Ray v. Ray
| Decision Date | 01 September 2020 |
| Docket Number | No. COA19-959,COA19-959 |
| Citation | 846 S.E.2d 859 (Table) |
| Parties | Ingrid P. RAY, Plaintiff, v. Gordon T. RAY and Lawrence V. Ray, Defendants. |
| Court | North Carolina Court of Appeals |
Mast, Johnson, Trimyer, Booker, Wright & Van Patten, P.A., Smithfield, by Lily Van Patten, for Plaintiff-Appellee.
Janvier Law Firm, PLLC, Raleigh, by Kathleen O'Malley, for Defendant-Appellant.
Defendant Gordon T. Ray appeals from an Equitable Distribution, Alimony, and Attorney's Fees Order.1 Defendant argues that the trial court erred in its valuation of the marital estate, improperly ordered Defendant to pay a distributive award, erred in the amount of alimony ordered, and erred by awarding attorney's fees. We affirm in part, reverse in part, vacate in part, and remand the matter for further proceedings.
Plaintiff Ingrid Ray and Defendant met while working at AT&T and married on 14 July 1978. As AT&T policy at the time prohibited employees from entering into personal relationships, Plaintiff left her job at AT&T and became a homemaker. On 7 September 2004, the couple purchased a house in Pinehurst, North Carolina. Sometime in 2006, they purchased a townhouse in New Jersey.
On 1 May 2013, the couple separated. On 28 October 2013, Plaintiff filed a complaint for divorce from bed and board, post-separation support, alimony, attorney's fees, equitable distribution, injunctive relief, interim distribution, trespass, and an accounting and constructive trust in the event the court finds that the marital funds were being improperly distributed. Defendant filed an answer and counterclaim for equitable distribution. On 11 March 2014, the trial court ordered Defendant to pay post-separation support to Plaintiff in the amount of $2,500 per month. On 18 July 2014, Defendant deeded his interest in the New Jersey property to Plaintiff; the deed was recorded on 9 December 2014. Thereafter, Defendant filed an amended answer and counterclaim for equitable distribution.
During the litigation for the equitable distribution and alimony claims, Defendant twice filed for Chapter 13 bankruptcy relief, first on 19 February 2015 and again on 22 July 2016. Both suits were originally dismissed; but on 16 November 2016, the bankruptcy court entered an order reinstating the 22 July 2016 case and terminating the automatic stay imposed by 11 U.S.C. § 362 to allow Plaintiff to pursue her equitable distribution claim.
On 14 February 2019, the trial court notified the parties that a hearing would be held on 3 April 2019 on all issues. Defendant's counsel had been allowed to withdraw and although Defendant had notice that the case would be heard on 3 April 2019, he did not appear for the hearing.
On 3 May 2019, the trial court entered an Equitable Distribution, Alimony and Attorney's Fees Order ("Order"). The trial court determined that an unequal distribution was equitable and ordered both the Pinehurst and New Jersey properties to be distributed to Plaintiff, along with two bank accounts, the personal property in the New Jersey property, and a 1989 Mercedes vehicle. The trial court also ordered Defendant to pay Plaintiff a distributive award of $75,000 within ninety days. The trial court further ordered Defendant to pay Plaintiff $7,500 in past-due post-separation support. In addition, the trial court ordered Defendant to pay $2,800 per month in alimony until the death of either party or Plaintiff's remarriage or cohabitation. Finally, Defendant was ordered to pay $6,390 of Plaintiff's attorney's fees within sixty days.
Defendant timely appealed.
Defendant argues that the trial court erred by failing to value all of the marital estate, ordering Defendant to pay a distributive award, ordering an amount of alimony that was not supported by the findings, and awarding Plaintiff attorney's fees.
As an initial matter, Plaintiff contends this appeal must be dismissed because Defendant failed to preserve any errors for appeal as he failed to appear in court to make specific objections to the evidence or the trial court's ultimate ruling. See N.C. R. App. P. 10(a)(1) ().
However, Rule 10 allows an appellant to challenge whether "the judgment is supported by the verdict or by the findings of fact and conclusions of law." Id. See also Rumely v. Inman , 62 N.C. App. 324, 324, 302 S.E.2d 657, 657 (1983). Here, Defendant's arguments involve whether the trial court's findings of fact are supported by the evidence and whether those findings support the conclusions of law. Accordingly, Defendant's arguments are properly before us.
