Rayme v. State
| Decision Date | 09 November 2005 |
| Docket Number | No. 01-04-00066-CR.,01-04-00066-CR. |
| Citation | 178 S.W.3d 21 |
| Parties | Aaron Keco RAYME, Appellant, v. The STATE of Texas, Appellee. |
| Court | Texas Supreme Court |
Ken Goode, Houston, for Appellant.
Charles A. Rosenthal, Jr., Dist. Atty.-Harris County, Carol M. Cameron, Asst. Dist. Atty., Houston, for Appellee.
Panel consists of Justices NUCHIA, JENNINGS, and ALCALA.
Appellant, Aaron Keco Rayme, pleaded not guilty to the offense of murder. The jury found him guilty and assessed punishment at life in prison. Appellant presents the following issues on appeal: (1) that he was egregiously harmed by the trial court's failure to instruct the jury in the punishment charge on the State's burden of proof regarding extraneous offenses, and (2) that he was denied effective assistance of counsel. We affirm.
Enjoli Lavette Taylor was the mother of Aeshia, her then two-year-old daughter with appellant, and Journey, her then one-year-old daughter with another man. Taylor's sister, Dineatras Smith, testified at trial that Taylor and appellant lived on opposite sides of town. Smith stated that Taylor occasionally left Aeshia with appellant, but that Taylor refused appellant's requests that he be allowed to keep Journey as well. Smith also testified about several instances in which appellant physically and verbally abused Taylor. Smith described a telephone call from Taylor in which Taylor said that appellant was threatening her with a box cutter and was going to kill her. Smith stated that she heard appellant say that he wasn't going to kill Taylor "right now," but that he would later, if he wanted to. Smith also testified that instances of appellant's abusive treatment of Taylor included the following: angrily knocking a telephone out of Taylor's hand, grabbing Taylor's cell phone and throwing it out of a car window, and making harassing telephone calls to Taylor on Mother's Day weekend that included death threats. Smith said that she called the police during the Mother's Day incident and that appellant, who had apparently come to the apartment, left after the police spoke with Taylor.
On the morning of June 14, 2003, Taylor left her apartment with the children to take Aeshia to stay with appellant. Smith testified that Taylor told her that appellant was angry because Taylor wasn't going to let him keep Journey as well. Later that day, appellant stabbed Taylor to death in the home of Ronald and Pamela Blackmon, who lived near appellant. Pamela Blackmon testified that she heard screaming in her front yard followed by knocking on her front door and that, when her husband opened the door, Taylor rushed into their house followed by appellant. Ronald Blackmon testified that appellant went straight to where Taylor was and grabbed her. He said that he tried to get between them and told appellant to let Taylor go, but that appellant "pulled out a knife and he start[ed] stabbing her." Blackmon said he and his family fled to a neighbor's house to call police. and, about 10 to 15 minutes later, appellant walked calmly to a house down the street.
Houston Police Department ("HPD") Officer Dan R. Hamill, testified that he responded to a "cutting-in-progress" call at the Blackmon home "a little after 3:00 o'clock" that day. Hamill said that he, another officer, and HPD Sergeant H.L. Mayer found and arrested appellant in the driveway of a home five houses down from the crime scene. Mayer testified that the owner of that home where appellant was arrested said she was appellant's cousin and that appellant had telephoned her from the Blackmon house and told her that he had killed Taylor. Ana Elisa Lopez, an assistant medical examiner, testified that Taylor was stabbed and cut 46 times in her face and scalp, back, buttocks, chest, abdomen, hands, arms, and vagina.
In his first issue, appellant asserts that he is entitled to a new punishment hearing because the trial court did not sua sponte instruct the jury at the punishment phase that the State had the burden to prove extraneous offenses and bad acts beyond a reasonable doubt. Appellant relies on Huizar v. State to support this contention. 12 S.W.3d 479 (Tex.Crim.App.2000).
