Rawson v. Recovery Innovations, Inc.

• Decision Date: 09 September 2020
• Docket Number: No. 19-35520,19-35520
• Citation: 975 F.3d 742
• Parties: Kenneth RAWSON, an individual, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. RECOVERY INNOVATIONS, INC., a corporation; Sami French, an individual; Jennifer Clingenpeel, an individual; Vasant Halarnakar, M.D., an individual, Defendants-Appellees.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Ninth Circuit

975 F.3d 742

Kenneth RAWSON, an individual, Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.RECOVERY INNOVATIONS, INC., a corporation; Sami French, an individual; Jennifer Clingenpeel, an individual; Vasant Halarnakar, M.D., an individual, Defendants-Appellees.

No. 19-35520

United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.

Argued and Submitted July 8, 2020 Seattle, Washington

Filed September 9, 2020

Timothy K. Ford (argued) and Jesse Wing, MacDonald Hoague & Bayless, Seattle, Washington; Sam Kramer, Madia Law LLC, Minneapolis, Minnesota; for Plaintiff-Appellant.

Benjamin R. Justus (argued) and Lory R. Lybeck, Lybeck Pedreira & Justus PLLC, Mercer Island, Washington, for Defendants-Appellees.

Before: RICHARD R. CLIFTON, D. MICHAEL FISHER,^* AND MILAN D. SMITH, JR., Circuit Judges.

M. SMITH, Circuit Judge:

Kenneth Rawson appeals the district court's dismissal of his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claims against Recovery Innovations, Inc. (RII) and its current and former employees Dr. Vasant Halarnakar, Advanced Registered Nurse Practitioner Jennifer Clingenpeel, and Mental Health Professional Sami French (collectively, Defendants). Rawson alleges that Defendants violated his Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment rights by wrongfully detaining him, forcibly injecting him with antipsychotic medications, and misleading a court into extending his period of involuntary commitment for a total of 55 days. On summary judgment, the district court dismissed Rawson's claims because it concluded that Defendants did not act under color of state law. We conclude to the contrary, and therefore reverse.

Facts and Prior Proceedings

On March 4, 2015, Rawson allegedly made comments about automatic weapons and mass murder to a bank teller in Clark County, Washington. When Rawson re-entered the same bank the next day, the bank employees called the sheriffs. Upon their arrival, the sheriffs immediately detained Rawson, who did not physically resist but yelled that he had a gun and that his rights were being violated. Rawson had a valid concealed carry permit and was a veteran; the sheriffs confiscated and unloaded Rawson's handgun without incident. After Rawson allegedly made statements to the sheriffs about "how people are against him," the sheriffs took Rawson into protective custody, placed him on a mental hold, and transported him by ambulance to a general hospital. The sheriffs’ actions triggered a series of events generally governed by Washington's Involuntary Treatment Act (ITA), Wash. Rev. Code (RCW) Ch. 71.05. See RCW § 71.05.153(2) – (3).¹

At the hospital, a Clark County Designated Mental Health Professional (DMHP) evaluated Rawson and filed a petition in state court for a 72-hour involuntary commitment. See RCW §§ 71.05.153(4), .020(11). The DMHP arranged for Rawson to be taken to RII's Lakewood facility in neighboring Pierce County.² RII is a private nonprofit corporation. It leases its Lakewood evaluation and treatment facility from the State of Washington on the grounds of one of the State's main psychiatric hospitals, Western State Hospital. RII's Medical Director at Lakewood, Dr. Halarnakar, is a full-time physician at Western State Hospital.

Once at RII, Rawson was evaluated by Clingenpeel and French, who prescribed medication and completed a petition for an additional 14 days of intensive treatment, certifying that Rawson was both "gravely disabled" and "presents a likelihood of serious harm to others." See RCW §§ 71.05.170, .210, .230. They based these conclusions on their evaluations of Rawson and information in the police report. The petition also stated that Rawson "den[ied] [having] any problem other than the bank and police misunderstanding." The court held a probable cause hearing and granted the 14-day petition on March 10.

During the 14-day commitment, Dr. Halarnakar met with Rawson. Dr. Halarnakar's notes indicate that Rawson was calm, cooperative, and polite, but had pressured speech. Though Rawson reported no symptoms of schizophrenia

, Dr. Halarnakar wrote that Rawson needed to keep taking his medication. In his second evaluation of Rawson, Dr. Halarnakar documented only that Rawson was argumentative and denied having a mental illness, denied needing antipsychotic medications, and denied having suicidal or homicidal ideations. Dr. Halarnakar nevertheless concluded that Rawson was paranoid, had no insight, and needed further treatment.

