Taylor v. Espy, Civ. A. No. 4:91-cv-199-HLM.

• Decision Date: 22 March 1993
• Docket Number: Civ. A. No. 4:91-cv-199-HLM.
• Citation: 816 F. Supp. 1553
• Parties: Betty Trew TAYLOR, Plaintiff, v. Michael ESPY, Secretary, Department of Agriculture, Defendant.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Northern District of Georgia

816 F. Supp. 1553

Betty Trew TAYLOR, Plaintiff, v. Michael ESPY, Secretary, Department of Agriculture, Defendant.

Civ. A. No. 4:91-cv-199-HLM.

United States District Court, N.D. Georgia, Rome Division.

March 22, 1993.

COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED

William George Schwall, Office of William G. Schwall, Chattanooga, TN, for plaintiff.

Daniel A. Caldwell, III, Office of U.S. Atty., N.D. Georgia, Atlanta, GA, for defendant.

ORDER

HAROLD L. MURPHY, District Judge.

This case is before the Court on Defendant's Motion to Dismiss or in the alternative for Summary Judgment and to Strike Jury Demand. Pursuant to the Court's December 9, 1992 Order, the Court will treat Defendant's Motion as a Motion for Summary Judgment.

I. BACKGROUND

This case stems from the Department of Agriculture's firing of Betty Trew Taylor, the Plaintiff, on July 1, 1988. Plaintiff sought administrative review by the Agriculture Department. She alleged that her superiors fired her because of her age. Plaintiff was 56 when the Department fired her. The Department notified her on April 18, 1990 that it found no basis for her claim of age discrimination. Plaintiff then filed a complaint with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission ("EEOC"). In a letter dated August 6, 1990 the EEOC informed Plaintiff that it too found that the Department did not discriminate against her based on her age. At the end of the letter, the EEOC specifically notified Plaintiff that:

You have the right to file a civil action in the appropriate United States District Court WITHIN THIRTY (30) DAYS of the date that you receive this decision, unless within that time you decide to file a request to reopen. As to any claim based on the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 (29 U.S.C. § 633a), you MAY have up to six years after the right of action first accrued. See Lehman v. Nakshian, 453 U.S. 156 101 S.Ct. 2698, 69 L.Ed.2d 548 (1981); 29 U.S.C. § 633a(f); and 28 U.S.C. § 2401(a).

Plaintiff's attorney at the time received the letter on or about August 9, 1990. Despite receiving the notice through her attorney, Plaintiff did not file this case until September 27, 1991. In her case, Plaintiff alleges that the Department of Agriculture violated her rights under the provisions of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 ("ADEA") relating to federal employees. See 29 U.S.C. § 633a. Plaintiff seeks reinstatement, back wages, contributions to her retirement, $300,000.00 in compensatory damages, attorney's fees, and court costs.

Defendant has now filed this Motion for Summary Judgment. Defendant argues that the applicable statute of limitations bars Plaintiff's claim, and that Plaintiff is not entitled to a jury trial, compensatory damages or attorney's fees. Plaintiff argues that the applicable statute of limitations does not bar her claim, and that even if it does, the doctrine of equitable tolling saves her claim.

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(c) authorizes summary judgment when all "pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and ... the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." The party seeking summary judgment bears the burden of demonstrating that no dispute as to any material fact exists. See Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 90 S.Ct. 1598, 26 L.Ed.2d 142 (1970); Bingham, Ltd. v. United States, 724 F.2d 921, 924 (11th Cir.1984). The moving party's burden is discharged merely by "`showing'— that is, pointing out to the District Court— that there is an absence of evidence to support an essential element of the nonmoving party's case." Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 325, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 2554, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986). In assessing whether the movant has met this burden, the District Court must view the evidence and all factual inferences in the light most favorable to the party opposing the motion. See Bradbury v. Wainwright, 718 F.2d 1538, 1543 (11th Cir. 1983). Once the moving party has adequately supported its motion, the nonmovant then has the burden to show that summary judgment is improper, coming forward with specific facts showing a genuine dispute. Matsushita Electric Industrial Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586, 106 S.Ct. 1348, 1355, 89 L.Ed.2d 538 (1986).