Following a finding of guilt, additional evidence may be introduced by both the State and the defendant at the punishment phase of trial in accordance with article 37.07, section 3 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, which states as follows:
Evidence of Prior Criminal Record in all Criminal Cases After a Finding of Guilty
(a)(1) ... evidence may be offered by the state and the defendant as to any matter the court deems relevant to sentencing, including but not limited to the prior criminal record of the defendant, his general reputation, his character, an opinion regarding his character, the circumstances of the offense for which he is being tried, and, notwithstanding Rules 404 and 405, Texas Rules of Evidence, any other evidence of an extraneous crime or bad act that is shown beyond a reasonable doubt by evidence to have been committed by the defendant, or for which he could be held criminally responsible, regardless of whether he has previously been charged with or finally convicted of the crime or act.
TEX.CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 37.07 § 3(a)(1) (Vernon Supp.2004-2005) (emphasis added). The Code of Criminal Procedure also requires that the jury receive, in the punishment phase of trial, any "additional written instructions as may be necessary." Id. § 3(b). Although the Code of Criminal Procedure does not expressly require a jury instruction concerning extraneous offenses admitted in the punishment phase of a trial under section 3(a), "such instruction is logically required if the jury is to consider the extraneous-offense and-bad act [sic] evidence under the statutorily prescribed reasonable-doubt standard." Huizar, 12 S.W.3d at 484. "Section 3(a)'s requirement that the jury be satisfied of the defendant's culpability in the extraneous offenses and bad acts is the `law applicable to the case' in the non-capital punishment context." Id. The trial court, thus, must instruct the jury that, at the punishment phase, extraneous offense and bad act evidence may only be considered if it meets the statutorily prescribed reasonable-doubt standard. Id. Because the trial court bears the responsibility to instruct the jury, the defendant is not required to make an objection or request under section 3(a) in order to preserve this type of charging error for appeal. Id.
While Huizar held that the trial court must sua sponte charge the jury under section 3(a) when extraneous evidence was admitted in the punishment phase of trial, this Court extended Huizar by holding that the trial court must sua sponte charge the jury under section 3(a) when extraneous evidence is used in the punishment phase of trial, even though the evidence was admitted during the guilt-innocence phase. See Graves v. State, 176 S.W.3d 422, 432 (Tex.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2004, pet. granted).
Appellant contends that the trial court erred by not instructing the jury regarding the State's burden of proof in the punishment phase of trial concerning the following extraneous offenses and bad acts that were introduced in the guilt-innocence phase of trial: "(1) Appellant would take the family car and be gone for extended periods of time, leaving the deceased and their child without provisions such as food, water, and diapers; (2) Appellant tried to force the deceased to get an abortion; (3) Appellant was `rough' with the deceased; (4) Appellant held his hand out like he was `hacking' the deceased and knocked a phone out of her hand; (5) Appellant menaced the deceased with a box cutter and threatened to kill her; (6) Appellant would take the deceased's money out of her purse; (7) Appellant was unfaithful to the deceased and had a child with another woman; [and] (8) Appellant threatened to kill the deceased on Mother's day."
Appellant's sole contention is that the trial court was required sua sponte to instruct the jury on the State's burden of proof on these eight extraneous acts that were introduced in the guilt-innocence phase of trial. Appellant does not assert that this evidence was used or referenced by the State in the punishment phase of trial. The eight extraneous acts referred to by appellant did not involve evidence introduced in the punishment phase, as did Huizar, or evidence admitted at the guilt-innocence phase and then used or referred to in the punishment phase of trial, as was the case in Graves. See Huizar, 12 S.W.3d at 484; Graves, 176 S.W.3d at 432. Thus, neither Huizar nor Graves supports appellant's argument that he is entitled to a section 3(a) instruction for extraneous evidence used only in the guilt-innocence phase of trial.
We are aware that one court has extended Huizar even further by requiring a jury instruction any time extraneous-offense evidence is admitted in the trial, regardless of whether it is admitted in the guilt-innocence phase or the punishment phase of trial, and regardless of whether the evidence admitted at the guilt-innocence phase is used or referenced in the punishment phase of trial. See Allen v. State, 47 S.W.3d 47, 50 (Tex.App.-Fort Worth 2001, pet. ref'd) () (emphasis added). But see, Guzman v. State, No. 04-02-00198-CR, 2003 WL 22336052, at *4 (Tex.App.-San Antonio Oct.15, 2003, pet. ref'd) (...
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