Raymond v. Holm
| Decision Date | 04 December 1925 |
| Docket Number | 24,926 |
| Citation | 206 N.W. 166,165 Minn. 215 |
| Parties | FLOYD RAYMOND AND ANOTHER v. MIKE HOLM, AS REGISTRAR OF MOTOR VEHICLES |
| Court | Minnesota Supreme Court |
Upon the relation of Floyd Raymond and another the district court for Hennepin county granted its alternative writ of mandamus directed to Mike Holm, registrar of motor vehicles, directing him to issue to Raymond Bros. a motor vehicle registration certificate. Petitioners appealed from an order, Bardwell J., sustaining a demurrer to the writ. Affirmed.
Tax on motor vehicles operates as privilege tax.
1. The tax upon motor vehicles using the public highways is fixed with reference to the use made of such highways. Although primarily a property tax, it is made to operate as a privilege tax, for such vehicles are prohibited from using the public highways until the tax is paid.
Classification of trucks using public highways prerogative of legislature.
2. It is the prerogative of the legislature to classify property for the purpose of taxation. Placing trucks engaged in commercial freighting on regular time or route schedules in one class and all other trucks using the public highways in another, amounts to a legislative finding that there was a sufficient difference in the use made of the public highways to justify the difference in classification, and the courts cannot say that there is no basis of fact for the finding.
1. See Licenses, 37 C.J. p. 171, § 9.
2. See Licenses, 37 C.J. p. 203, § 53; Taxation, 37 Cyc. pp 746, 747.
1. See note in 1 L.R.A.(N.S.) 215; 37 L.R.A.(N.S.) 440; 52 L.R.A.(N.S.) 949; L.R.A. 1915D, 322; 17 R.C.L. p. 504; 3 R.C.L. Supp. p. 697; 4 R.C.L. Supp. p. 1137.
Jamison, Stinchfield & Mackall, for appellants.
Clifford L. Hilton, Attorney General, James E. Markham, Deputy Attorney General, and Ernest C. Carman, Assistant Attorney General, for respondent.
Appeal from an order sustaining a demurrer to an alternative writ of mandamus requiring the defendant as registrar of motor vehicles to issue to the relators a certificate of registration for the year 1925 for a certain motor truck specified therein or show cause why he should not do so.
Article 16 of the Constitution creates a trunk highway system for the state and devotes the proceeds of the tax imposed on motor vehicles using the highways to the construction, improvement and maintenance of such highways.
Section 3 of this article reads in part:
"The legislature is hereby authorized to provide, by law, for the taxation of motor vehicles, using the public streets and highways of the State, on a more onerous basis than other personal property; provided, however, that any such tax on motor vehicles shall be in lieu of all other taxes thereon, except wheelage taxes."
Pursuant to this authority the legislature enacted that
The amendment to this statute, made by chapter 299, p. 376, L. 1925, does not go into effect until January 1, 1926.
It is conceded that the truck in question was engaged in commercial freighting between the cities of Minneapolis and St. Cloud on a regular time and route schedule. The relators tendered a tax of 2 3/4 per centum of its value and demanded a registration certificate. Defendant refused to issue the certificate unless a tax of ten per centum of value was paid.
The Constitution in article 9, section 1, provides: "Taxes shall be uniform upon the same class of subjects." The relators contend that taxing trucks engaged in commercial freighting "on regular time or route schedules" at ten per centum of value, and trucks engaged in such freighting, but not on regular time or route schedules at 2 3/4 per centum of value, violates this requirement, and is an unlawful discrimination against them. It is difficult to see how or wherein they are discriminated against. Trucks engaged in commercial freighting which are operated on regular time or route schedules are put in one class; those which are not operated on such schedules in another. It is beyond question that the relators may place their truck in either class at their own option. Where a person has a free choice and of his own volition places his property in a particular class, he is hardly in position to claim discrimination because that class is subjected to burdens not imposed upon another class in which he could have placed it, and in which he may still place it if he chooses to do so. Th sole reason for placing or keeping the relators' truck in the class of trucks operating on a time and route schedule is to secure advantages not possessed by trucks in the other class. Unless they deemed such advantages sufficient to outweigh the additional burdens, they would not keep their truck in that class.
The relators insist that the tax imposed by the act is a property tax only, and that the fact that a truck operates over the public highways on a regular time and route schedule, furnishes no reasonable ground for taxing it at a different rate than is imposed on trucks not operating on such a schedule.
The tax is imposed to provide funds for constructing and maintaining...
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