Dr. Halarnakar and French then petitioned for an additional 90-day commitment, alleging that Rawson had "threatened, attempted, or inflicted physical harm" upon a person or property "during the period in custody." See RCW §§ 71.05.230(8), .290. They recommended that the court involuntarily commit Rawson to Western State Hospital. In response to a later request for the specific statements that were threatening, French conceded Rawson had made no "threatening statements."

Rawson exercised his right to request a jury trial, which was continued multiple times while he remained involuntarily committed at RII. See RCW § 71.05.300. In preparation for the trial, Dr. Halarnakar and French communicated extensively with the Pierce County Deputy Prosecuting Attorney regarding discharge possibilities, current treatment methods, the strength of the evidence against Rawson, and the theory to argue to the jury. See RCW § 71.05.130. Meanwhile, a court-appointed expert psychiatrist evaluated Rawson and concluded that he was not dangerous, his frustrations were not unreasonable, and he had no symptoms related to psychosis

or a mood disorder.

On April 29, almost two months after Rawson's arrival, RII finally released Rawson pursuant to an attorney-negotiated agreement. Rawson later brought this § 1983 action against RII and many of the individuals involved in his commitment.

On summary judgment, the district court dismissed Rawson's claims against Defendants based on the conclusion that they were not acting under color of state law. The court found that the "public function" test was not satisfied because Rawson did not establish "that involuntary commitments are both traditionally and exclusively governmental." The court found that the "joint action" / "close nexus" test was not satisfied because Rawson did not establish "government involvement sufficient to override the purely medical judgment of the private individual."

Rawson timely appealed.

Jurisdiction and Standard of Review

We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review a grant of summary judgment de novo , construing the evidence in the light most favorable to the non-moving party. Anderson v. Warner , 451 F.3d 1063, 1067 (9th Cir. 2006) (citing Celotex Corp. v. Catrett , 477 U.S. 317, 322, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986) ). "[W]e must determine whether there are any genuine issues of material fact and whether the district court correctly applied the relevant substantive law." Id.

Analysis

I.

Pursuant to § 1983, a defendant may be liable for violating a plaintiff's constitutional rights only if the defendant committed the alleged deprivation while acting under color of state law. See Jensen v. Lane Cty. , 222 F.3d 570, 574 (9th Cir. 2000). Similarly, a violation of the plaintiff's constitutional rights cognizable under the Fourteenth Amendment can occur only by way of state action. Id. Thus, the color of law and state action inquiries are the same. Id.

Before we can answer the question of whether Defendants acted under color of law, we must identify the "specific conduct of which the plaintiff complains." Caviness v. Horizon Cmty. Learning Ctr., Inc. , 590 F.3d 806, 812 (9th Cir. 2010) (quoting Am. Mfrs. Mut. Ins. Co. v. Sullivan , 526 U.S. 40, 51, 119 S.Ct. 977, 143 L.Ed.2d 130 (1999) ). Here, Rawson seeks to hold Defendants liable for certain actions relating to the 14-day and 90-day petitions, as well as his detention and forcible medication pursuant to the authority provided by those petitions. The specific alleged conduct Rawson challenges includes involuntarily committing him without legal justification, knowingly providing false information to the court, and forcibly injecting him with antipsychotic medications without his consent.³ The relevant inquiry is therefore whether Defendants’ role as custodians, as litigants, or as medical professionals constituted state action. See id.

II.

The determination of whether a nominally private person or corporation acts under color of state law "is a matter of normative judgment, and the criteria lack rigid simplicity." Brentwood Acad. v. Tenn. Secondary Sch. Athletic Ass'n , 531 U.S. 288, 295–96, 121 S.Ct. 924, 148 L.Ed.2d 807 (2001). "[N]o one fact can function as a necessary condition across the board for finding state action; nor is any set of circumstances absolutely sufficient, for there may be some countervailing reason against attributing activity to the government." Id.

We have recognized at least four different general tests that may aid us in identifying state action: "(1) public function; (2) joint action; (3) governmental compulsion or coercion; and (4) governmental nexus." Kirtley v. Rainey , 326 F.3d 1088, 1092 (9th Cir. 2003) (citation omitted). "Satisfaction of any one test is sufficient to find state action, so long as no countervailing factor exists." Id. "Whether these different tests are actually different in operation or simply different ways of characterizing the necessarily fact-bound inquiry that confronts the Court in such a situation need not be resolved here."

Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co., Inc. , 457 U.S. 922, 939, 102 S.Ct. 2744, 73 L.Ed.2d 482 (1982).

"The public function test is satisfied only on a showing that the function at issue is ‘both traditionally and exclusively governmental.’ " Kirtley , 326 F.3d at 1093 (quoting Lee v. Katz , 276 F.3d 550, 555 (9th Cir. 2002) ). The close nexus and joint action tests may be satisfied where the court finds "a sufficiently close nexus between the state and the private actor ‘so that the action of the latter may be fairly treated as that of the State itself,’...