Ray v. State
| Decision Date | 22 July 2022 |
| Docket Number | Supreme Court No. S-17645 |
| Citation | 513 P.3d 1026 |
| Parties | Jason D. RAY, Petitioner, v. STATE of Alaska, Respondent. |
| Court | Alaska Supreme Court |
Emily Jura, Assistant Public Defender, and Samantha Cherot, Public Defender, Anchorage, for Petitioner.
Timothy W. Terrell, Assistant Attorney General, Anchorage, and Clyde "Ed" Sniffen, Jr., Acting Attorney General, Juneau, for Respondent.
Before: Bolger, Chief Justice, Winfree, Maassen, Carney, and Borghesan, Justices
In State v. Henry the court of appeals held that a defendant who entered a plea agreement providing for a specific period of probation has the right, when being sentenced for a subsequent probation violation, to reject further probation and to serve a sentence of active imprisonment only.1 Now the court of appeals has certified to us the question of whether the legislature intended to abrogate that right when it enacted AS 12.55.090(f).2 We conclude that it did. Although AS 12.55.090(f) does not expressly mention a defendant's right to reject probation, its plain text precludes a judge from reducing or terminating a previously-agreed-upon period of probation unless both the prosecution and the defendant agree, and the legislative history does not persuade us that the legislature intended something other than the plain meaning of the language it used.
Jason Ray was arrested in October 2013 for stealing a pair of boots from a grocery store in Kodiak. Because Ray had two prior theft convictions, the State charged him with theft in the second degree. Ray pleaded guilty as part of a plea agreement pursuant to Alaska Criminal Rule 11.3 The plea agreement called for Ray to receive a sentence of 24 months’ imprisonment with 20 months suspended, followed by three years of supervised probation. Ray served his four months in prison and was then released on supervised probation.
Several months later, the State filed a petition to revoke probation, alleging that Ray had violated conditions of probation. At the probation adjudication hearing, Ray admitted that he had violated two conditions, and the superior court found that he had violated two others. At the disposition hearing, Ray announced that he wanted to reject further probation. Neither the sentencing judge nor the prosecutor had been aware of Ray's intentions before this time, but both acknowledged his desire to reject probation. However, in addition to sentencing him to serve 16 months (which was all but 90 days of his remaining suspended jail time), the superior court placed Ray on unsupervised probation for five years. The only condition of this unsupervised probation was that Ray obey the law. The superior court's apparent purpose in keeping Ray on unsupervised probation was to allow the court to impose a more severe sentence if Ray committed another felony before his five years of probation expired.4
Ray appealed the sentence on two grounds. First, Ray contended that the superior court erred by ruling against him on the two contested violations of probation.5 The court of appeals disagreed, concluding that the evidence was sufficient to support the superior court's findings that Ray violated the two probation conditions.6
Second, Ray argued that the superior court erred by not honoring his right to reject further probation. Ray relied on the court of appeals’ decision in State v. Henry , which held that a defendant whose Rule 11 plea agreement provides for a specific period of probation has the right, when being sentenced for a subsequent probation violation, to elect to serve only active imprisonment rather than any further probation.7
In response, the State argued that the legislature had abrogated the Henry decision by enacting AS 12.55.090(f), which limits a judge's authority to reduce a period of probation provided for in a Rule 11 agreement:
The State argued that this statute, by precluding a judge from "reduc[ing] the specific period of probation" set forth in a Rule 11 agreement unless the prosecutor agrees, eliminated the right of defendants like Ray to reject a previously-agreed-upon period of probation.9
The court of appeals was unable to resolve this dispute. The three judges on the court of appeals wrote separately, each proposing a different interpretation of AS 12.55.090(f).10
