cir.1987)).

"The mere existence of a scintilla of evidence in support of the party's position will be insufficient; there must be evidence on which the jury could reasonably find for that party." Anderson, 477 U.S. at 252, 106 S.Ct. at 2512. Finally, "in reviewing the evidence submitted by the parties ..., the court must view all evidence in the light most favorable to the non-moving party." Baber, 977 F.2d at 875.

III.

Defendant argues that plaintiff's cause of action is untimely, and this Court has, therefore, lost jurisdiction. This case is one of first impression for this Circuit. The ADEA provides no specific statute of limitations, Stevens v. Department of the Treasury, 500 U.S. 1, 7-8, 111 S.Ct. 1562, 1567, 114 L.Ed.2d 1 (1991), and to date, no court in the Fourth Circuit has determined the appropriate statute of limitations in an age discrimination case against a federal employer. In Stevens, the Supreme Court assumed "that Congress intended to impose an appropriate period borrowed either from a state statute or from an analogous federal one." Id.

Courts which have considered the ADEA statute of limitations question agree on several points. They agree that the legislative history of the ADEA provides no guidance on why the statute contains no limitations period; and they agree that where a statute has no limitations period, and federal policies are at stake, the courts look to analogous federal statutes from which to borrow a limitations period. See Del Costello v. International Brotherhood of Teamsters, 462 U.S. 151, 158-159, 172, 103 S.Ct. 2281, 2787-88, 2294, 76 L.Ed.2d 476 (1983). However, the courts disagree on which federal statute to borrow. Some courts have adopted the general six year statute for actions against the federal government. See, e.g., Lubniewski v. Lehman, 891 F.2d 216 (9th Cir.1989); Medwid v. Baker, 752 F.Supp. 125 (S.D.N.Y.1990). Some courts have followed the Title VII requirements. See, e.g., Lavery v. Marsh, 918 F.2d 1022 (1st Cir.1990); Taylor v. Espy, 816 F.Supp. 1553, 1556-1559 (N.D.Ga.1993). One court has taken an "either/or" approach, willing to apply either the statute of limitations under 42 U.S.C. § 1981, or the two or three year period under the ADEA for actions against private employees. Coleman v. Nolan, 693 F.Supp. 1544, 1548 (S.D.N.Y.1988).

Plaintiff argues that this Court should apply the general statute of limitations setting an outside time limit of six years on suits against the United States. See 28 U.S.C. § 2401(a). However, this Court holds that Congress did not intend for courts to fall back on this catch-all provision whenever a statute of limitation is in question. There are other statutes of limitation from which to choose that more closely mirror the cause of action in this case. "It would indeed be anomalous to hold ... that a federal catch-all provision governs with respect to ADEA claims when there are available other relevant statutory provisions more specifically geared to the claim brought." Coleman v. Nolan, 693 F.Supp. at 1548.

Another option is to borrow the statute of limitations from Title VII cases. It...