Rawlins v. State
| Decision Date | 08 November 1905 |
| Citation | 52 S.E. 1,124 Ga. 31 |
| Parties | RAWLINS et al. v. STATE. TURNER v. SAME. |
| Court | Georgia Supreme Court |
Syllabus by the Court.
The board of jury commissioners may, in the exercise of their discretion, omit from the jury list of the county all persons who are exempted by law from jury service, as well as those whose business or avocation is such that it is reasonably probable that an excuse from jury service would be granted by the judge.
In the determination of whether the venue of a criminal case shall be changed for the reason that the condition of the public mind is such that the accused cannot obtain a fair trial by an impartial jury, the law imposes upon a trial judge the responsibility of making an examination and informing himself of the truth of the averments upon which the application is made, and the Supreme Court has no power to control his discretion in such a matter unless it has been plainly and manifestly abused. The record does not disclose any such abuse of discretion in the present case.
Principals and accessories before the fact may be charged in the same indictment and in one count.
An indictment which charges that one, being absent at the time when the crime was committed, did "procure, counsel, and command" the person alleged as principal in the crime to commit the same, contains a sufficient charge against one indicted as an accessory before the fact.
The indictment was not subject to any of the objections set forth in any of the demurrers.
When a motion for a continuance is made upon the ground of the absence of witnesses, and the court postpones the case until the following day, and notifies counsel that officers will be furnished to bring into court the absent witnesses, and such officers are furnished, and all the witnesses desired are brought into court, and there is no further motion for a continuance, a ground of a motion for a new trial complaining of the refusal to continue on the day the case was first called is without merit.
The failure of the court to interpose of its own motion, in case of disorder by the spectators at the trial, will not generally be a sufficient reason to reverse the judgment when no ruling in reference to the disorder was invoked from the court.
That the accused, who was jointly indicted with others, was jointly arraigned with the others, after he had elected to sever upon the trial, furnishes no reason for granting a new trial, after a separate trial has been accorded to him.
The action of the sheriff in making the statement to the judge in the presence of the jury, that the mother of the accused had requested her satchel to be brought into court, and that the satchel contained a pistol, was reprehensible as to the manner in which the fact was communicated to the judge. As it appeared from a statement of counsel for the accused that the pistol was in the satchel solely for the reason that the mother of the accused and her two daughters had been traveling through the country, and that it was carried for protection only, and was not in the satchel nor brought into court for any improper purpose, and as evidence was introduced to the same effect, and the truth of the statement and the evidence was admitted by the Solicitor General, and the jury were instructed not to allow the incident to have any effect upon their minds in determining upon their verdict, a refusal to declare a mistrial on account of the conduct of the sheriff was properly overruled.
The fact that a confession is brought about by improper and unlawful methods from one alleged to be concerned in the commission of the crime is no reason for refusing to allow such person to testify as a witness on the trial of his associates in the criminal enterprise. The circumstances under which the confession was made, and any evidence tending to show that the witness is still laboring under fears brought about by such circumstances, is admissible to discredit the witness, but the witness is nevertheless competent.
In the trial of a murder case, evidence tending to show a state of bad feeling between the father of the accused and the father of the deceased is admissible for such weight as a jury might see fit to give it in determining whether the accused had a motive in becoming one of a party of assassins to slay the father of the deceased and other members of his family; and this is true, although the father escaped assassination and only two of his children were slain.
When in the trial of a murder case, there is evidence tending to show that the accused on trial entered into a conspiracy to slay the deceased and others, the acts, conduct, and sayings of any of the conspirators, while the conspiracy was in progress and before the crime was committed, are admissible as evidence, as well as an act of a conspirator other than the accused, after the commission of the crime, when the act sought to be proved was contemplated by the terms of the conspiracy to be performed after the perpetration of the crime was completed.
Errors in the admission of the evidence, made during the progress of the trial, may be corrected by the judge withdrawing the evidence from the consideration of the jury and instructing them not to consider it; and errors in his charge may be corrected by the judge calling attention to the erroneous part of the charge, and in lieu thereof giving to the jury the correct rule.
Challenge to the array is not the proper method of raising the question of the disqualification of individual jurors.
When two are tried jointly for a capital offense, and neither waives his peremptory challenges, the state is entitled to one-half of the whole number of challenges the law allows to both.
A portion of a charge that is substantially correct, wherein a complete proposition is stated, is not erroneous simply because it fails to embrace an instruction which would have been appropriate in connection with that proposition.
Where counsel in argument makes improper statements, counsel for the injured party may move either for an appropriate instruction to the jury or for a mistrial. Where counsel ask simply for such an instruction, which is given, and the case ordered to proceed, a motion for a mistrial then made upon the same ground should not generally be entertained.
Where a motion is made to continue a criminal case upon the ground that the accused is physically unable to go to trial, and upon such question the testimony introduced is conflicting, the discretion of the trial judge in overruling the motion will not be controlled.
A motion for continuance on account of the illness of counsel, like all other motions of the same nature, is addressed to the sound discretion of the trial judge. When counsel, whose illness is the ground of the motion, is himself in court presenting and urging the motion, the court is authorized, in the determination of the question whether the condition of counsel is such that the interests of justice demand a postponement of the case, to take into consideration the general appearance of counsel and the mental and physical vigor displayed in the presentation of the motion, and when such a motion is overruled this court may take into consideration what appears in the record as to the manner in which counsel conducted the case, in determining whether there has been such an abuse of discretion in refusing the continuance as to require a reversal of the judgment. In the present case it does not appear there was any abuse of discretion in refusing to continue the case.
In the trial of one charged as an accessory, it is incumbent upon the state to show the guilt of the person charged as a principal beyond a reasonable doubt; and, as a general rule, in order to establish this fact, any evidence may be introduced which would be admissible if the principal was on trial.
In the trial of one who is charged as an accessory before the fact to a murder, when it appears that the deceased were killed during the night, as they emerged from the home of their father, by persons who had surrounded the house, evidence that the accused had made threats to slay the father, and had offered persons money to kill him, was admissible.
It is lawful to receive a verdict in a criminal case on Sunday.
The evidence as to those who were charged as principals was sufficient to authorize the verdicts rendered against them.
The evidence as to the accused, charged as accessory before the fact, who was the father of three of the persons charged as principals, was sufficient to authorize the verdict.
The evidence against the other accused, charged as an accessory before the fact, was not sufficient to authorize the verdict, and the court erred in not granting him a new trial.
Error from Superior Court, Lowndes County; R. G. Mitchell, Judge.
Leonard Rawlins, Frank Turner, and others were convicted of murder. Leonard and Jesse Rawlins brought error, and Turner also brought error. Judgment on bill of exceptions of Turner reversed, and on other bills affirmed.
A verdict in civil, as well as in criminal, cases, may be lawfully received and entered on Sunday.
Milton Jesse, Leonard, and J. G. Rawlins were arrested for the offense of murder, and were committed to jail. A special term of the court was called for the disposition of their cases. When the grand jury was organized, and before any indictment was preferred, each of the accused filed a written challenge to the array, upon the ground that the grand jury was not legally organized. The objection was that jury commissioners had arbitrarily excluded from the grand jury all lawyers, ministers, doctors, dentists, railroad engineers, and firemen, there being 10 or other large number of each class in the county who were citizens and...
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Turner v. State
...the court did not err in overruling the motion for a continuance in so far as it was based upon counsel's illness. See Rawlins v. State, 124 Ga. 31 (19), 52 S. E. 1. Then, should the ease have been continued because of counsel's lack of time to prepare for trial? The defendant was arrested ......