Ray v. State
| Decision Date | 18 April 2000 |
| Docket Number | 99-00237 |
| Court | Tennessee Court of Appeals |
| Parties | JERRY RAY, Executor of the Estate of James Earl Ray v. STATE OF TENNESSEEIN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF TENNESSEE AT NASHVILLE |
Direct Appeal from the Probate Court for Davidson County No. 98P912
This appeal arises from a dispute over property in the custody of the Criminal Court Clerk of Shelby County. In 1969, the Decedent, James Earl Ray, was convicted of the murder of Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr., after the Decedent pled guilty to this charge in the Criminal Court of Shelby County. In the years following his conviction, the Decedent filed numerous petitions in both state and federal courts seeking post-conviction relief on various grounds. These criminal proceedings finally concluded upon the Decedent=s death in 1998. Thereafter, Jerry Ray, the Decedent=s brother and the Executor of the Decedent=s estate, filed this lawsuit against the State of Tennessee in the Probate Court of Davidson County, seeking the return of certain property that had been used as evidence in the Decedent=s criminal proceedings and that remained in the custody of the Shelby County Criminal Court Clerk. The Probate Court granted the State=s motion to dismiss because the court ruled that the Executor=s claim was barredby the doctrines of sovereign immunity and collateral estoppel. We affirm the Probate Court=s dismissal of the Executor=s complaint; however, we do so upon the alternative ground that the Probate Court lacked the authority to order the transfer or disposition of property held in the custody of the Criminal Court Clerk.
Paul J. Bruno, Nashville, Tennessee, for the appellant, Jerry Ray, Executor of the Estate of James Earl Ray.
Paul G. Summers, Attorney General and Reporter, and Dianne Stamey Dycus, Deputy Attorney General, for appellee, State of Tennessee.
OPINION
In March 1969, the Decedent pled guilty to the first-degree murder of Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr., and was sentenced to ninety-nine years in the state penitentiary. Thereafter, the Decedent sought a new trial based upon his claim that his guilty plea was not entered knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily. Our supreme court rejected this claim and denied the Decedent=s petition for writ of certiorari. See Ray v. State, 451 S.W.2d 854 (Tenn. 1970). In the years following the supreme court=s denial of the Decedent=s petition, the Decedent pursued at least seven claims for post-conviction relief in state and federal courts. See Ray v. State, 984 S.W.2d 236, 237 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1997). Apparently, the Decedent continued to pursue his seventh petition for post-conviction relief until his death in April 1998. See State v. Ray, 984 S.W.2d 239 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1998). The Decedent=s criminal proceedings concluded upon his death. See Carver v. State, 398 S.W.2d 719, 720 (Tenn. 1966).
After the Decedent=s death, the Decedent=s brother, Jerry Ray, was appointed Executor of the Decedent=s estate by the Probate Court of Davidson County. The present lawsuit commenced in October 1998, when the Executor filed a motion in the Probate Court asking the court to order that certain property currently in the possession of the Clerk of the Criminal Court of Shelby County be transferred into the possession of the Clerk of the Probate Court of Davidson County. Specifically, the Executor asked the Probate Court to transfer possession of the following property: (1) one .30-06 caliber Remington hunting rifle; (2) one transistor radio; (3) one pair of binoculars; (4) one Schlitz beer can; and (5) underwear, toothbrush, and other miscellaneous personal property. The Executor subsequently filed a complaint against the State of Tennessee seeking the return of the subject property. The Executor=s complaint asserted that
the defendant, acting through its duly elected official, the past, present and future . . . Clerk of the Criminal Court of the 30th Judicial District, . . . wrongfully refuses to deliver up possession of property owned by James Earl Ray used in the prosecution of the decedent for the alleged murder of Doctor Martin Luther King and inasmuch as that proceeding has been terminated there is no legal reason for said property to be withheld any longer.