In deciding a motion for summary judgment, it is not part of the Court's function to decide issues of genuine material fact but solely to determine whether there is such an issue to be tried. See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986); Warrior Tombigbee Transportation Co. v. M/V Nan Fung, 695 F.2d 1294, 1296 (11th Cir.1983). It is the applicable substantive law which will identify those facts that are material. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248, 106 S.Ct. at 2510. Facts which in good faith are disputed, but which do not resolve or affect the outcome of the suit will not properly preclude the entry of summary judgment. Id. In short, such facts are not material. The materiality of a fact rests solely on the governing substantive law. A District Court "can only grant summary judgment `if everything in the record ... demonstrates that no genuine issue of material fact exists.'" Tippens v. Celotex Corp., 805 F.2d 949, 952 (11th Cir.1986), quoting Keiser v. Coliseum Properties, Inc., 614 F.2d 406, 410 (5th Cir.1980) (emphasis in original).

Genuine disputes are those by which the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmovant. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248, 106 S.Ct. at 2510. Moreover, for factual issues to be "genuine" they must have a real basis in the record. Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 587, 106 S.Ct. at 1356. The nonmovant "must do more than simply show that there is some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts.... Where the record as a whole could not lead a rational trier of fact to find for the nonmoving party, there is no `genuine issue for trial.'" Id. at 586, 106 S.Ct. at 1355 (citations omitted.) "This standard mirrors the standard for a directed verdict.... The inquiry under each is the same: whether the evidence presents a sufficient disagreement to require submission to a jury or whether it is so one-sided that one party must prevail as a matter of law." Anderson, 477 U.S. at 251-52, 106 S.Ct. at 2512.

III. DISCUSSION

A. Statute of Limitations

The ADEA, as enacted in 1967, prohibited discrimination on the basis of age, in private employment. 29 U.S.C. §§ 621 et seq. It incorporated the enforcement scheme of the Fair Labor Standards Act ("FLSA"). In 1974, Congress added an entirely new section, 29 U.S.C. § 633a, to prohibit age discrimination in federal employment.

The ADEA contains a two or three year statute of limitations (two years generally and three years for willful violations) for claims against private employers. See 29 U.S.C. § 626(e)(1).¹ However, the ADEA contains no statute of limitations for federal employees who pursue administrative relief before proceeding to U.S. District Court. Thus, this Court must determine the proper statute of limitations for such actions.

The Supreme Court has made clear that where Congress has created a cause of action, but has not specified a period of limitation, courts should "not ordinarily assume that Congress intended there to be no time limit on actions at all." DelCostello v. International Broth. of Teamsters, 462 U.S. 151, 158, 103 S.Ct. 2281, 2287, 76 L.Ed.2d 476 (1983). Instead, courts should "`borrow' the most suitable statute or other rule of timeliness from some other source." Id. Generally, courts should borrow "the local time limitation most analogous to the case at hand." Lampf, Pleva, Lipkind, et al. v. Gilbertson, ___ U.S. ___, 111 S.Ct. 2773, 2778, 115 L.Ed.2d 321 (1991). However, when the operation of a state limitations period would frustrate the policies embraced by the federal enactment, courts should look to federal law for a suitable period. Lampf, ___ U.S. at ___, 111 S.Ct. at 2778; DelCostello, 462 U.S. at 162, 103 S.Ct. at 2289. Moreover, borrowing from another federal source is particularly appropriate when the borrowed statute was "designed to accommodate a balance of interests very similar to that at stake." Reed v. United Transp. Union, 488 U.S. 319, 324, 109 S.Ct. 621, 625, 102 L.Ed.2d 665 (1989).

Neither the Supreme Court nor the Eleventh Circuit have addressed the issue of what limitations period should apply to ADEA claims by federal employees. The courts that have addressed the issue have basically reached three conclusions. First, some courts have applied the limitations period for analogous claims of employment discrimination filed by federal employees under Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act ("Title VII"), as amended, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e, et seq. See Lavery v. Marsh, 918 F.2d 1022 (1st Cir. 1990); Healy v. United States Postal Service, 677 F.Supp. 1284 (E.D.N.Y.1987). Second, some courts have applied the six year catch-all statute of limitations for nontort civil actions filed against the United States under 28 U.S.C. § 2401(a). See Lubniewski v. Lehman, 891 F.2d 216, 221 (9th Cir.1989). Third, some courts have applied the two and three year limitations periods for claims of employment discrimination filed by private employees under 29 U.S.C. § 626(e). See Coleman v. Nolan, 693 F.Supp. 1544, 1548 (S.D.N.Y.1988); Wiersema v. Tennessee Valley Authority, 648 F.Supp. 66, 68 (E.D.Tenn. 1986).²

This Court finds that the proper statute of limitations to borrow is that for analogous claims of employment discrimination filed by federal employees under Title VII as amended, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e, et seq., because Title VII was designed to accommodate a balance of interests very similar to that of the ADEA. The Supreme Court has remarked that the "ADEA and Title VII share a common purpose, the elimination of discrimination...