Raymond v. Raymond

• Decision Date: 06 July 1982
• Citation: 447 A.2d 70
• Court: Maine Supreme Court
• Parties: Constance L. RAYMOND v. Laurier T. RAYMOND, Jr.

Page 70

447 A.2d 70

Constance L. RAYMOND v. Laurier T. RAYMOND, Jr.

Supreme Judicial Court of Maine.

Argued June 14, 1982.

Decided July 6, 1982.

Kurtz & Myers, P. A., Theodore H. Kurtz (orally), South Paris, for plaintiff.

Marshall, Raymond, Beliveau, Dionne & Bonneau, Judith W. Andrucki (orally), Lewiston, for defendant.

Before McKUSICK, C. J., NICHOLS, CARTER and WATHEN, JJ., and DUFRESNE, A. R. J.

WATHEN, Justice.

The parties in this case were divorced in January, 1980 by a decree entered in Superior Court, Androscoggin County. The decree, which incorporates an agreement of the parties and subsequent revisions in chambers, provided:

"support ... in the amount of $1,350. per month commencing Jan. 1, 1980. Said payment includes $200. towards the support of minor child, and $1,150 as alimony toward the support of Constance L. Raymond. Said periodic payments shall continue for five years from January 1, 1980, but shall terminate on the death of Constance Raymond, should that first occur."

In the matter now before the Court the defendant moved to suspend the decree for alimony on the grounds that plaintiff had remarried. The motion was heard and denied, and defendant appeals that decision. We deny the appeal. The issue raised is whether plaintiff's remarriage requires that defendant's obligation to pay alimony be terminated.

In 1945 in Bubar v. Plant, 141 Me. 407, 410, 44 A.2d 732, this Court discussed the impact of the remarriage of the receiving spouse on the obligation to pay alimony We think that the correct rule is that the remarriage of a divorced wife does not of itself terminate her right to alimony, but that it does make out a prima facie case which requires the court to end it, in the absence of proof of some extraordinary circumstance justifying its continuance. It is a question in which public policy plays an important part; and it is against public policy in the ordinary case for one man to be supporting the wife of another who has himself assumed the legal obligation for her support.

Defendant argues that Bubar required the trial court to suspend alimony in this case. We disagree.

Preliminarily, we point out that public policy concerning marriage and divorce has not remained static since 1945. The advent of no fault divorce, the effective recognition of equality of the sexes, and recent changes in the federal income tax law concerning alimony have combined to make any categorical statements of public policy concerning these matters ill-advised. In 1979, against the backdrop of ever-changing societal values concerning divorce, the Maine legislature recognized the need for flexibility in addressing the issue of alimony and amended 19 M.R.S.A. § 721 (1981) to provide:

This section shall not limit the court, by full or partial agreement of the parties or otherwise, from awarding alimony for a limited period, from awarding alimony which may not be increased regardless of subsequent events or conditions, or otherwise limiting or conditioning the alimony in any manner on terms that the court deems just.

Although Bubar's policy of termination of alimony upon remarriage may retain vitality in some instances, ¹ the statute makes clear that under appropriate circumstances (one of which may be the agreement of the parties) the court may deem it just to decree that alimony continue past remarriage. Such a considered determination by...