Ray v. Kelly

• Citation: 35 So. 165,82 Miss. 597
• Court: United States State Supreme Court of Mississippi
• Decision Date: 26 October 1903
• Parties: HARVEL RAY v. ISAAC M. KELLY

35 So. 165

82 Miss. 597

HARVEL RAY v. ISAAC M. KELLY

Supreme Court of Mississippi

October 26, 1903

FROM the chancery court of Madison county. HON. ROBERT B. MAYES Chancellor.

Ray appellant, was complainant, and Kelly, appellee, was defendant in the court below. From a decree in defendant's favor, the complainant appealed to the supreme court. The facts are fully stated in the opinion of the court.

Judgment affirmed.

W. H Powell & Huber, for appellant.

The deed was made and the expressions therein were used with reference to and with a knowledge of the power of the court to remove Ray's civil disabilities of minority and make him of age so far as all of his property rights and powers were concerned, and it is with property rights, not political or moral, that we are to deal.

No arbitrary meaning can attach to the words "minority" or "of age" but the words should be generally and liberally construed, not technically.

Harvel Ray has jumped his "minority" and is now "of age," and is entitled to a settlement with Kelly, and should receive a conveyance of the legal title to his property. We give the definitions of the terms. Age is defined by Bouview (Law Dictionary) as "that period of life at which the law allows persons to do acts or discharge functions which, for want of years, they were prohibited from doing or undertaking before."

Kinney in his law dictionary, adds to this, "the period is variedly fixed by statute in different jurisdictions." This makes it evident that the words "of age" must be construed in its most general sense and cannot be limited to twenty-one years any more than it can to eighteen or twenty-five years.

The Century Dictionary defines as follows: "Age--a period of existence, an age, a life time."

See also paragraph three, and also more especially, "of age," "full age;" full age or lawful age, designates the attainment of majority, or that period when the general disabilities of infancy cease."

Such disabilities cease as surely by decree of court as by the lapse of years. Again, the same authority defines minority, "the state of being a minor or not come of age, and therefore legally incapacitated for the performance of certain acts."

We say that the incapacity is removed by law (the decree of the court) just as effectually as the incapacity was created (by the general laws of the state making twenty-one years the age of majority). The Standard Dictionary defines it as follows: "Minority, law--the state of being a minor, legal infancy." The decree has destroyed the legal state of infancy.

It may be argued that one whose civil disabilities of minority have been removed cannot vote. That is true, but it is because the constitution and statute says that one cannot vote until he becomes twenty-one years of age. Constitution, sec. 241; Code, sec. 3631. The law does not say that a minor cannot vote, but that one who is under twenty-one years of age cannot vote. This is an arbitrary fixing of the age at twenty-one years.

If Mary Ann Ray had intended by her deed that the legal title to the property should rest with the trustees until her son became twenty-one years of age, she would have so stipulated in the bond, and her will would have become the law and left no room for construction, just as the constitution has fixed the age at twenty-one years when one can become a qualified elector.

Twenty-one years is definite and conclusive, but "of age," "minority," and "majority" are not conclusive.

The most reasonable view to take is that Mrs. Ray made a deed with a knowledge of the law, that her son's civil disabilities could be removed by the court, and that her intention was for him to have the property whenever he was deemed qualified by the law to manage it.

Barnett & Perrin, for appellee.

Under the common law and the Code of 1892, sections 1505, 1508, a person is a minor or an infant in law until the age of twenty-one is reached.

After the removal of the disabilities of a minor, there are many things he cannot do, such as voting, holding office, etc. The code does not authorize the court to make a minor of age, but authorizes it to remove the disabilities of minority in whole or in part. Section 497, in directing what kind of a decree shall be rendered says, . . . . "and the decree made shall distinctly specify to what extent the disabilities of the minor is removed and what character of acts he is empowered to perform notwithstanding his minority.

What was the intention of the creator of the trust? It is a fundamental rule of interpretation that words are to be given their plain, ordinary, and popular meaning. What is the plain, ordinary, and popular meaning of the phrase "becomes of age" and "during minority" in those jurisdictions where the common law rule as to majority is in force? We think there is no room for doubt that in each instance the age of twenty-one is referred to. But it will be contended that as every person is presumed to know the law that the creator of the trust thus knowing of the power of the court to remove disabilities of minority, advisedly omitted the use of the word twenty-one and substituted other words. The maxim that ignorance of the law excuses no one, and the expression that every one is presumed to...