Ray v. State

• Decision Date: 05 May 1933
• Docket Number: 22934.
• Citation: 169 S.E. 538,47 Ga.App. 22
• Parties: RAY v. STATE.
• Court: Georgia Court of Appeals

169 S.E. 538

47 Ga.App. 22

RAY v. STATE.

No. 22934.

Court of Appeals of Georgia, First Division

May 5, 1933

Rehearing Denied May 27, 1933.

Syllabus by the Court.

Statute declaring that overtaking operator desiring to pass vehicle shall blow his horn, and that operator of overtaken vehicle shall promptly, on such signal, turn his vehicle as far as reasonably possible to right, held not void as being too vague and indefinite (Laws 1927, p. 236, § 12 (d); Civ Code 1910,§§ 628-635).

Accusation charging violation of statute regulating overtaking and overtaken vehicles in statutory language, and containing other necessary allegations, such as being on public highway etc., is sufficient (Laws 1927, p. 236, § 12 (d); Civ. Code 1910, §§ 628-635).

1. The act of 1927 (Ga. L. 1927, pp. 236, 237), which declares that "an operator overtaking and desiring to pass a vehicle shall blow his horn, and the operator of the vehicle so overtaken shall promptly, upon such signal, turn his vehicle as far as reasonably possible to the right, in order to allow free passage on the left of his vehicle" (section 12 (d), is not void because it is too vague and indefinite to be capable of enforcement.

2. An indictment or accusation which alleges a violation of such act in the language of the act, together with the other necessary allegations--such as being on a public highway etc.--is sufficient to put the defendant on notice as against what facts and charges he must contend.

3. The evidence amply supported the verdict, and the court did not err in overruling the petition for certiorari.

Error from Superior Court, Fulton County; E. D. Thomas, Judge.

C. L Ray was convicted of a violation of the rules of the road and he brings error.

Affirmed.

Paul L. Lindsay, of Atlanta, for plaintiff in error.

John S. McClelland, Sol., John A. Boykin, Sol. Gen., and J. Walter Le Craw, all of Atlanta, for the State.

GUERRY, Judge (after stating the foregoing facts).

1. The continuous enlargement of the use and operation of automobiles upon public highways within the last thirty years has given rise to numerous statutes in the various states of the Union. Before that time, the use of highways had not become so dangerous but that the universal custom and law (Civil Code, § 628) as to turning to the right was all that was necessary for the protection of life and property and the prevention of traffic jams. The time, place, and manner of one vehicle passing another was governed by the condition of the ruts in the road and the load carried, and it was not necessary to fix with definiteness and particularity any set of rules or laws regulating traffic. The General Assembly of this state in 1910 passed certain regulatory statutes which have been changed and enlarged from time to time by subsequent acts. This court in the case of Hayes v. State, 11 Ga.App. 371, 75 S.E. 523, held the Acts of 1910, p. 90, making it criminal to operate an automobile on a public highway at a rate of speed greater than is reasonable and proper, having regard to the traffic and use of such highway so as to endanger life, etc., too uncertain and indefinite in its terms to be capable of enforcement. While this is the rule adopted by the courts of review of this state, it may be well to state that it is not in accord with the rule adopted in a majority of the states, and a statute similarly worded is held in other states to be sound, and not too vague and uncertain. They say further that, after all, juries are and should be the judges of the particular facts of each case, and the fact that one jury might decide one way and another jury the other is no reason to declare a law null and void. The decision in the Hayes Case has been criticized by courts of other states. Schultz v. State, 89 Neb. 34, 130 N.W. 972, 33 L.R.A. (N. S.) 403, Ann.Cas. 1912C, 495; State v. Schaeffer, 96 Ohio St. 215, 117 N.E. 220, L.R.A. 1918B, 945, Ann.Cas. 1918E, 1137; Maxon v. State, 177 Wis. 379, 187 N.W. 753, 21 A.L.R. 1484; 26 A.L.R. 898. The "rule of reason" doctrine as enunciated by the United States Supreme Court in Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1, 31 S.Ct. 502, 55 L.Ed. 619, 34 L.R.A. (N. S.) 834, Ann.Cas. 1912D, 734, is also in conflict with the principle in the Hayes Case.

Our...