Raynes v. City of Leavenworth
| Decision Date | 09 January 1992 |
| Docket Number | No. 56382-9,56382-9 |
| Citation | 118 Wn.2d 237,821 P.2d 1204 |
| Court | Washington Supreme Court |
| Parties | John and Alice RAYNES, husband and wife, Appellants, v. CITY OF LEAVENWORTH, a municipal corporation; Leavenworth City Council; Raymond Regan and Sarah Regan, husband and wife; and Icicle Inn Creek Corporation, a Washington corporation, Respondents. |
J. Richard Aramburu, Jeffrey M. Eustis, Seattle, for appellants.
Terrence M. McCauley, Leavenworth City Atty., Cashmere, for respondents.
Appellants challenge the adoption of a zoning ordinance amending the City of Leavenworth (City) zoning code on the basis that the proceedings violated the appearance of fairness doctrine. We hold that the appearance of fairness doctrine does not apply because the proceedings were legislative, and affirm the trial court in all respects.
Leavenworth, Washington is a tourist-oriented city located on Highway 2 on the east slope of the Cascade Mountains. To promote tourism, the Leavenworth Area Comprehensive Plan provides that certain areas of town, designated the Tourist Commercial (TC) District, be reserved for motels, restaurants, service stations, and similar uses to accommodate auto-oriented patrons. The TC district consists of 38 acres of land, out of a total city area of 616 acres.
John and Alice Raynes own a unit in the Rothenburg Condominiums, located in the TC district. Raymond Regan is purchasing a 5.8-acre parcel, adjacent to the Raynes' condominium, from Karl Rieche. Rieche is an agent with Ballinger-West Real Estate, Inc., the listing broker, and is the agent selling his own property. The sale is contingent on Regan obtaining the necessary permits for construction and operation of a recreational vehicle (RV) park.
Eugene Beard, a member of the Leavenworth City Council, is also a real estate agent at Ballinger-West. His income from Ballinger-West is derived entirely from commissions generated from sales of property in which he acted as either the listing or the selling agent. His contract with Ballinger-West does provide, however, that he "work diligently and with his best efforts to sell, lease or rent any and all Real Estate listed with the Broker ..." Moreover, it obligates him to act in such a way as to promote business and good will for Ballinger-West. Councilman Beard's participation in the adoption of a zoning amendment is challenged by the Raynes.
In April 1988, Regan submitted an application and environmental checklist to the City to rezone the 5.8-acre piece of land in the TC district as an RV Park Planned Development District. The proposal would have rezoned one specific parcel of land and altered the City's zoning map. The city administrator, Michael Cecka, pursuant to the State Environmental Policy Act of 1971 (SEPA), RCW 43.21C, determined that the proposed RV park would create no significant adverse environmental impact. The Raynes appealed this determination to the City Council, and the Council met to hear the SEPA appeal on July 26, 1988.
Prior to deliberations, City Attorney Terrence McCauley informed the Council that the appearance of fairness doctrine applied to the proceedings. Three City Council members recused themselves. Councilmember Beard disqualified himself because of his association with the realtor involved in the sale of the property on which the RV park was to be located. The remaining councilmembers set August 16, 1988 to hear the appeal.
In August 1988, the Raynes' SEPA appeal was denied. The City Council did not reach the merits of the Regan RV park proposal, however. In response to advice from the city attorney, and at the urging of the Raynes' lawyer, the Council determined that Regan's application for an RV Park Planned Development District rezone was not an appropriate method to add an RV park to the Tourist Commercial District. Both Regan and another RV park applicant, Icicle Inn Creek Corporation, withdrew their applications.
In October 1988, Regan submitted an application asking the City to amend the zoning ordinance to permit RV parks as a conditional use in the TC district. The City responded by holding the appropriate series of hearings and also conducted a citizen survey of opinions regarding the ordinance. The City then drafted a zoning amendment which would permit RV parks in the TC district as a conditional use. The amendment provided detailed minimum requirements for each RV park, and also provided for direct review of each proposal by the Board of Adjustment through the usual process for obtaining a conditional use permit.