Defendant first argues that the trial court erred by failing to identify, classify, and value all of the parties’ property and debts, including: the New Jersey property, the pre-marital value of his pension, and personal property that the parties may possess.
We review a trial court's order for equitable distribution for abuse of discretion. Robinson v. Robinson , 210 N.C. App. 319, 322, 707 S.E.2d 785, 789 (2011). "When the trial court sits without a jury, the standard of review on appeal is whether there was competent evidence to support the trial court's findings of fact and whether its conclusions of law were proper in light of such facts." Dechkovskaia v. Dechkovskaia , 232 N.C. App. 350, 356, 754 S.E.2d 831, 836 (2014) (quoting Kelly v. Kelly , 228 N.C. App. 600, 601, 747 S.E.2d 268, 272 (2013) ). The trial court's findings of fact are conclusive if they are supported by any competent evidence from the record. Robinson , 210 N.C. App. at 322, 707 S.E.2d at 789.
Under N.C. Gen. Stat. § 50-20 (2019), "the trial court must classify the parties’ property into one of three categories—marital, divisible, or separate—and then distribute the parties’ marital and divisible property." Berens v. Berens , 260 N.C. App. 467, 469, 818 S.E.2d 155, 157 (2018). "In determining the value of the property, the trial court must consider the property's market value, if any, less the amount of any encumbrance serving to offset or reduce the market value." Robinson , 210 N.C. App. at 323, 707 S.E.2d at 789 (citing Alexander v. Alexander , 68 N.C. App. 548, 550–51, 315 S.E.2d 772, 775 (1984) ). The trial court's findings "must be specific and detailed enough to enable a reviewing court to determine what was done and its correctness." Carr v. Carr , 92 N.C. App. 378, 379, 374 S.E.2d 426, 427 (1988) ().
Defendant argues that the trial court erred by "find[ing] the marital value of the New Jersey property to be zero ($0) dollars" as no evidence was offered which would support the trial court's valuation. Although evidence regarding the New Jersey property's value and mortgage debt was presented, we agree that the trial court failed to make sufficient findings of fact regarding the value of the New Jersey property.
In the pre-trial order, Plaintiff valued the New Jersey property at $330,000 while Defendant valued it at $340,000; neither party listed any secured debt associated with the New Jersey property. At trial, Defendant did not present any evidence of the value of the New Jersey property, since he did not appear in court. In his absence, Plaintiff testified that there was a mortgage on the New Jersey property and that "practically the whole amount[, m]aybe 300-and something-thousand dollars" was still owed on the mortgage. She also testified, and the trial court found, that the parties purchased the New Jersey property for their son, Carl, although it was titled to the parties and the mortgage was in their name, and that sometime in 2014, Defendant signed over his interest in the New Jersey property to Plaintiff. The trial court classified the New Jersey property as marital property and valued it at zero dollars.
Defendant does not challenge the classification of the New Jersey property as marital or the distribution of the property to Plaintiff. Defendant challenges only the valuation of the property as the trial court failed to explain how it calculated the marital value of the property at "zero ($0) dollars."2
Based on the evidence presented, the trial court may have valued the New Jersey property at zero dollars, perhaps due to Plaintiff's testimony about the New Jersey property's mortgage. The order before us does not so indicate because the trial court failed to explain the basis for its zero-dollar valuation, and this Court cannot make such findings of fact. Therefore, we must remand this matter for the trial court to make additional findings of fact as to the basis for its valuation of the New Jersey property.
Defendant next contends that the trial court erred by failing to determine the pre-marital value of his pension. Defendant essentially contends his pension should be classified as partially separate and partially marital. However, Defendant failed to appear at the hearing and, as he concedes on appeal, "did not introduce any evidence of the pre-marital value of the pension."3 Embler v. Embler , 159 N.C. App. 186, 191, 582 S.E.2d 628, 632 (2003). Thus, the trial court Id.
Defendant next argues that the trial court erred in its distribution of the tangible personal property by ordering that "[e]ach party is awarded as their sole and separate property any and all personal property and household furnishings in their respective...
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