Ray v. State
| Decision Date | 24 February 1954 |
| Docket Number | No. 26682,26682 |
| Citation | 160 Tex.Crim. 12,266 S.W.2d 124 |
| Parties | RAY v. STATE. |
| Court | Texas Court of Criminal Appeals |
Jerome Parker, Jr., Al Clyde, Fort Worth, for appellant.
Wesley Dice, State's Atty., Austin, for the State.
DAVIDSON, Commissioner.
Murder is the offense; the punishment, twenty-five years in the penitentiary.
Childless and despairing of hope that they would ever have children of their own, appellant and her husband decided to adopt a child into their home. With that in view, an application was made to a children's home, as a result of which they obtained, at the end of October, 1951, a five-year-old boy, John Thomas Owens, the deceased. There is no evidence that the child was ever legally adopted by them.
The testimony shows that the boy was retarded both mentally and physically; that he did not have the intelligence of an average two-year-old child; that, to an unnatural degree, he was insensible to pain and would not cry out or scream when hurt; that he was unable to keep a normal balance when walking; and that he was unable to talk coherently.
The child lived with appellant and her husband for some five months before his death on March 14, 1952.
In the early evening of the aforesaid date, a physician, Dr. Fredeking, was summoned to the appellant's residence on Moore Street in the city of Forth Worth. When he arrived, appellant was hysterical but in the general confusion it was indicated that he should see the child. In the bedroom, the boy lay dead.
An examination, after the arrival of detectives, revealed small hunks of flesh torn from the deceased's body, deep, penetrating cuts through the lower lip, a torn and flattened nose, front teeth missing, and an arm broken. However, according to a detective participating in the examination, there was no blood on the body, which at that time was clothed.
The deceased was then taken to the Lucas Funeral Home, where pictures of the body in the nude were taken. A justice of the peace, on being contacted by the polic and coming to the funeral home, ordered an autopsy.
Dr. Andujar, a pathologist, was called to perform and explain in the presence of witnesses the results of such autopsy. His findings included: 'multiple cerebral and cerebellar Hemorrhages with two skull fractures and 14 contributing causes * * 258 recent cuts and abrasions, 44 old scars * * * a fracture of the * * * arm bone * * * a piece of lower lip missing * * * an old third degree burn right down to the bone at the base of the spine * * * a recent second-degree burn on the * * * thigh * * * a dislocated left index finger * * * a missing fingernail * * * blood in the chest * * * a big hemorrhage * * * within the belly cavity.' The witness further testified that the spleen was broken; that the body was undernourished; that the 'nose was broken, smashed and pushed in so that the medium plate of the nose, the septum, was protruded backward up into the sinuses at the base of the bridge of the nose'; that there were numerous fresh burns present, and also sharp cuts and puncture marks, both old and recent, on the male organ. An internal surgical examination was also made * * * of the skull, chest and abdominal cavity. The organ controlling bodily coordination, the cerebellum, was severely injured. It was the witness' opinion that the 258 cuts and abrasions were made within a few hours of death; that, with the other injuries, the untreated laceration and internal bleeding in the spleen, the accumulation of blood in the chest, the hemorrhaging in the stomach, the multiple cerebral hemorrhages and the skull fractures would cause death. It was his opinion, also, that 'the cause of the ruptured spleen was the application of external force,' and that any of the aforesaid factors, independent of each other, could have caused death.
Following the autopsy, officers carried appellant home from the hospital to which she had been taken due to her hysterical condition. From there, they took her to the police station for questioning. After statutory warning, appellant there made a statement to the then district attorney, in which she recounted whipping the boy numerous times with the small leather belt which was admitted in evidence at the trial. She also recounted that on the day of the tragedy she became annoyed with the child and 'knocked him off the chair' in which he had been standing; that after picking him up and kissing him, he went outside but returned shortly and crumpled over in convulsions; that when he stopped breathing she left the house to call her husband; and that on her return she thought she 'fainted.'
After the making of the statement, the officers took appellant home. There, she handed them the belt referred to (which is 3/4 inch wide, 18 1/2 inches long, and weighs under two ounces). Noticing her high-heeled boots in the living room, the officers examined them 'for anything that might lead to her having injured the child in any way with them by kicking or stamping him.' They found 'some fragments (of hair) imbedded in the leathers of the heel * * * three strands.' It was the expressed opinion of one of the officers that the hairs were of the same color as the child's. The witness testified that 'after examining them' (the hairs), he did not recall 'what happened to them.' The hairs were never identified as being those of the deceased, the witness testifying that he did not know 'that hair can be definitely identified as to type and from whom it came * * *.'
Appellant refuted a portion of the statement which was admitted in evidence. She testified that she made two statements; that she signed the second one but that 'they changed words * * * to make it sound different'; that she 'was forced to sign it'; and that 'they would not let' her 'call a lawyer.'
On the trial, appellant, corroborated by a number of witnesses, sought to explain the deceased's injuries as follows: that he injured himself by falling in the rocky yard, down the unrepaired steps, on a neighbor's concrete porch * * * constantly bruising and hurting himself and not allowing the wounds to heal; that by digging into the sores, scabs could not form and the sores always stayed 'open and fresh' and that the child felt no pain when so gouging into them. She stated that their dog often scratched him; that the burn at the base of his spine was caused by his backing too close to a stove; and that through all the multiple injuries that would cause a normal child to scream with pain he never cried. She further testified that he 'moved about like a monkey,' did not see well, had no ability to communicate his need for or to control body eliminations, and could speak only a few words at a time.
A former neighbor testified that appellant told her that she and her husband loved the boy and intended to adopt him, also that they had insurance on his life and a burial policy. There was no proof of the issuance of such insurance.
There was testimony that when the Rays moved from the neighborhood about six or seven weeks before the alleged murder, the boy was 'beat up something pitiful.' On questioning, one witness testified, Witnesses told of hearing--but not seeing--numerous and prolonged beatings by the appellant, whose voice would be raised...
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