The Council directed the city administrator to prepare an environmental checklist for the proposed amendment. In March 1989, Cecka filed the prepared checklist. The checklist reflected that within the TC district, there were five parcels that were over the 2-acre size required by the ordinance, accounting for a total of 21.3 acres of land which had the potential for development into RV parks if the amendment were passed. Cecka went on to note that of the potential parcels, only two--the Regan site and the Icicle Inn Creek property--were "reasonable sites with potential for generating RV park conditional use permit applications under this ordinance." Cecka concluded that the proposed amendment presented no significant adverse environmental impact. The Raynes appealed the determination of nonsignificance, and asked that the City file an Environmental Impact Statement.
On March 28, 1989 the Leavenworth City Council met to consider the RV park amendment and the related SEPA appeal filed by the Raynes. The Raynes' attorney, J. Richard Aramburu, addressed the Council and requested that Councilmember Beard recuse himself from consideration of the amendment. Although he conceded that the proceedings were legislative, Mr. Aramburu stated that he believed the appearance of fairness doctrine applied to the proceedings because the amendment was closely involved with specific parcels of property. Mr. McCauley responded by advising the councilmembers that because the proceedings contemplated were legislative in nature, the appearance of fairness doctrine did not apply. Councilman Beard declined to step down.
The City Council then denied the Raynes' SEPA appeal and passed zoning ordinance 840 by a 4-to-2 vote. Councilman Beard voted with the majority in each case.
The Raynes filed a complaint in Chelan County Superior Court. The complaint requested a statutory and a constitutional writ of review, 1 and a declaratory judgment that the ordinance was void because the appearance of fairness doctrine was violated, and because there was an actual conflict of interest.
The trial court denied the application for writ of review. The court found that the actions of the City Council were legislative and not judicial within the meaning of RCW 7.16.040, the writ of review statute, and that the actions were also legislative within the meaning of RCW 42.36.010 and RCW 42.36.030, the appearance of fairness statute. The court found further that the appearance of fairness doctrine did not apply to the actions of the Council on March 28, 1989, and finally that the Raynes had an adequate remedy at law through their declaratory judgment action.
In the declaratory judgment action, no discovery was undertaken, and the parties brought cross motions for summary judgment on the basis of affidavits previously submitted to the court. The trial court ruled that the appearance of fairness doctrine did not apply to the actions of the City Council because those actions were legislative, and that Councilman Beard did not have a conflict of interest when he voted on the amendment. The court dismissed the Raynes' declaratory judgment action.
This case is now before the court on the Raynes' direct appeal. We affirm.
Because of the circumstances of this case, we are confronted by a peculiar coincidence. Both the propriety of issuing a writ of review and the applicability of the appearance of fairness doctrine turn on our determination that the proceedings to amend the Leavenworth zoning code were either legislative or quasi-judicial in nature. This determination of the nature of the proceedings before us is fundamental to our ability to make the appropriate decision. If the actions before us are legislative in nature, great deference should be afforded them. It is not our role to substitute our judgment for that of duly elected officials. Moreover, the separation of powers doctrine is implicated in this determination. Standow v. Spokane, 88 Wash.2d 624, 630, 564 P.2d 1145, appeal dismissed, 434 U.S. 992, 98 S.Ct. 626, 54 L.Ed.2d 487 (1977). In addition, the appropriate remedy when legislative action is considered unjust is political. However, if those actions were indeed quasi-judicial, then we may examine them as we do actions of any trial court charged with error.
No clear line can be drawn between judicial, legislative and administrative functions of local decisionmaking bodies. Judicial actions have no single essential attribute. Instead, a number of factors are important to the determination. If a given proceeding of a decisionmaking body has a sufficient number of relevant characteristics, it may be considered quasi-judicial in nature. Taggart v. State, 118 Wash.2d 195, 822 P.2d 243 (1992), argued October 16, 1990. Thus, no test should be rigidly applied. Rather, a flexible approach should be employed which gives ample consideration to the functions being performed by the decisionmaking body.
Here, this inquiry is twofold. First, we must determine if the proceedings were similar enough to judicial proceedings to merit judicial review through the writ of review process. Second, we must determine if the proceedings were similar enough to judicial proceedings to warrant the special protections called for by the appearance of fairness doctrine. We answer both inquiries in the negative.
The Raynes argue that the trial court incorrectly denied...
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