The Attorney General filed a notice of appearance on behalf of the State of Tennessee. In the notice of appearance, the Attorney General asserted that the State had Aownership and rights of disposition of this property@ by virtue of a 1993 decision of this court, see Hays v. Montague, 860 S.W.2d 403 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1993), and a 1994 enactment of the General Assembly, see Tenn. Code Ann. ' 10-7-510 (Supp. 1997). The cited statute purported to authorize criminal court clerks to transfer custody and ownership of records, documents, and physical evidence in their possession to higher educational institutions, museums, libraries, or other not-for-profit corporations, provided that the transferred items constituted Apublic records@ of Ahistorical significance@ and provided that certain other conditions were met. See Tenn. Code Ann. ' 10-7-510(b) (Supp. 1997).1 After the Executor filed his complaint against the State of Tennessee, the State filed a motion to dismiss pursuant to rule 12 of the Tennessee Rules of Civil Procedure. As grounds for its motion, the State contended that the Executor=s claim against it was barred by the doctrines of sovereign immunity, res judicata, and/or collateral estoppel.
After conducting a hearing in June 1999, the Probate Court granted the State=s motion to dismiss. In its order of dismissal, the Probate Court ruled that the Executor=s Aclaim against the State of Tennessee seeking to obtain property allegedly owned by the decedent at the time of his death [was] barred by the doctrine of sovereign immunity@ and, further, that the Executor was Acollaterally estopped from seeking to obtain said property based on the holding of the Tennessee Court of Appeals in Hays v. Montague, 860 S.W.2d 403 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1993).@ On appeal, the Executor contends that both of these rulings were in error.
We agree with the State=s assertion that the Probate Court properly dismissed the Executor=s complaint, but on somewhat different grounds than those relied upon by the Probate Court. See Continental Cas. Co. v. Smith, 720 S.W.2d 48, 50 (Tenn. 1986) (). The gravamen of the Executor=s complaint was that the Criminal Court Clerk of Shelby County acquired possession of certain property belonging to the Decedent when the property was used as evidence in the Decedent=s criminal prosecution and that, inasmuch as the criminal proceedings terminated upon the Decedent=s death, no legal justification existed for the Criminal Court Clerk to retain this property. We conclude that the Probate Court lacked the authority to determine the disposition of property held in the custody of the Criminal Court Clerk after the Decedent=s criminal proceedings terminated.
As our Court of Criminal Appeals recognized in a previous decision involving one of the Decedent=s petitions for post-conviction relief, the trial court Ahas the inherent authority to determine the custody and control of evidence held in the [trial court] clerk=s office.@ Ray v. State, 984 S.W.2d 236, 238 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1997). This authority includes Athe right to exercise control over physical evidence after a case has been concluded.@ Id. at 238 n.4.2
Ordinarily, one court should not interfere with property Aof which another court has custody or control through the latter=s officer or representative.@ 21 C.J.S. Courts ' 189, at 224 (1990). When a trial court clerk possesses property as an officer of the trial court, the clerk=s possession of such property is subject to the trial court=s orders. See Massey v. Holmes, 227 S.W.2d 25, 26 (Tenn. 1950). Our supreme court has explained that the reason for this rule is
that while property . . . is in custodia legis,3 the officer holding it is the mere hand of the court; his possession is the possession of the court, and to interfere therewith is to invade the jurisdiction of the court itself, an officer so situated being bound solely by the orders and judgments of the court whose mere agent he is, and having no right to make any disposition of such . . . property without the consent of his own court, express or implied.
Massey, 227 S.W.2d at 26 (quoting 4 Am. Jur. ' 386, at 795) (footnote added).
BR> This doctrine of noninterference also applies to criminal cases and the procedure thereunder. See Outerbridge Horsey Co. v. Martin, 120 A. 235, 236 (Md. 1923); accord State v. Allen, 66 N.W.2d 830, 837-38 (Neb. 1954). When a criminal court or its agent lawfully obtains custody of property, Ato permit an interference with [this] possession would be to interfere with the jurisdiction of the court, and [to] divert the property, from the purposes for which it is held.@ Outerbridge Horsey Co., 120 A. at 236. When property Ais in custodia legis, and subject to the order of the court having criminal jurisdiction of the offense, . . . neither by attachment proceeding nor by injunction should the criminal court=s power of disposition of the [property] be taken away or interfered with.@ Allen, 66 N.W.2d at 837. As one court observed, A[t]he criminal court . . . , in the first instance, has sole control of its own process and of the conduct of its own officers thereunder.@ State v. George, 181 S.E. 713, 715 (W. Va. 1935). Thus, A[o]fficers acting under, or pursuant to, the process of that court are accountable to that court for their conduct.@ Id.
In accordance with the foregoing authorities, we conclude that the Probate Court lacked the authority to...
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