Raymond Lloyd Co. v. District Court for Twentieth Judicial Dist.

• Decision Date: 09 February 1987
• Docket Number: 86SA349,Nos. 86SA191,s. 86SA191
• Citation: 732 P.2d 612
• Parties: RAYMOND LLOYD COMPANY, Petitioner, v. DISTRICT COURT FOR the TWENTIETH JUDICIAL DISTRICT, and the Honorable Murray Richtel, In His Official Capacity as District Court Judge for the Twentieth Judicial District of the State of Colorado, Respondents. Jason WEXLER, a Minor, by his Parents and Next Friends Paula WEXLER and Jack Wexler, Petitioners, v. DISTRICT COURT FOR the TWENTIETH JUDICIAL DISTRICT, and the Honorable Richard McLean, In His Official Capacity as District Court Judge for the Twentieth Judicial District of the State of Colorado, Respondents.
• Court: Colorado Supreme Court

Page 612

732 P.2d 612

55 USLW 2459

RAYMOND LLOYD COMPANY, Petitioner, v. DISTRICT COURT FOR the TWENTIETH JUDICIAL DISTRICT, and the

Honorable Murray Richtel, In His Official Capacity as

District Court Judge for the Twentieth Judicial District of

the State of Colorado, Respondents.

Jason WEXLER, a Minor, by his Parents and Next Friends Paula

WEXLER and Jack Wexler, Petitioners, v. DISTRICT COURT FOR the TWENTIETH JUDICIAL DISTRICT, and the

Honorable Richard McLean, In His Official Capacity as

District Court Judge for the Twentieth Judicial District of

the State of Colorado, Respondents.

Nos. 86SA191, 86SA349.

Supreme Court of Colorado En Banc.

Feb. 9, 1987.

King, Paulsen & Wanebo, P.C., Dennis B. Wanebo, Westminster, for petitioners in No. 86SA349.

Duane Woodard, Atty. Gen., Charles B. Howe, Chief Deputy Atty. Gen., Richard H. Forman, Sol. Gen., Cheryl J. Hanson, Asst. Atty. Gen., Denver, for respondents in all cases.

Walberg Law Offices, Larry A. Henning, Todd A. Myers, Denver, for petitioner in No. 86SA191.

KIRSHBAUM, Justice.

In these two original proceedings the petitioners, Raymond Lloyd Company and Jason Wexler, by his parents Paula Wexler and Jack Wexler, challenge the authority of the District Court for the Twentieth Judicial District (the District Court) to establish by administrative order a procedure imposing minimum fines on parties to civil actions who settle their disputes after trial dates have been set. The cases have been consolidated for purposes of decision because they raise almost identical issues. We conclude that the portions of the administrative order under which the fines were imposed are invalid and, therefore, make absolute the rules to show cause previously issued herein.

Petitioner Raymond Lloyd Company (Lloyd) was a party in a mechanic's lien foreclosure action (84CV1336) filed in the District Court. On Friday, January 10, 1986, pursuant to scheduling procedures adopted by the District Court, a scheduling judge set the case for trial commencing Thursday, January 16, 1986. On Wednesday, January 15, Lloyd and the owner of the property which was the subject of the foreclosure action, Sherrelwood, Inc., reached a settlement of the dispute. The attorneys for Lloyd and Sherrelwood, Inc. informed the trial judge of the settlement on the morning of January 16, the day the trial was scheduled to begin. The trial judge approved the settlement and, pursuant to the provisions of Administrative Order 85-3 of the District Court, imposed a fine of $500 upon each party.

Petitioner Jason Wexler, through the representation of his parents, was the plaintiff in a personal injury action (85CV213-3) filed in the District Court. On Friday, July 18, 1986, a scheduling judge set that case for trial commencing Monday, July 21, 1986. The parties settled their dispute on the morning the trial was scheduled to begin. The trial judge accepted the settlement and, pursuant to Administrative Order 85-3, imposed a fine of $500 upon each party.

Administrative Order 85-3 of the Twentieth Judicial District provides, in pertinent part, as follows:

NEGOTIATED DISPOSITIONS AND SETTLEMENT:

The disposition cut-off date in criminal cases is 12:00 noon, the Thursday prior to the scheduled trial week. All cases in which a negotiated disposition has been made shall ordinarily be set for appearance or entry of plea at 8:30 a.m. on the morning set for trial before the Judge to whom the case is assigned. All cases which must be re-set in the criminal divisions shall be heard at 8:30 a.m. on the Monday of the common trial week in the division to which the case is assigned.

NOTICE:

The parties in civil cases scheduled for more than one day which settle AFTER THE SETTING OF THE SCHEDULE SHALL BE ASSESSED A FINE of no less than $500.00 each for failure to resolve the case in a timely manner. In exercising its discretion as to the amount of sanction to be imposed the Court may consider the length of trial time allocated to the settled case and the number of trial days vacated by virtue of its having been scheduled for trial. See: Eash v. Rigg[in]s Trucking, Inc., 757 F.2d 557 (3rd Cir.1985).

Order 85-3 is entitled "District Court Scheduling Procedure--Common Trial Weeks." It is one of several administrative orders provisionally adopted by the District Court as local rules on May 28, 1985, establishing procedures to be followed in setting cases for trial. The rules as a whole fulfill the laudable goal of setting forth in detail how civil and criminal cases will be processed from filing to trial or other resolution. Many of the orders contain specific time requirements for accomplishing various pretrial tasks.

Article VI, section 19 of the Colorado Constitution provides that the "practice of all courts of the same class ... shall be uniform." In view of the uniformity requirement of this constitutional provision regarding procedural rules in Colorado's courts, this court adopted C.R.C.P. 121 to establish a uniform method by which trial courts may promulgate rules governing matters strictly local in nature. Colorado Rule of Civil Procedure 121(a) states as follows:

(a) Matters which are strictly local. Each court by action of a majority of its judges may from time to time make and amend local rules not inconsistent with the Colorado Rules of Civil Procedure or Practice Standards set forth in C.R.C.P. 121(b), nor inconsistent with any directive of the Supreme Court. Copies of proposed local rules or amendments to be made by any court, before their adoption, shall be lodged with the Supreme Court through the office of the State Court Administrator. Rules so submitted shall take effect 45 days after being so lodged except as to those rules which the Supreme Court may have rejected in writing during said period. Reasonable uniformity of local rules is encouraged.

This court has recognized that "local rules designed and intended to improve the administration of justice, and to upgrade the judicial processes in the eyes of the public at large are to be encouraged." Pittman v. District Court, 149 Colo. 380, 388-89, 369 P.2d 85, 90 (1962). Numerous courts have recognized the fact that late settlement of pending cases unnecessarily increases court expenses by disrupting schedules without necessarily avoiding payment of jury costs. E.g., Martinez v. Thrifty Drug and Discount Co., 593 F.2d 992 (10th Cir.1979); White v. Raymark Indus., Inc., 783 F.2d 1175 (4th Cir.1986); Eash v. Riggins Trucking, Inc., 757 F.2d 557 (3d Cir.1985); Nesco Design Group, Inc. v. Grace, 577 F.Supp 414 (W.D.Pa.1983). Reduction of time spent in final trial preparations results in reduced legal expenses and reduced disruption of the personal and business schedules of parties and witnesses. Exploration of means to eliminate avoidable expenses and administrative inefficiencies occasioned by settlements achieved on the eve of trial is to be encouraged. Nevertheless, we conclude that the provisions of Administrative Order 85-3 relating to the imposition of fines for late settlements are not of a strictly local nature.

A decision by parties to a civil action to resolve their...