Judge Mannheimer concluded that AS 12.55.090(f) does not abolish a defendant's right to reject probation provided for in a plea agreement.11 He reasoned that had the legislature intended to abolish this right, the statute would have expressly said so.12 Judge Mannheimer instead concluded the statute prohibits a court only from unilaterally reducing the defendant's period of probation unless both the prosecuting authority and defendant agree.13 In his view, the legislative history demonstrated an intent "to restrict judicial sentencing discretion in probation revocation hearings, so that judges could not unilaterally reduce a defendant's bargained-for period of probation when the judge grew tired of dealing with the defendant."14 Judge Mannheimer concluded that the legislature did not intend to repeal the right to reject probation, but instead intended only to limit the discretion of judges who do not want to "deal[ ]" with troublesome probationers.15
Judge Mannheimer also concluded that, under AS 12.55.090(f), defendants who reject further probation are not automatically sentenced to the remainder of their suspended term of imprisonment.16 In his view, because a defendant does not waive any rights that were not specifically and explicitly waived in the plea bargain, a defendant who rejects probation must be re-sentenced according to the criteria described in State v. Chaney .17
Judge Suddock agreed with Judge Mannheimer that AS 12.55.090(f) did not abolish a defendant's right to reject probation previously agreed to in a Rule 11 plea agreement.18 But Judge Suddock concluded that AS 12.55.090(f) did affect the consequences of this right: If a defendant rejects further probation, the judge is required to impose the balance of suspended time and has no discretion to calculate a term of imprisonment according to the Chaney criteria.19
Like Judge Mannheimer, Judge Suddock relied heavily on legislative history. But what Judge Suddock found prominent was an intent by the legislature to overrule the Henry decision.20 He observed that testimony from the witnesses supporting the legislation emphasized that "a deal is a deal": Once the defendant and prosecuting authority execute a plea agreement, the agreement's terms cannot be altered by the judge after sentencing.21 He therefore concluded that, if the defendant rejects probation, the sentencing court must impose all the remaining suspended time of imprisonment without regard to the Chaney sentencing criteria.22
Judge Allard concluded that AS 12.55.090(f) eliminated a defendant's right to reject further probation if the length of the defendant's probation was a specified component of the defendant's plea bargain.23 Judge Allard began with the language of the statute.24 She observed that the statute's terms give a judge no authority to reduce a period of probation specified in a Rule 11 agreement unless the parties agree to that reduction.25 She reasoned that this language necessarily implicates a defendant's right to reject probation because, as a practical matter, "a defendant cannot formally reject probation and be resentenced to a flat-time sentence unless the court is authorized to conduct that resentencing."26
Judge Allard turned next to the legislative history. She concluded that "[a]lthough not as clear as it could be, the legislative history does make clear that AS 12.55.090(f) was introduced in response to [the] decision in State v. Henry ."27 She highlighted testimony that "the State opposed any reduction in the defendant's probationary term because it was a bargained-for term of the plea agreement" — which was the State's position in Henry .28 Judge Allard also highlighted testimony that "a deal is a deal" and that it was "not fair for a trial court to terminate probation when it is part of a bargained-for exchange because ‘both sides have negotiated in good faith over what is an appropriate sentence.’ "29
Judge Allard concluded, based on her analysis of the text and legislative history, "that AS 12.55.090(f) was enacted to prevent a defendant from unilaterally rejecting probation if the period of probation was part of a bargained-for term of the defendant's plea agreement."30
With no majority, the court of appeals certified the question of how to interpret AS 12.55.090(f) to this court.31
Probation is a form of punishment typically imposed as an alternative to a sentence of imprisonment or a fine.32 In Alaska, a court's power to suspend a sentence of imprisonment and offer probation instead is entirely statutory.33 Our statutes give the sentencing court significant discretion to determine the appropriate period and conditions of probation.34
Because probation is an alternative to the statutorily defined punishment for the crime, we long ago recognized in ...
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Blythe P. v. State
...we cannot affirm the court's ruling under the correct standard.28 In re B.L.J. , 717 P.2d 376, 380-81 (Alaska 1986).29 Ray v. State , 513 P.3d 1026, 1033 (Alaska 2022) (quoting City of Valdez v. State , 372 P.3d 240, 254 (Alaska 2016) ).30 Pruitt v. Off. of Lieutenant Governor , 498 P.3d 59......